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First, then, it must be said that in those days things were achieved scarcely inferior to the
construction of the Tower of Babel, although as regards divine approval, at least
according to human reckoning, strongly at variance with that work. 1 say this because
during the early days of building a scholar wrote a book in which he drew the comparison
in the most exhaustive way. In it he tried to prove that the Tower of Babel failed to reach
its goal, not because of the reasons universally advanced, or at least that among those
recognised reasons the most important of all was not to be found. His proofs were drawn
not merely from written documents and reports; he also claimed to have made enquiries
on the spot, and to have discovered that the tower failed and was bound to fail because of
the weakness of the foundation.
Franz Kafka, “The Great Wall and the Tower of Babel”
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ABSTRACT
AMERICAN PRAGMATISM AND DEMOCRATIC FAITH
FEBRUARY 2006
ROBERT J. LACEY, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT
M.P.P., GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Jerome M. Mileur
My dissertation is a study of the origins and legacy of participatory democratic thought in
America. In June 1962, the Students for a Democratic Society signed the Port Huron
Statement, in which they articulated their vision of citizens participating directly in the
governance of their country and putting an end to many intractable problems in American
life, including racial discrimination, poverty, and the paranoid logic of cold war policy
(e.g., brinkmanship). The New Left ideal of participatory democracy captured the
imagination of a generation of political activists in the late 1950s and early 1960s but
never planted a firm foothold in American political soil. Largely dismissed as an
unviable idea in such a large country, it had limited influence on the development of
political institutions in the United States and would only receive serious consideration
from political theorists. To understand why participatory democracy was so short-lived, I
argue that one must trace its intellectual origins to the pragmatists who in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries laid the foundation for this ethos. Thus, I focus
on the writings of the early pragmatist philosophers, including Charles Sanders Peirce,
William James, and John Dewey. Next, I turn to the legacy of participatory democratic
thought and examine the work of Sheldon Wolin and Benjamin Barber, two
contemporary political theorists who, respectively, represent radical and mainstream
versions of this idea. Finally, I argue that once situated within the pragmatist tradition,
participatory democratic thought proves not only impracticable but also theoretically
untenable. This might compel political scientists to revisit questions about participation,
civic education, citizenship, civil society, and representation.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In June of 1962, the Students for Democratic Society (SDS) released their
founding manifesto, the Port Huron Statement. Written at a United Auto Workers retreat
in Port Huron, Michigan, it reflected the authors’ growing disenchantment with the world
they lived in. Racial bigotry in the South and the paranoid logic of the Cold War, in
particular, led them to question the status quo — the political and social institutions that
most Americans accepted, even embraced, without question. Politicians invoked the
American principles of democracy, liberty, and equality, but these terms rang
increasingly hollow to those in SDS. Blacks were still disenfranchised and oppressed in
the South, despite the growing popularity of the civil rights movement. The entire nation
dangled over the precipice of total annihilation and had little, if any, control over the
direction of American foreign policy. The elites of the country had a firm grip on the
pillars of power, and they alone controlled the nation’s destiny, a destiny that portended
disaster: stark inequality, poverty, racial discrimination, greed, alienation, war, famine,
and perhaps world annihilation. Much to the consternation of the SDS, most Americans
were complacent because they enjoyed unprecedented prosperity. But beneath this
veneer of satisfaction, the SDS believed, lurked a specter of widespread anxiety.
The authors were in part reacting against the 1 950s, a decade often associated
with repressive conformity and an almost military-like regimentation, but they were
particularly agitated by the lack of popular control over political institutions. While most
of the country remained apathetic about, or unaware of, their political impotence, the
SDS became convinced that only “participatory democracy” could restore sanity to
politics. Conventional democratic institutions, which at best obliquely represented the
will of the people, were woeftilly inadequate. Participatory democracy, on the other
hand, meant that each individual share[s] in those social decisions detennining the
quality and direction of his life; that society be organized to encourage independence in
men and provide the media for their common participation.” All “decision-making of
basic social consequence [would] be carried on by public groupings,” and politics would
create an acceptable pattern ot social relations” and draw “people out of isolation and
into community.” 1
For SDS, participatory democracy represented the panacea for the country’s
social and political ills and led to a world in which their optimistic assumptions about
human nature could be realized. Unlike political thinkers in the liberal tradition, they
believed that man was nearly perfectible, a work in progress that could reach untold
moral heights.
We regard men as infinitely precious and possessed of unfulfilled
capacities for reason, freedom, and love...We oppose, too, the doctrine of
human incompetence because it rests essentially on the modem fact that
men have been “competently” manipulated into incompetence—we see
little reason why men cannot meet with increasing skill the complexities
and responsibilities of their situation, if society is organized not for
minority, but for majority, participation in decision-making. 2
SDS believed liberal doubts about the wisdom of the people and fear of majority tyranny
to be unfounded and elitist. For them, every man possessed this unfulfilled potential. If
1
“Port Huron Statement.”
2
Ibid. In his memoirs, Tom Hayden describes how at the last minute the drafters of the
Port Huron statement substituted the words “precious” for “perfectible” and “unfulfilled
for “infinite.” See Hayden, Reunion
,
96.
2
only he were situated in the proper political and social context, wherein he had ample
opportunity for truly deliberative political participation, man could cultivate his unlimited
capacity for goodness and empathy, for thinking beyond narrow self-interest. They
believed that participatory democracy was both educational and enlightening, that
deliberation with others in the community would lift the veil of ignorant selfishness and
reveal to man, in all their stark reality, the experiences and needs of his fellow men.
Participatory democracy was transformative, turning isolated, perpetually inward-looking
souls into citizens who considered communal good over private interest.
This is not to suggest that people must submit their individual identities to the
collective. To the contrary, out of their political and social involvement, individuals
would in part find “meaning in personal life” and also a way to reach their “unrealized
potential for self-cultivation, self-direction, self-understanding, and creativity.”3 Though
undoubtedly influenced by Marxist alienation theory, the early SDS members were not
adherents of communism or any of its twentieth-century manifestations. Indeed, the free
individual was paramount in their unwaveringly humanist judgment. On the other hand,
they also understood the individual self to be malleable and dependent on social relations.
The individual was not subordinate to society, but he was a product of it and thus in many
ways accountable to it. Forcing the individual to submit to the general will, as was seen
in Rousseau’s (and indeed Stalin’s) chilling formulation, robbed man of his dignity and
freedom. But placing the individual in an ideal social and political context, in which he
can ofhis own volition arrive at certain ethical realizations about his role in the greater
community, was a win-win situation: He maintains his personal dignity and freedom
3
Ibid.
3
while at the same time he learns he has the responsibility to help make a better and more
just society. Participatory democracy, then, promotes the general welfare and the moral
development of each individual. Society is more just, and each individual happier.
A nascent student organization, with only 800 dues-paying members and a
handful of functioning chapters in the north, the SDS had hubristic ambitions, its leaders
somehow convinced they could effect a radical transformation of American values. Only
a few dozen student activists were in attendance for those five days, most of them hailing
from the University ot Michigan and a few others colleges in the midwest, yet the Port
Huron Statement has become so legendary for defining the political values that animated
1 960s activism that literally thousands claim to have been there. Still, the Port Huron
gathering represents an important moment in the history of American political thought,
for it gave voice to the idea of participatory democracy which captured the imagination of
a whole generation of student activists. It ceased to be an empty intellectual concept, the
lost relic ot civic republicanism, and galvanized a movement. Sharon Jeffrey, a
participant at Port Huron, said that “the key theme there was participatory democracy,
and this was something that somehow had a resonance to it.”4 According to another
participant, Bob Ross, their “vision of participatory democracy” was “that people,
separately and together, have the power to direct the key institutions of the society, power
to control their own lives.” This meant, said Steve Max, yet another attending activist,
that
democracy was something you go out and do everyday, and it wasn't
merely voting for representatives every couple of years...You found ways
of implementing democracy every time you got up in the morning. You
4
“Rebels with a Cause.” (Film.)
4
didn't wait for the government to pass a civil rights law if you couldn’t get
into the barber shop. You opened the doors and went in, and that was the
essence ot what participatory democracy was about.
s
Not surprisingly, members of SDS drew inspiration from the civil rights movement and
especially the activities ot the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC),
which organized peaceful sit-ins and demonstrations to protest racial segregation in the
south. As the civil rights movement made unmistakably clear, people had no choice but
to take direct action when social and political institutions controlled by elites failed to
address their grievances and even went so far as to safeguard the practices of bigotry and
hatred. Many in SDS became Freedom Riders, spending their summers in the south to
help organize voter registration drives and participate in demonstrations, but their
grievances extended far beyond racial injustice. They believed that the problems of race,
poverty, social and economic inequality, and nuclear proliferation—to name a few—were
symptoms of the more fundamental issue of citizen complacency and apathy, of mind-
numbing acquiescence to a system controlled by self-regarding elites. Only direct
political participation could awaken the dormant American public from its slumber, and
SDS activists were audacious enough to believe in their ability to help make this happen.
Unlike the old left, which received its inspiration from the dogmatic assertions of
Marx and Lenin, SDS did not believe that people should ever blindly embrace the values
or truths handed down to them by previous generations or venerated figures of the past.
Though SDS shared many concerns with the old left, it believed that communities had to
arrive at truths and principles on their own, through a painstaking and deliberative
process. Rather than awaiting orders from a revolutionary vanguard, a community had to
5
Ibid.
5
believe in its own ability to construct values by which it would willingly abide. “The
idea that you made your own values as a group was a new thing,” said Steve Max. “That
values weren’t just inherited and just weren’t transmitted from the older generation but
that people could actually sit down and work out an ethical framework as an
organization, and then go and try to live that way was not something that was popularly
in the culture.’’6 Though Max characterized this faith in participatory democracy as a
“new thing,” it did not emerge in a vacuum. Given the responsibility of writing an initial
draft of the manifesto that would later become the Port Huron Statement, Tom Hayden
has cited a number of influences, among whom the most important were New Left
thinkers C. Wright Mills and Arnold Kaufman and the pragmatist philosopher John
Dewey.
7
Perhaps the most immediate inspiration for the Port Huron Statement was a short
essay by C. Wright Mills entitled “Letter to the New Left” published in The New Left
Review in I960.' In this brief missive, Mills urged young intellectuals to accept the
mantle of political radicalism and to reject the status quo and the complacent acceptance
of the prevailing liberal democratic ethos. Members of SDS felt as if Mills had been
speaking directly to them, which served to intensify their sense of urgency. In his
6
Ibid.
n
See Hayden, Reunion
,
42, 75-81; Hayden and Flacks, “The Port Huron Statement at
40.” In his memoirs Hayden also cites Albert Camus as an important influence on the
SDS and his drafting of the Port Huron Statement, but the French existentialist had less
impact on their democratic thought and more on their view of the “absurdity” of the
human condition. Inspired especially by their reading of The Plague
,
they perceived a
“desperate weariness” and “sense of exile and deprivation” infecting humankind. But
they had to turn to Mills, Kaufman, and Dewey for democratic solutions to this “plague."
8 Hayden and Flacks, “The Port Huron Statement at 40”; Amowitz, “A Mills Revival?”
6
memoirs, Hayden describes Mills as “the oracle of the New Left,” for the renegade
professor ot sociology at Columbia University offered a devastating critique of the
establishment and its elite-driven institutions. Especially influential was The Power
Elite, in which Mills argued that real power in this country was vested in the hands of a
relatively small number of elites occupying positions of power in the corporate, political,
and military worlds. He understood the power elite not as a permanent ruling class, such
as an aristocracy, but as a loose network of corporate leaders and other high-level
decision-makers. Though these elites did not work together in a conspiratorial fashion,
they shared common interests, especially in denying average citizens the power to effect
social change. Though he offered no easy solution to this problem, Mills argued that the
old leftist approach, dictatorship of the proletariat, would only replace one group of elites
with another. Instead, he called for the radical democratization of society, in which
“everyone vitally affected by a social decision, regardless of its sphere, would have a
voice in that decision and a hand in its administration.” 10 His hope was that America
could recapture the intense level of public spiritedness and civic engagement once
enjoyed in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—and praised so eloquently by
the famous visitor from France, Alexis de Tocqueville. Sadly, he would not live to
witness his influence on a generation of activists. He died in March of 1962, three
months before the retreat in Port Huron.
Arnold Kaufman, a professor of philosophy at the University of Michigan who
taught Tom Hayden and other members of SDS and shared their admiration for Mills,
9
Mills, The Power Elite.
10
Mills, The New Men ofPower: America 's Labor Leaders, 252-53.
7
was also an important influence on the emerging New Left; he inspired many of his
students with his lectures on “participatory democracy”—a term he often receives credit
for coining." New Left historian James Miller suggests that Kaufman’s influence on the
Port Huron Statement can hardly be overestimated. 12 Like his student acolytes, Kaufman
denied that human beings were incapable of assuming the responsibilities of self-
governance and maintained that democracy had the power to transform its participants,
both morally and intellectually. “The main justifying function of participation,” he
argued, is development of man s essential powers—inducing human dignity and respect,
and making men responsible, by developing their powers of deliberate action.” 13 While
Kaufman accepted the fallibility of the people, even going so far as to suggest that “men
do not always know what is best for them,” he refused to accept the assertion that a
coterie of experts would have superior knowledge with which to rule wisely. 14 In the
end, he considered it quite reasonable to assume that a participatory democracy would
provide citizens the education necessary to “judge men and policies with reasonable
intelligence, and also initiate policy in suitable spheres.” 15 That said, Kaufman did not
wish to dismantle traditional institutions in which bureaucrats and elites operated but,
1
1
Hayden and Flacks, “The Port Huron Statement at 40”; Hayden, Reunion
,
42; Mattson,
Intellectuals in Action
,
197.
“ Miller,
“Democracy is in the Streets From Port Huron to the Siege ofChicago, 95.
13
Kaufman, “Human Nature and Participatory Democracy.” Reprinted in Connolly, ed.,
The Bias ofPluralism, 198.
14
Kaufman, The Radical Liberal, 58-59. See also Kaufman, “Human Nature and
Participatory Democracy,” 191-93.
15 Kaufman, “Two Cheers for American Education," 23.
8
instead, sought to “enrich the Welfare State by increasing the element of participatory
democracy. ,l6 He recognized the many achievments of the centralized and bureaucratic
state and argued that opportunities for citizen participation should supplement rather than
replace it. His ultimate aim was to reconcile participatory democracy with New Deal
liberalism.
In many ways, Kaufman stands as one of the most important figures in the history
of the New Left, it largely forgotten. Unlike Mills, who died prematurely in 1962,
Kaufman lived to experience the rise of 1960s campus activism. He received an
invitation to participate at Port Huron, where he proudly worked alongside many of his
students and former students and helped create a founding document that echoed many of
his ideas. A few years later he assumed a leadership role of his own, organizing teach-ins
against the war in Vietnam, first at the University of Michigan in March of 1965 and then
nationwide two months later. These early and highly successful teach-ins proved
groundbreaking, paving the way for their proliferation on campuses throughout the
country. Kaufman saw the teach-in as participatory democracy in action, an opportunity
for teachers, students, and members of the campus community at large to engage in
lengthy and fruitful discussion about vital issues affecting them all. Intellectuals served a
particularly useful purpose, creating a forum where citizens can learn useful information,
express their opinions, relate their experiences, and listen to the perspectives of others.
Kaufman was careful to make sure that teachers limited their efforts to providing
information and facilitating discussion and gave everyone in the community an equal
voice. Exhibiting an immense reserve of energy, Kaufman devoted more and more of his
16
Kaufman, “The Affluent Underdog,” 350.
9
time to political activism. He threw himself into the civil rights movement, helped to
organize the New Democratic Coalition (NDC) in an attempt to move the Democratic
Party leftward, and became the president of his local American Federation of Teachers
union after moving to UCLA in 1969. Unfortunately, Kaufman also met an early demise,
perishing in a plane crash in June of 1971. 17
Though both Mills and Kaufman played important roles in shaping the
participatory democratic ethos that animated a generation of student radicals, we must go
back a step or two further in history to locate the intellectual origins of the New Left and
its founding manifesto. In developing their radical conceptions of democracy, both Mills
and Kaufman drew heavily on the pragmatist school, especially the work of John Dewey,
a towering figure in American philosophy through the first half of the twentieth century. 18
Both Mills and Kaufman were steeped in the pragmatist tradition and acknowledged their
debt to it. Mills wrote his dissertation on pragmatism and read with particular interest
Dewey's definitive statement on democratic theory, The Public and Its Problems} 9
Kaufman also admired Dewey’s works on political thought and argued that a defense of
participatory democracy must rest, at least partly, on pragmatist grounds. 20 Long before
Mills, Kaufman, or SDS came on the scene, Dewey espoused the kind of participatory
17
Mattson, Intellectuals in Action
,
197-207, 210, 218-19. See also Kaufman, “Teach-Ins:
New Force for the Times.”
18
See Mattson, Intellectuals in Action, 12-1A, 191-96.
19
Mill’s dissertation was published and entitled Sociology and Pragmatism. See
Mattson, Intellectuals in Action, 72-73.
20
Ibid., 191-92, 195-96.
10
democracy for which the New Left would have such boundless enthusiasm, and he often
invoked pragmatist ideas in his efforts.
Accordingly, the first objective of this work is to locate the origins of
participatory democracy in the pragmatist tradition. I argue that pragmatism, founded in
the late nineteenth century by Charles Peirce and William James, provided the necessary
intellectual foundation for the democratic ideas advocated more than half a century later
by SDS and the New Left. Often considered America’s first and only native-born
philosophy, pragmatism challenged conventional ideas about truth and human nature. By
maintaining that truth is probabilistic and socially-constructed, that men are mutable and
improvable, and that men are poised for willful action, pragmatism opened the doors for a
radically different understanding of democracy. It meant that human beings could no
longer appeal to an established authority for political and ethical truths, that they must
share the responsibility of creating values and solutions to social problems with their
fellow citizens. Rejecting inherited dogmas and first principles, citizens must employ
democratic methods to attain socially useful knowledge, and they must believe that they
can always better themselves and meet the challenges of group deliberation and
cooperation. While liberals have long argued that democracy unrestrained can quite
easily degenerate into mob rule and thus become inimical to liberty, advocates of
participatory democracy have seen democracy as an unqualified good, an ideal way of
life for all citizens. Rather than criticize this position on liberal-elitist or Madisonian
grounds, I find it far productive to understand it on its own terms and explore its
intellectual origins. Throughout this work, my aim is to take participatory democratic
thought seriously, even to approach it with a certain measure of sympathy. All along, I
11
worked under the assumption that exploring the pragmatist origins of participatory
democracy, unfettered by any preconceived notions about it, could help shed light on this
theory and enrich our understanding of its underlying assumptions and of its usefulness
and coherence as a theory in today’s world.
This leads to the second objective of this work—to leap forward in time to assess
the legacy of New Left enthusiasm for participatory democracy. More than forty years
after Port Huron, the influence of participatory democratic thought appears limited even
non-existent. Our formal political institutions have remained largely the same since
Dewey began his crusade, and the call for participatory democracy has created neither
formal mechanisms nor public space tor citizen deliberation and decision-making.
Moreover, democratic uprisings have failed to deliver any death blows to the prevailing
system. The American people show little interest in opportunities for political
participation; the level of political ignorance, apathy, and complacency seems higher than
ever. Studies show citizens are less knowledgeable about, and interested in, public affairs
than they were a generation ago, and voter turnout has reached all-time lows, barely
exceeding 50 percent of the voting-age population in recent presidential election years. 21
The New England town meeting, one of the few shining examples of participatory
democracy in the United States, has on the whole experienced decreases in attendance. 22
21
See R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, and Patterson, The Vanishing Voter.
22
R. Putnam, Bowling Alone, 42-43. Putnam cites the Roper Social and Political Trends
surveys, which indicate that the number of Americans who attended at least one public
meeting on town or school affairs in the previous year declined by 40 percent between
1973 and 1994.
12
Even Tom Hayden and Dick Flacks, two principal authors of the Port Huron Statement,
admitted recently that their “dreams have hardly been realized.”23
Though the dreams of true participatory democracy may never have been realized,
the spirit of John Dewey has permeated the American political, social, and intellectual
landscape. In the last forty years nearly every political and social institution in America
has undergone some form of democratization—a downward shifting of power from elites
to the rank-and-file—under the very premise that “the people” should have more direct
say in decision-making. We have become increasingly wary of leadership and elite-
driven decision-making in this country, and the academic New Left in particular has
fueled this line of thinking. But we can find the legacy of the New Left most readily
within the margins of academia. Intellectual heavy-weights Sheldon Wolin, C. B.
Macpherson, Robert Dahl, Carole Pateman, Benjamin Barber, Jane Mansbridge, and
Amy Gutmann to name just a few—have all called for deepening democracy, arguing
that liberalism and representative democracy have done more to protect the prerogatives
of a bloated plutocracy than to safeguard the rights of the truly vulnerable, more to
consolidate the power of an established elite than to promote political equality and
fairness. Some of these thinkers regard all institutions and refonn efforts with suspicion,
while others believe it is possible to change the system from the inside without
compromising oneself. But they all reject liberalism, share a concern about the political
complacency and passivity of most people today, and believe that our current crises
demand a significant devolution of power into the hands of average citizens. Their
influence, even if confined within the gates of academia, invites a careful analysis of the
23
Hayden and Flacks, “The Port Huron Statement at 40.”
13
assumptions undergirding their thought and an assessment of its relevance and viability in
twenty-first century America.
It might be useful to describe my work here as a before- and after-picture of
participatory democracy, an idea that captivated a generation of activists and inspired,
ever so briefly, the New Left movement. I first turn my attention to American
pragmatism, which planted the genn of participatory democracy and nurtured it from its
embryonic state to early adolescence. I then jump to the present to see what happened to
participatory democracy, an idea that never seemed to reach adulthood, that either met its
untimely demise or was stricken with a debilitating condition that forced it into reclusion.
One thing is for certain, in the aftermath of 1960s radicalism, participatory democracy
quickly withered away from the mainstream of American political discourse, only
enjoying serious attention today from a handful of scholars. My aim is to discover why
this occurred. Was the idea so terribly naive and unrealistic that it was bound to recede
into academic obscurity, or was it a viable idea that failed to gain traction because
reactionary forces, personified by Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, overwhelmed it in
the end? 1 conclude in this work that the withdrawal of participatory democracy into
academia seemed preordained from the beginning. Burdened with pragmatist DNA, it
was fated for a short life.
I.
Though William James introduced pragmatism to the world in a 1898 lecture at
the University of California in Berkeley, the philosophy actually emerged as early as
1872, when a number of young intellectuals at Harvard—including James, Charles
Peirce, Chauncey Wright, and Oliver Wendell Holmes—met occasionally to discuss
14
philosophy in the short-lived and ironically named “Metaphysical Club.” It was
“ironically named" because pragmatism was putatively a rejection of metaphysics—of
abstract sources of moral or intellectual authority. In the wake of Darwin and Nietzsche,
modernity suffered from what historian John Diggins has called a “crisis of knowledge
and authority," and pragmatism offered a solution without invoking old and outdated
ideas .
24 Any attempt to describe pragmatism in brief will undoubtedly be inadequate, as
it embodies many variants and subtly different approaches. But Louis Menand, whose
Pulitzer prize-winning The Metaphysical Club has revived popular and scholarly interest
in pragmatism, has perhaps come the closest to capturing its essence in a few words!
If we strain out the differences, personal and philosophical, they had with
one another, we can say that what these four thinkers had in common was
not a group of ideas, but a single idea—an idea about ideas. They all
believed that ideas are not “out there waiting to be discovered, but are
tools—like forks and knives and microchips—that people devise to cope
with the world in which they find themselves. They believed that ideas
are produced not by individuals, but by groups of individuals—that ideas
are social. They believed that ideas do not develop according to some
inner logic of their own, but are entirely dependent, like germs, on their
human carriers and the environment. And they believed that since ideas
are provisional responses to particular and unreproducible circumstances,
their survival depends not on their immutability but on their adaptability. 2
^
Of course, to suggest there is an “essence” to pragmatism belies what it is trying to do,
for its adherents reject essences; they reject the notion that there is an a priori truth or an
objective reality of which, ifwe work hard enough, our minds can produce a mirror
image. A priori truth may in fact exist, but we do not have the capacity to attain it. No
matter how much logic, reason, prayer, meditation, or study we devote to our quest for
24
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truth (a strategy metaphysicians and philosophers have pursued relentlessly and
fruitlessly tor centuries), we will never find it outside or independent of our earthly
experience. For truth, according to pragmatist thought, does not exist pnor to human
experience; rather, truth is constituted by it. Thus “we don’t act because we have ideas;
we have ideas because we must act.”26
William James described ideas as “rules tor action’’ which become true if they
give us satisfactory results, if they have what he called “cash-value.”
The great assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means essentially
an inert static relation...
Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. ‘Grant an
idea or belief to be true,' it says, ‘what concrete difference will its being
true make in anyone’s actual life? How will the truth be realized? What
experiences will be different from those which would obtain if the belief
were false? What, in short, is the truth's cash-value in experiential terms?
The moment pragmatism asks this question it sees the answer:
True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and
verify. False ideas are those that we cannot.
.
.
The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth
happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is
in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its
veri-fication?
1
Truth is embedded in life experience. Like scientists we must subject truth claims to a
process of verification. Truths are always tentative and must undergo re-testing as new
experiential data arrives. “Intellectualists,” as James calls anyone who is not a
pragmatist, hold that a true idea must correspond with some immutable and independent
reality. Pragmatists, on the other hand, argue that a true idea must only correspond with
our experience of reality. A truth is an idea that works. I do not, for example, accuse my
26
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neighbors of being noisy because they have met some a priori condition of noisiness;
rather, I make this accusation because their loud music and foot-stomping disrupted my
concentration while reading William James. I experienced this disruption first, and
afterwards applied the term “noisy” to describe my neighbors. My subjective experience,
not objective knowledge about the essence of noisiness, led me to make this particular
truth claim about my neighbors.
James claimed metaphysical truths can be put to this same test: If a particular
religious belief works for me, if it gives me emotional satisfaction, it is true. One would
be hard-pressed to determine conclusively whether Jesus was actually the son of God, but
so long as this belief has cash-value, it is true. The problem is, this instrumental
conception of truth may ultimately prove unsatisfactory. After all, Christianity may have
emotional and psychological benefits, but we only enjoy them if we actually believe its
principles are universal and timeless. If I observe Christianity in the pragmatic spirit, will
it not fail to give me satisfaction and thus fail to meet the pragmatist test of truth? G. K.
Chesterton suggested as much when he said, “Pragmatism is a matter ofhuman needs,
and one of the first of human needs is to be something more than a pragmatist.”28 In
other words, one can and should reject pragmatism on pragmatist grounds. We all need
to believe in a truth that exists outside our subjective experience.
This radical subjectivism has led critics to charge pragmatism with opening the
floodgates to a dangerous relativism—or even a Nietzschean nihilism—where, as
Dostoevsky once described a world without God, everything is permissible." But
28
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pragmatists were no Nietzscheans. While pragmatism shared with Nietzsche a disregard
tor metaphysics, it remained optimistic about the possibility of acquiring truths that
proved useful in our experience. Nietzsche disparaged instrumental conceptions of truth:
We have no organ at all for knowledge, for "truth”: we "know" (or believe
or imagine) precisely as much as may be useful in the interest of the
human herd, the species: and even what is here called "usefulness" is in
the end only a belief, something imagined and perhaps precisely that most
fatal piece of stupidity by which we shall one day perish. ^ 1
Rejecting the quest for truth altogether, Nietzsche argued that science was just another
metaphysic, another religion that mistakenly put truth within man's grasp. Though far
more sanguine than Nietzsche about man's capacity for acquiring truth, pragmatism
embraced a dynamic of uncertainty that could not so easily escape charges of relativism.
For the pragmatists put a great deal of emphasis on science and the scientific method.
Pragmatism democratized the scientific method in its suggestion that we all acquire
knowledge just like a scientist does—by testing and re-testing hypotheses with the
empirical evidence at our disposal. We all generate truths through an endless process of
verification and re-verification. If at some point our truths fail to meet these tests, if they
fail to work as they once did, we must at the very least adapt them and at most scrap them
altogether. All truths are provisional, according to pragmatism, except perhaps for one
—
the method by which those truths are attained.
The English philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote some of the most scathing
indictments of pragmatism. He was quick to detect a democratic spirit inhabiting
pragmatism, but he believed that underneath all its impatience with authority, prejudice,
Nietzsche, The Gay Science
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and certitude lurked “the worship of force.”31 Pragmatism was objectionable to Russell
because its rejection of any kind of absolute truth existing outside of human experience
led to a Nietzschean epistemology of power. Its fatal flaw was hubris—the belief in
man s limitless capacity to improve himself and the world around him. In an astonishing
reversal of the crude Machiavellian motto, “The ends justify the means,” pragmatists
actually suggested that the means justify the ends in their myopic focus on method.32 The
assumption was that concentrating on the correct means, the scientific method, would
automatically yield a conformity of good ends—that we would all naturally come to an
agreement on what is true and right. Russell considered this is a naive and dangerous
assumption. If taken seriously, this refusal to consider ends uptront deracinates man
from any moral foundation, leaving him free to define “the true” simply as that which he
considers “expedient.” 33 Truth simply becomes what works for me, period. And if what
works for me clashes with what works for someone else, there is no objective referee to
whom we can turn to settle our dispute. Russell colorfully described the problem: “In
the absence ot any standard of truth other than success, it seems evident that the familiar
methods of the struggle for existence must be applied to the elucidation of difficult
questions, and that ironclads and Maxim guns must be the ultimate arbiters of
31
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metaphysical truth.”34 Only through violent struggle and bloodshed will people arrive at
an authoritative settlement between competing truths. The victors, those who have
achieved power, will write history. The victors will determine truth.
Russell s argument proved so powerful that it resonated throughout the twentieth
century in the writings of such luminaries as Randolph Bourne, Lewis Mumford.
Mortimer Adler, Robert Hutchins, and Leo Strauss, to name only a few. All these critics
echoed Russell’s discomfort with the pragmatist disavowal of objective truth. Especially
in light of the inconceivable devastation and horrifying atrocities which beset humanity in
the twentieth century, the pragmatist abandonment of objective truth invited sharp
criticism. In the end, it seemed this method-oriented philosophy could not even explain
why Nazism was evil. After all, could not the most enthusiastic and horrifying
participant in the Final Solution, Josef Mengele, have justified his actions on pragmatist
grounds? Could he not have said that the mass destruction of the European Jewry was
true and right because it “worked” for the Nazi cause? Because pragmatism “stands for
no particular results... has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its method,”35 it has no basis
on which to criticize the Nazi cause. Because pragmatism rejects—to use James’s
words—“first things” or “principles,” it can only assess the truth of an idea by the degree
to which that idea fulfills the “last things, fruits, [or] consequences” one seeks,36 no
matter how monstrous or sickening they may be to the rest of us. When the means justify
the ends, everything becomes permissible.
34
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But these seemingly devastating criticisms in part betray a superficial
understanding of pragmatism. While it was true that pragmatism was instrumental and
method-oriented, its critics tended to overlook another essential characteristic of
pragmatism: the quest for truth must be social and public. This fact might be lost on the
cntic who focuses on the work of James, whose individualist streak downplayed the
social aspect of learning in pragmatist thought, but Peirce and Dewey could not stress this
point enough. Indeed, Peirce warns his readers not to take the instrumental
understanding of truth “in too individualistic a sense.”37 Behind Peirce’s epistemology
was his concept of falliblism. A real, objective truth may exist out there, but none of us
is likely to find it on our own. All truth claims and experiences were subject to the law of
errors. Any individual truth claim, based on one person’s subjective experience, is
woelully fallible. But a collective, which draws on the experiences and perceptions of
many people, is less fallible. An advanced student of mathematics and probability
theory, Peirce’s epistemology was explicitly statistical: Add more people to the inquiry
(i.e., increase the sample size), and you are likely to get a little closer to the truth (i.e.,
reduce the amount of standard error).
Peirce believed induction—this very process of sampling specific facts from
which one can infer generalizable truths—was the principal way people acquired reliable
knowledge. In fact, he was suspicious of deductive forms of reasoning. Exposing a
racism he inherited from his father, Peirce liked to use the following syllogism to
demonstrate the unreliability of deduction:
All men are equal in their political rights;
37
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Negroes are men;
Negroes are equal in political rights to whites. 38
The problem with deductive logic, for Peirce, was that all conclusions—such as the
political equality ot blacks—rested on highly suspect and general postulates. Working
from faulty assumptions, induction could at the very start lead us astray in the pursuit of
truth. Deduction moves from the general to the specific, while induction does the
opposite. Induction begins with specific experiences from which one can draw general
conclusions, and this was why Peirce considered it a superior form of knowledge
attainment. Any individual experience is certainly fallible, but a collection of
experiences can begin to shed light on a subject through a process of verification and
validation.
The scientific method involves the testing of hypotheses (or beliefs) time and time
again by a community ot scientists who share information and review each others’ work.
Peirce suggests that all truth inquiries must apply the same rigorous method. That an idea
works or has “cash-value” for one or two people hardly makes it true. An idea must work
for a group ofpeople who, after exhaustive testing and deliberation, reach a consensus
about the utility of an idea.
To satisfy our doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be
found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by
some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has
no effect. Some mystics imagine that they have such a method in a private
inspiration from on high. But that is only a form of the method of tenacity,
in which the conception of truth as something public is not yet developed.
Our external permanency would not be external, in our sense, if it was
restricted in its influence to one individual. It must be something which
affects, or might affect, every man. And, though these affections are
necessarily as various as are individual conditions, yet the method must be
38 •
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such that the ultimate conclusion of every man shall be the same. Such is
the method of science.
Peirce suggests that the “method of 8016006”—unlike our individual experiences—is a
reliable arbiter of truth. It is a “method.
. .by which our beliefs may be determined by
nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our
thinking has no effect." While James agreed that the method of science was vital. Peirce
made a point of stressing that his “conception of truth” must be “public”—otherwise, it
tails to be scientific. It only applied to “one individual” and not to “every man” it “might
affect, then the method is not adequately scientific. Peirce summarized his social and
consensual conception of truth as follows: “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately
agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by truth, and the object represented in
this opinion is the real. Truth, then, is an agreement among a community of inquirers.
To state this in statistical terms: As the number of inquirers grows to constitute the entire
population ot the community in question (i.e., as the sample size approaches the entire
population size), the proximate truth will converge on the actual truth (i.e., the standard
error will become negligible).
Another element of pragmatism to which we should pay attention is its
understanding of habit. Ideas and beliefs are “rules for action,” according to the
pragmatists, and when they work, these rules quickly become engrained in us; they form
into habits. In fact, both Peirce and James suggested that even natural laws are really just
39
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habits. This meant that man had unlimited potential, that he was not restricted by the
immutable laws ot human nature. James maintained that our ideas and beliefs, when
acted upon repeatedly, become habits which are hard-wired in our neural pathways, thus
ensuring that certain stimuli will elicit predictable (or habitual) reactions. Ideas that
become habits cease in a way to be ideas because we do not think about them anymore.
They are automatic. Before long, these habits seem immutable and are often construed as
human nature. But, though habits are indeed difficult to break and thus a “conservative
agent/’4~ there is always the possibility that they can be changed. If a habit ceases to be
useful or a different rule for action proves more useful, individuals or groups can
condition themselves to develop new habits. The extent to which a habit becomes
engrained or hard-wired depends on its reliability, on how well it works—not just for the
individual in question but for others in his community. Man, then, is not rigid and
uneducable; he is not fated by the laws of nature. Rather, he is a “bundle of habits”43 and
has the power to change when more useful ideas materialize.
This of course presupposes that people have a certain degree of agency or free
will, a notion that Peirce and James embraced whole-heartedly. Both argued that ideas
and beliefs serve as guides or rules for action, and that there is no reason for us to think
that these ideas are necessarily pre-detennined. Peirce and James saw an element of
chance or spontaneity in the universe that leaves considerable room for human freedom.
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The universe did not resemble a large and complex machine of which we were an integral
part and whose immutable laws were slowly becoming known to us. Rather, it was an
evolving system whose laws were subject to random mutation. Laws of causation do
exist in the universe, said Peirce, but “conformity to law exists only within a limited
range of events and even there is not perfect, for an element of pure spontaneity or
lawless originality mingles, or at least, must be supposed to mingle, with law
everywhere. It is quite reasonable to believe that human beings who act on their ideas
often reflect this “pure spontaneity or lawless originality.” The influence of Darwinism
cannot be overestimated here, for the pragmatists rejected a mechanistic view of the
universe in favor of chance variation.45
Furthermore, according to the pragmatists, the very process of ascribing meaning
and finding truth in the world requires volition. Both Peirce and James argued that
volition is fundamental to human experience and our ability to make any sense of the
world. We cannot interpret the world around us or be conscious of it without the power
of volition. The general idea of an apple, for example, comes from the total sum of
sensory experiences which our willful actions produce. We do not know a certain object
is an apple until we look at it and notice it is red, pick it up and feel its smoothness, bite
into it and taste its peculiar juiciness, etc. The idea of appleness exists within individual
apples, but the idea will not manifest itself until we exercise our will on those apples (i.e.,
bite them, touch them, inspect them, etc.). Our willful actions test the veracity of our
44
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ideas—in this example, that this particular object is indeed an apple. While it has often
been fashionable to believe that human beings are at the mercy of systems beyond their
control—whether biological, social, or political—pragmatism subscribes to the view that
we meet the world half-way and give it meaning through our actions, that we make the
world and not vice-versa. To believe otherwise is to deny us our humanity.
While Russell and other critics were right to associate pragmatism with power, it
was wrong to argue that power was the arbiter of truth in the pragmatist conception. It
would be more accurate to suggest that, for the pragmatist, power (or will) operates as the
agent ot action and freedom. People arefree so long as they have the power to act on
their ideas to put them into practice. The notion that freedom and power are, in
essence, one and the same became especially manifest in John Dewey’s work. Dewey
represented the next generation of pragmatists and, unlike his predecessors, devoted a
great deal of time and energy to political philosophy, advancing a participatory
democratic theory that anticipated the ideas espoused in the Port Huron Statement. He
summarized his political philosophy most succinctly in The Public and its Problems
(1927), where he argued that “the cure for the ailments of democracy is more
democracy.”46 Whenever his contemporaries bemoaned the inadequacies of democracy
in practice or warned against the tyrannical tendencies of democratic majorities, Dewey
argued that these concerns did not reveal any problems inherent to democracy. Instead,
any problems facing democracies today showed that our political institutions were not
democratic enough. Dewey rejected the purported tension between individual freedom
and the social good, between liberty and democracy, which necessitated restraints on
46
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democratic institutions. All the “ailments” identified by Walter Lippmann and others-
such as widespread popular ignorance about important public issues, or the inability of
democratic governments to address social problems rationally and efficiently—were
primafacie evidence that democracy had not fully set root in the American political soil.
For Dewey, free elections were not sufficient grounds for true democracy. Only when
the people played a direct role in political decision-making, when democratic
participation became a way of life for all citizens, would America become a true
democracy and nation of free citizens.
Democracy was an ethical ideal in which each individual is given the opportunity
to realize his potential for self-governance and his ability to work with his fellow men to
build a community based on reciprocity and mutual respect. Like his intellectual
descendents in the SDS, Dewey rested his democratic ideal on a “faith in the capacity of
human beings for intelligent judgment and action if proper conditions are furnished .”47
He bitterly rejected the notion that individual genius or intelligence develops
autonomously, for every person is socially constructed and thus only as brilliant or
talented as his circumstances allow. Education and learning are inherently social
processes, and democracy itself could become the school from which socially beneficial
ideas emerged and in which individuals realized their potential, both intellectually and
ethically. For Dewey, participatory democracy represented the scientific method par
excellence and an ideal way of life. As James Kloppenberg has suggested, the Deweyan
“democratic community replicates the community of broadly conceived scientific
enquiry... Free and creative individuals, in democratic as in scientific communities,
47 Dewey quoted in Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy , xv.
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collectively test hypotheses to find out what works best. These communities set their
own goals, determine their own tests, and evaluate their results in a spirit of constructive
cooperation.”48 In other words, participatory democracy represents the scientific
community writ large—or science without the professional exclusion. It was the best
means by which to ascertain social truths, and the best ends in which to find self-
fulfillment and happiness. The accusation that pragmatism sacrificed ends in its love
affair with method was wrong, Dewey believed, for pragmatism culminated in
participatory democracy, which was both the means and ends of an improved humanity.
Participatory democracy promoted the common good and empowered the individual.
II.
This Deweyan faith in participatory democracy—in its capacity both to promote
the common good and to transform the individual—rests on three pragmatist tenets. The
first is that truth is probabilistic and socially-determined, never absolute. Man does not
arrive at truth through the use of reason or the pious contemplation of God, nor does he
arrive at truth within the confines of his scholarly hermitage. Instead, men arrive at truth
socially, deliberatively, and experientially, and the more people involved in this rather
unruly and messy process, the closer they get to truth. Displacing Jehovah, Jesus,
Mohammad and even human reason, statistics and the scientific method become the new
gods, the arbiters of truth: by increasing the sample size of competent inquirers who
rigorously apply the scientific method, by allowing more participants to bring their
48
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experiences and knowledge to the fore, we maximize statistical power, reduce the amount
ot standard error, and more accurately approximate the true answer. Put another way, we
must attain truth inductively, sampling a large number of specific experiences from
which we can infer generalizable truths—truths that serve the interests of the entire
collective. We can call this a democratic epistemology
,
49
The second tenet, which flows from the first, is that man himself is a social
construct. In other words, there is no such thing as human nature, nothing in man’s
character that is static or fixed. What at first appears to be nature or law is merely
habit—perhaps deeply entrenched habit—which can ultimately be changed. Man is
eminently mutable and educable and therefore brimming with unlimited potential; he
forever remains a soft piece of clay that can be wrought and re-wrought into near
perfection. Despite what pessimists say, man is not fatally flawed (or irredeemably
wayward). He only awaits a proper education to fulfill his immense capacity for love,
empathy, and moral strength. What constitutes a “proper” education becomes evident
when we recall the first tenet, the democratic epistemology. As man arrives at truth
socially and experientially, not autonomously and contemplatively, the best form of
education must create opportunities for this kind of group-based and interactive
education. We can call this a democratic psychology. Given these assumptions—that
humankind gains knowledge socially and that each man has nearly limitless potential to
improve himself
—
participatory democracy appears to be the logical form of governance.
Unlike any other conceivable political system, it rightly includes as many people as
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possible in the process of acquiring better truths, and, in turn, these truths-along with
the process of forming them—educate, rehabituate, and transfonn the participants. Thus
the democratic participant is both sculptor and sculpture, both artist and work of art, both
Professor Higgins and Miss Doolittle.
The third pragmatist tenet upon which democratic faith rests is that people have
free will and thus have the capacity to devote considerable time and energy to politics.
Even if democratic participation has the aforementioned epistemological and
psychological benefits, there is no guarantee that people will actually engage in politics in
a serious way. Or, to put it bluntly, there is no telling whether people will actually go to
all those damned meetings. But participatory democratic theorists argue that this
argument betrays a liberal misunderstanding of the human condition. They claim that
liberal theory rests on the fiction that man, completely rational and unencumbered by
history or custom, contracts with others and willingly exchanges his natural liberty, his
power, for security lest he should die violently and painfully. In the liberal conception,
each person is a self-contained atom fearful of injurious contact with other equally self-
contained atoms. Freedom means assuaging people's fears of physical suffering and
violent death by guaranteeing their safety and comfort. The political means by which this
is accomplished is really beside the point. Pragmatists and participatory democrats, on
the other hand, understand that man is embedded in a complex web of history, traditions,
and customs. His freedom does not depend on severing ties with this social and historical
embeddedness—a goal that is as imprudent as it is impossible. On the contrary, his
freedom depends on the power to share in the shaping of the history, traditions, and
customs to which he is inextricably bound. From a Deweyan perspective, it is
30
inconceivable that people may prefer to exchange this freedom for security and material
comfort. Vested with tree will, people are poised for civic action. That people have this
freedom and will embrace it unrelentingly—this is what we might call a democratic
theology. It is the belief that, if given chisels, people will take hold of them and begin the
long and painstaking process of sculpting themselves and the world around them. It is
the faith that if given the opportunity people will exercise this power and work
collectively to put their ideas into action.
James and Peirce believed that pragmatism corrected the way philosophers
hitherto had looked at the world. Pragmatism tried to reconcile the purported tensions
between science and religion, body and mind, experience and truth, society and the
individual. Dewey built on this project in his efforts to reconcile the long purported
tension between democracy and liberty. He spent a lifetime trying to convince people
that true freedom depended on a deepening of democracy. Detractors of his political
philosophy abounded. They just could not believe that citizens would ever devote
considerable time and energy to civic life, or that, if they happened to by chance, they
would ever do so intelligently and judiciously.
III.
A number of thinkers emerged in the wake of Dewey’s writings about democracy
to challenge his idealism. Often called democratic realists, these thinkers proffered an
alternative democratic theory that placed far less responsibility on the shoulders of the
average citizen. Walter Lippmann, journalist and fonner student of William James,
raised questions about the effectiveness of democracy in his two influential books, Public
31
°pini0n and The Phantom Public
• wh* made Lippmann’s criticisms especially
damaging was the tact that they rested on similar philosophical and epistemological
grounds. He agreed with the pragmatists that man could only ascertain truth through the
lens of his subjective (and hence epistemologically fallible) experiences, but he did not
conclude, like Dewey, that democracy was the scientific method writ large. Lippmann
doubted the average man s capacity to act like a scientist and collaborate with his fellow
citizens to learn from the collectivity of their experiences. The ideal of participatory
democracy faced some serious real world challenges: man had limited access to
information germane to political and social problems, and he possessed a mind that all
too easily distorted the facts to which he did have access.
According to Lippmann, public opinion will always be fallible because of
artificial censorships, the limitations of social contact, the comparatively
meager time available in each day for paying attention to public affairs,
the distortion arising because events have to be compressed into very short
messages, the difficulty of making a small vocabulary express a
complicated world, and finally the fear of facing those facts which would
seem to threaten the established routine of men’s lives. 50
Man is subjected to the influence of his culture and heritage: “In the great blooming,
buzzing confusion of the outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for
us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us
by our culture.” 51 Each man perceives the world “through a class, darkly,” and he
reinforces his stereotypes within his social set and passes them along to the next
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generation. 52 These stereotypes are habits that no one can easily break. If he had the
time and energy, man could theoretically counteract these stereotypes by subjecting them
to scientific scrutiny, by treating them as tentative hypotheses which must be tested and
evaluated. But reality places limits on the possible. Most men will not avail themselves
of opportunities to deliberate with their fellow citizens and will not constantly question
their own preconceptions about the world. Most of us cannot achieve this scientific habit
of mind and instead believe in the absolutism of our own vision, and consequently in the
treacherous character ot all opposition.” 53 As a result, Lippmann concluded that truth as
agreement among people is a pipedream.
Other democratic realists—such as Charles Merriam, Harold Lasswell, Joseph
Schumpeter, David Truman, and E. E. Schattschneider—compounded the attack on
Deweyan democracy, rejecting the notion that government decisions should reflect public
opinion. Instead, they conceived ot democracy in pluralist terms, as a competition among
elites or groups for influence over government. 54 Most people have neither the time nor
the energy tor serious political activity, and they wisely delegate these responsibilities to
experts and specialists whose full-time job is to represent their interests and work hard to
influence public policy. Many of these realists, like Schumpeter and Truman, believed
this competition yielded the most efficient and socially desirable policy outcomes, but
others, like Schattschneider, argued “the flaw in [the pluralist conception of democracy]
52
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is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.” 55 Schattschneider
certainly agreed that democracy was a competition among groups represented by elites,
but he maintained that some groups never gained access to the system, and thus the
system favored the interests of the rich and powerful. Only strong political parties,
according to Schattschneider, could make the system more inclusive and bring these
alienated groups into the competition. Despite their differences of opinion, all the
democratic realists rejected crude majoritarianism and favored, in some form or other,
liberal constraints on democracy.
The liberal critique of unrestrained democracy is compelling and should not be
overlooked. It urges us to consider that democracy is merely a procedure—and a fallible
one at that not an end in itself. Frederick Hayek scolded the “doctrinaire democrat” for
assuming that “the will of the majority determines not only what is law but what is good
law.”
56
This “fetish" of democracy, for which he held democratic enthusiasts like Dewey
responsible, rested on the naive faith that “so long as power is conferred by democratic
procedure, it cannot be arbitrary.”57 Liberals admonish us never to forget that a
democratic majority can be just as tyrannical as a monarch
—
perhaps more so, for as
Tocqueville suggests, the democratic polity derives power from numbers and, with it, the
appearance of legitimacy. 58 Fearful of unfettered democracy, the American founders
established constitutional government and a system of checks and balances to secure the
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nghts of minorities. They believed democracy requires institutional safeguards that
mitigate its excesses and protect individuals from tyrannical majorities; accordingly, they
designed a fragmented governmental system that frustrated the whims of the people and
promoted incrementalism, deliberation, and compromise.
Liberals detect a trace of Rousseau in the New Left, and it is this almost
metaphysical faith in the general will that frightens them. Rousseau, too, envisioned a
republic in which all men participate actively in civic affairs and develop a strong sense
of citizenship. But in Rousseau’s formulation, civic participation and freedom are
indistinguishable: man must become free through his obedience to the general will, even
when his private will conflicts with it. Because the general will is "always right," it
follows that when "the opinion contrary to mine prevails, this proves merely that I was in
error, and that what I took to be the general will was not so.”59 Should I decide
stubbornly to exercise my private will, I must be “forced to be free.”60 In the minds of
many liberals, Rousseau anticipated twentieth century totalitarianism. 61
Despite these powerful warnings emanating from the liberal camp, contemporary
proponents of participatory democracy have continued in the Deweyan faith. They
cannot contain their frustration with the inadequacy of guaranteeing only formal liberty.
As David Held puts it, “The formal existence of certain rights is, while not unimportant,
of little value if they cannot be genuinely enjoyed. An assessment of freedom must be
made on the basis of liberties that are tangible, and capable of being deployed within
59
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realms of both state and civil society.”''2 In reality, some people enjoy more freedoms
and privileges than others, and these inequalities do not just stem from innate individual
differences. They often have structural causes that liberals are too prone to dismiss out-
of-hand. Theorists like C. B. Macpherson, Carole Pateman, and Benjamin Barber
criticize liberals for failing to acknowledge that asymmetries of power and resources give
some groups systematic advantages—social, economic, and political—over others.
These advantaged groups can quickly mobilize and attain better access to liberal
government institutions; not surprisingly, they have a preponderant influence on public
policy and enjoy a disproportionate share of the benefits. Furthermore, as Pateman
argues, the assumption that the liberal state is separate from civil society is clearly wrong.
The implication here is that, despite what liberal theorists say about the ideal
nightwatchman role of the state, the state and civil society will always intermingle in
some way, and thus the state itself is often culpable of perpetuating social inequalities. 63
The liberal state claims to be neutral on questions of the good life and on group conflicts
in civil society, but its actions (or, in many cases, inaction) undoubtedly privilege certain
groups over others.
This is where participatory democracy comes in. The goal is to empower those
people who have been effectively disenfranchised in liberal democratic society, to give
them the opportunity to participate directly in politics. Until everyone has the
opportunity to make his voice heard, the chorus of democracy is incomplete. In
suggesting that the pluralist heaven “sang with an upper-class accent,” Schattschneider
62
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agreed that many voices were excluded from the chorus. Yet he thought the creation of a
robust two-party system would be sufficient to connect hitherto excluded groups to the
political process. But, for participatory democrats, the solution is to empower the
individual, not to strengthen political parties or state institutions. The solution is to give
each individual what Isaiah Berlin called positive freedom—the freedom to lead one’s
own life and to be the author and definer of one’s own existence. Proponents of positive
freedom contend that in concentrating on “freedom from” intrusion on the individual’s
private sphere, liberalism fails to address the fundamental question, "What am I free to do
or be?"64 Positive freedom affirms a person’s right to self-determination, his “freedom
to” be his own master. Participatory democrats maintain that civic engagement, direct
involvement in the political process, is the principal way a person can exercise his
positive freedom and control his own destiny. Liberal warnings about threats to negative
freedom in an unrestrained democracy are unwarranted because political participation
enlarges man's thinking and transforms him into an enlightened citizen who, while
seeking the common good, always remains mindful of individual rights.
Participatory democrats have been vague about the practicalities, but many,
including Benjamin Barber and Carole Pateman, agree that it would be foolish (and
impracticable) to discard many of the central institutions of liberal democracy, such as
competitive parties, political representatives, an independent judiciary, and periodic
elections.
65
Often called proponents of deliberative democracy, they acknowledge that
civic participation will work best with those issues that affect people directly. More
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complex or remote national issues are less likely to attract the interest of average citizens;
but simpler and more salient issues that have an immediate and discernible impact would
likely draw more people to the political process. 66 This means that participatory
institutions would complement, rather than replace, many of these institutions and would
have a limited role in the political process. But, according to these participatory
democrats, it is important to underscore how vital these participatory institutions could
still be at a broader level, for if people are made to understand that their participation will
produce tangible results, that their participation will make a difference in their lives, their
faith in political institutions and in their own political efficacy will be restored. Their
participation will elevate government accountability and ensure that, in listening to all the
voices in the democratic chorus, the government will serve the public good, not just
privileged interests. And, perhaps more importantly, participation will have a
transformative effect: people who engage in public affairs will learn about the nuts and
bolts of democratic procedures, the painstaking nature of deliberation, the necessity of
compromise, and the virtue of thinking beyond one’s own interests. Conscious of the
pragmatist influences on his own democratic thought, Barber articulates well the
transformative element of participatory democracy.
The participating citizen... is a being with a mutable nature, whose
evolution is in part a function of its social habitat. It is this very talent for
self-transformation that enables the citizen thus conceived to engage in the
process of individuation: not merely in bargaining and exchange over
fixed and permanent interests but to modify the notion of what those
interests actually are. Participation entails change—a faculty for self-
transformation—for the community as well as for the participating
member. 67
66
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Like his pragmatist predecessors, Barber believes that man is a decidedly social creature
whose capacity for “self-transformation” stems from deliberation and interaction with his
fellow men. Democratic participation, he claims, changes “the community as well
as. . .the participating member.”
But many participatory democrats uphold a more radical and uncompromising
vision of democracy to which they compare the extant system of centralized power.
Nothing short of a total subversion of the system will bring an end to what they see as a
crisis in American politics. Sheldon Wolin, often considered the patriarch of the history
of political philosophy in the American academy, has been a forceful advocate of so-
called radical democracy and, through his reputation as an august and unassailable
scholar, has given credence and intellectual gravitas to the New Left ethos. For Wolin,
the term democratic state is an oxymoron. The rise of the megastate, which comprises
the sinister cooperation of big government and big business, is the tragic story of
modernity and signifies the beginning of a Kafkaesque nightmare from which no one can
easily escape. In his view, until power is reconstituted in a serious way, such that it
remains decentralized and resistant to cooptation by the state—until democracy can
flourish and remain immune to systemization and institutionalization—a quiet despotism
will continue to loom ominously in our lives.
Though he offers no clear remedy to the problem, it is quite clear that he
considers reform efforts insufficient; only in renegade democratic uprisings—or what he
calls “fugitive democracy”—does he find hope. Empowering communities to redress
social injustices and promote the commonweal, participatory democracy in its purest
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form remains spontaneous and unencumbered by plans, rules, and institutional norms.
Blue prints are anathema to democracy because they immediately place limits on the
possible and necessarily guide politics in particular directions. To use probabilistic
metaphors, they load the deck or rig the lottery. Radical democrats have been so bold (or
foolhardy) as to take pragmatism to its logical extreme. By insisting that democracy
remain pure, they keep open all horizons and search endlessly for truth. But without a
blue print, democracy remains an elusive and perhaps illusive political form. What
emerges from Wolin s writings is a blurred line between “pure” democracy and
anarchism. Though representing a more radical vision, Wolin also sees democracy as a
transformative process:
Democracy involves more than participation in political processes: it is a
way of constituting power. Democracy is committed to the claim that
experience with, and access to, power is essential to the development of
the capacities of ordinary persons because power is crucial to human
dignity and realization. Power is not merely something to be shared, but
something to be used collaboratively in order to initiate, to invent to bring
about.68
Wolin brings far more focus on power in his democratic theory than many of his
counterparts, arguing that the democratic re-constitution of power can bring about not
only positive change for the community but can also develop “the capacities of ordinary
persons.”
Locating participatory democratic thought, of either the deliberative or radical
variety, in the pragmatist tradition may raise some eyebrows. After all, the idea that civic
participation can promote the general welfare and transform self-absorbed individualists
into other-regarding citizens would seem to fall within the civic republican tradition,
68
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which began with the proclamatton by Aristotle that man is a political antmai, has
enjoyed some continuity over the centuries in the thought of Machiavelli, Rousseau.
Harrington, and the Anti-Federalists, and can be seen in the writings of contemporary
communitarian thinkers, such as Michael Sandel and Alisdair MacIntyre. Though it
shares similarities with this tradition, I think there are sound reasons for understanding
participatory democracy as a descendant of American pragmatism instead.
First, civic republicans place considerable emphasis on the importance of virtue
and the cultivation of this quality in the citizenry. Participationists like Wolin and Barber
shy away from discussing virtue, mostly because it smacks of foundationalism, the belief
in the existence of fixed truths, prior to human experience. This belief is anathema to
democratic participation, for it implies that we must rely on those elites with the authority
or expertise to attain these truths and then instruct the rest of us on how to act virtuously.
As anti-foundationalists, participatory democrats believe that politics is an ongoing
process ot discovery which must include every person with relevant experiences to share.
In other words, they embrace a democratic epistemology, while civic republicans do not.
Second, there is an element of elitism in the republican tradition for which
participationists have great contempt. This elitism stems in large part from its embracing
foundationalism, believing that only a select few, perhaps a certain class, have the natural
endowment to attain truth. As a result, the republican tradition has never demanded full
inclusion in the political process. Over the centuries, it has been comfortable with
excluding certain segments of society—slaves, women, peasants, the working class,
“barbarians” or “savages.” Participatory democrats have been uncompromising on this
point, that all people have the capacity for citizenship and must be given the opportunity
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to engage fully in politics. For participation is the road to self-realization. While
participation's subscribe wholeheartedly to a democratic psychology, civic republicans
have betrayed a distrust of human nature.
Third, civic republicans are prepared to subordinate individual freedom and
happiness to the common good. Though mindful of the commonweal, participationists
refuse to compromise individual dignity and development. In an attempt to reconcile
individualism and communalism, they insist that the dignity of the individual requires
voluntary civic engagement. Hardly subsumed by the collective, the citizen elects to
engage with it and is transformed in the process. He is not forced to be free; he chooses
to become free. The democratic theology of participationists remains intact. The same
cannot be said of civic republicans.
IV.
In part a work of intellectual history, this study traces the lineage of participatory
democratic theory to its pragmatist roots. I tell a story that begins with the founders of
American pragmatism, Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey—the origins of
the participatory democracy for which the New Left had such enthusiasm, however
briefly, in the early 1960s. The story ends with contemporary democratic theorists
Benjamin Barber and Sheldon Wolin, who in many ways deserve to be called the
political descendants of the early pragmatists. They represent the legacy of participatory
democracy. But while this story may be illuminating in its own right, this is hardly
history for history's sake. I also shed light on participatory democratic theory: by
examining it through the lens of pragmatism, I hope to explain why it has receded to the
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margins of academia. Most political scientists attack participatory democracy on
Madisonian or liberal-elitist grounds, but I maintain that it is more useful to understand it
on its own terms and explore its intellectual origins. My analysis shows that participatory
democratic theory—of all kinds, whether institution-friendly or radical—rests on three
pragmatist tenets: that truth is probabilistic and socially-determined (democratic
epistemology); that man is malleable and educable (democratic psychology); and that
vested with free will, man is poised for civic action (democratic theology). Taken
together, these tenets lay the foundation for the participatory democratic creed: that
democracy is a transformative experience for both individuals and communities, and that
people have the freedom to partake in that experience once they become aware of its
benefits. In the view of participatory democrats, political man learns best in the school of
democracy, where a community of competent inquirers can devise the best policies for
their community and where each participant can grow and mature into a broad-minded
citizen. And unfettered by biological determinism or the hard logic of historical or social
forces, man has the freedom to enter that school and will certainly do so once he
discovers the transfonnative effects of democratic participation. But should any of the
three tenets prove untenable, participatory democracy stands on shaky ground.
Ultimately, this could account for its untimely death or withdrawal from political
discourse. As will be seen, we have every reason to call all three tenets into question,
especially the democratic theology.
To recap, this work is a study of the origins and the legacy ofNew Left
enthusiasm for participatory democracy—a before- and after-picture, if you will, of an
idea that peaked, ever so briefly, at a quiet retreat in rural Michigan. In Chapters Two
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and Three, I focus on the founders of pragmatism, Charles Sanders Peirce and William
James, who quite unwittingly laid the philosophical groundwork for participatory
democratic theory. In Chapter Four, I discuss how John Dewey drew on pragmatism to
develop his participatory democratic theory. In Chapters Five and Six, I examine the
work of two contemporary participationists, Sheldon Wolin and Benjamin Barber,
respectively, and I not only identify the pragmatist tenets supporting their ideas but also
highlight their shaky democratic theologies which stem from doubts about the viability of
participatory democracy. In Chapter Seven, the conclusion, I make preliminary efforts to
evaluate the democratic tenets and show how participatory democratic thought rests on
tenuous philosophical ground.
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CHAPTER II
CHARLES PEIRCE: THE JOYFUL NIRVANA OF THE UNLIMITED COMMUNITY
Charles Sanders Peirce (1 838-1914), under-appreciated and misunderstood in his
own time, has in recent years been called the most important philosopher in the American
canon. Although his erudition was undoubtedly impressive, ranging from the study of
mathematics and astronomy to formal logic and semiotics, he probably is best known as
the founder (or one of the founders) of pragmatism. He hardly devoted any systematic
study to political philosophy or showed any serious interest in democratic politics, but
Peirce’s pragmatism helped lay the philosophical foundation for the rise of participatory
democratic thought in America. Peirce’s philosophy evoked a democratic temperament
of which he may have only been partly aware but which nonetheless should not be
overlooked, for we can identify all three democratic tenets in Peirce’s thought.
Endorsing a democratic epistemology, he maintained that people can only acquire
knowledge socially and deliberatively, and that they should always keep an open mind
and accept the provisional status of all human knowledge. He also embraced an
unquestionable democratic psychology, asserting that human nature is malleable and
socially-determined, that people have the capacity to learn new habits and, drawing on
the spirit of social cooperation, transform themselves for the better. Finally, he revealed
a democratic theology in his belief that human beings enjoy the freedom—albeit
limited—to choose their social destiny.
It seems never to have occurred to Peirce to derive political lessons from these
ideas, as Dewey would begin to do in the 1920s, in large part because he understood the
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pursuit of knowledge as primarily a scientific endeavor in which only an educated elite
could participate. But Peirce’s epistemology does strike a democratic tenor when he
suggests that the scientific method should and could be applied more broadly-inside and
outside the laboratory and by scientists and laymen alike.' Accordingly, Peirce planted
the seeds for a democratic theory that would grow in importance and influence
throughout the twentieth century in America, culminating perhaps with the New Lett in
the 1960s but continuing to have its voice heard in academic circles to this day. The
story of participatory democratic thought in America, thus, begins with pragmatism and
its founders, especially Charles Peirce.
Having devoted two years of his early years to daily study of Immanuel Kant’s
Critique ofPure Reason
,
the young Peirce was particularly struck by the German
philosopher’s notion of “pragmatic belief’. Kant provides the example of a physician
who observes the symptoms of a dangerously ill patient and makes a provisional
diagnosis to the best of his ability. Quite aware that “his belief is contingent only,’’ the
doctor understands that “another observer might perhaps come to a sounder conclusion.”
Nevertheless, this “contingent belief’—his diagnosis—will guide the doctor’s action, his
particular course of medical treatment. He does not know for sure that the patient suffers
from, say, jaundice, but the symptoms indicate that he probably does. Betting that the
patient has jaundice, the doctor acts accordingly. 2 Whereas Kant believed “pragmatic
1
Philosopher Richard J. Bernstein has argued that Peirce’s thought, especially his idea of
community, has “important consequences for democratic theory,” even though he did not
necessarily conceive of community in democratic terms. See his chapter entitled
“Community in the Pragmatic Tradition" in Dickstein, ed.. Revival ofPragmatism, 144.
" Kant, Critique ofPure Reason , 647-48.
46
belief was one of many kinds of belief, Peirce believed it was the only kind. Ideas or
beliefs of any kind, said Peirce, are just rules for action which we are betting will work in
our experience. We can thank Kant for inspiring Peirce to coin the tenn “pragmatism” in
the early 1 870s, even though the world did not hear the term until William James
introduced it nearly 25 years later, and also for planting the germ of a new and fecund
idea.
Alexander Bain, whose The Emotions and the Will was published in 1859, also
had a profound influence on Peirce and the other participants of the Metaphysical Club.
The Scottish philosopher defined a belief as “that upon which a man is prepared to act,”
and Peirce and his fellow club members found this an exciting proposition. Drawing on
Kant, Bain, and the intellectual ferment at Harvard, Peirce wrote a paper which he
delivered at the last meeting of the Metaphysical Club in the summer of 1 872 where,
according to James, he first introduced the idea of pragmatism. Six years later he
published a version of his paper as an article entitled “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” in
The Popular Science Monthly. Though Peirce does not use the term “pragmatism” in the
article, he does clearly articulate a pragmatist creed—the idea that beliefs involve “the
establishment in our nature of a rule of action, or, say for short, a habit.”3 Acting on our
beliefs habitually is our modus operandi, but when these beliefs suddenly cease to work
for us we are irritated by doubt. Seeking to alleviate this irritation and return to our
contented state of belief, we investigate the problem immediately, and by trial and error
we discover what went wrong and, accordingly, modify our habits or develop entirely
new ones. Whatever ultimately works after repeated tries becomes the modified or new
3
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habit. This fairly simple idea constitutes the core of Peirce’s thought. While Peirce’s
ideas matured considerably over the next 40 years or so, what became his stunningly
complex and comprehensive philosophical system can be traced back to those
rudimentary ideas tormed during his early years in Cambridge.4 Without a doubt Peirce
was indebted to a number of philosophers and thinkers—including Duns Scotus,
Ockham, Hume, Kant, Bam, and many of his peers in Cambridge—but it is important to
note that his ideas grew far beyond his influences and into something quite original.
Peirce was attracted to pragmatism in large part because he believed it helped
settle the centuries-long debate between realism and nominalism. Peirce was a dyed-in-
the-wool realist. He believed that the regularities or uniformities that we observe in our
experience, and then give a name or label, reflect a reality independent of what anybody
thinks ot them. In other words, mental ideas or general concepts are real. Newton
introduced the concept of gravity, for example, when he observed that objects
consistently fall to the ground when we let go of them. According to Peirce, this concept
is real in the sense that it tells us something essential about how objects in the universe
behave, and about how the universe in general operates. Nominalists, on the other hand,
maintain that general concepts are not real but convenient fictions which help us
negotiate the world around us but tell us nothing about the reality of the universe. The
only real things in the universe of which we can be certain are particulars, individual
events or objects. Peirce characterizes nominalism as the view “that the facts are, in
themselves, entirely disconnected, and that it is the mind alone which unites them. One
4
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stone dropping to the earth has no real connection with another stone dropping to the
earth.”
5
The connection between these similar events exists only in our minds, not in the
objects themselves. I observe something real when I drop my fork to the ground, and I
observe something real again when immediately afterwards I drop my pen. Each discrete
event and the objects involved are real, but any general or universal concept that attempts
to explain this regularity or commonality can never be real, for there is no telling whether
the fork or pen will drop to the ground tomorrow. At most, the concept has proven
convenient to us so far, but we do not know what the future holds.
While it may be true that the pen may not drop to the floor when I let go of it
tomorrow, the realist believes that there is something real about the strong likelihood of
the pen falling to the floor again and again. Concepts like gravity may not tell us what
will occur in the future, but they do tell us something about what is likely to occur. Peirce
maintained that this potential, this statistical likelihood, which we gauge from past
experience, tells us something real about the universe. The whole point of scientific
investigation, Peirce argued, is not merely to construct associations in our minds but
rather to establish laws that tell us something about the objective world and that predict
what is likely to occur in the future under similar circumstances. While not infallibly
predictive, scientific laws generally work for us time and time again. Having
demonstrated a high degree of reliability in the past, these laws are real, according to
Peirce, even when instances of them are not currently being exemplified, for we know we
could put any of these laws on display at a moment’s notice if we desired. That many of
his contemporaries in the scientific community subscribed to nominalism was a
5
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considerable source of frustration for Peirce. An unwillingness to believe in the reality of
generalizable expenences (or “generals”) belies what they were trying to accomplish-
namely, to explain why the universe operates in certain ways. Said Peirce: “Uniformities
are precisely the sorts of facts that need to be accounted for. That a pitched coin should
sometimes tum up heads and sometimes tails calls for no particular explanation; but if it
shows heads every time, we wish to know how this result has been brought about. Law is
par excellence the thing that wants a reason.”6 The scientist always seeks an explanation
behind observed regularities and believes his analysis can reveal something real and
general about the objective world.
The nominalist-realist debate extends beyond the realm of scientific laws and into
everyday experience, such as when we consider the general concept of an object—say, an
apple. The realist would have us believe that there is something real about this concept,
while the nominalist would say it is a linguistic construction, a grouping together of
individual objects that we call “apples" out of convenience. As the nominalists would
suggest, to assert that a general idea ot “appleness exists in the universe is almost
laughable, echoing the Platonic forms which exist in some transcendent realm outside our
corporeal experience. But Peirce was no Platonist. He argued that the meaning of our
ideas inhere in our particular experiences. Those objects we call “apples” have a set of
“conceivable practical effects" which constitute appleness. In “How to Make Our Ideas
Clear" Peirce articulated what is commonly called the “pragmatic maxim” in famously
tortured prose: “Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings,
we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
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is the whole of our conception of the object.”7 In other words, our conception of an
object or idea stems from the sum total of its conceivable effects on us. It is worth noting
that Peirce used the qualifier “conceivable” because “[i]f pragmattsm is the doctrine that
every conception is a conception of conceivable practical effects, it makes conception
reach far beyond the practical. It allows any flight of imagination, provided this
imagination ultimately alights upon a possible practical effect.”
8
This means that we
derive our general conception of an apple from our actual and our imaginable experiences
with those objects to which we eventually attribute the name “apple”. The entire set of
conceivable practical effects from an apple is of course infinitely long, but listing a few
will be illustrative: If I look at an apple, I will see the color red or green; if I bite into it, I
will taste its unique flavor and juiciness; if I hold it, it will feel smooth and spherical; if I
throw it, it will fly fairly far; etc. Peirce the realist maintained that the experiences we
have with apples—their color, taste, texture, throwability, etc.—exist independently of
what any ot us may think of them, forcing themselves into our consciousness through
their brute reality. The real,” he claimed, “is that which insists upon forcing its way to
recognition as something other than the mind s creation. 10 The meaning of appleness
inheres in those very real experiences we have or could conceivably have with apples.
A closer examination of the pragmatic maxim requires a discussion of Peirce’s
three phenomenological categories. Perhaps Peirce’s most original and provocative
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contribution to pragmatist thought was his reduction of all human experience-the entire
cosmos, for that matter—to three “indecomposable concepts.” 1
1
His extensive study in
logic led him to the conclusion that any experience in the universe could be broken down,
like a chemical compound, into its constitutive elemental parts. The chemistry analogy is
apt, although the periodic table has 1 12 elements while Peirce’s phenomenology only has
three—which he calls firstness, secondness, and thirdness. An explication of these
categories will eventually shed light on his theories about knowledge, human nature, and
free will (i.e., his epistemology, psychology, and theology). As Peirce put it,
“pragmatism cannot be understood without [the categories].” 12
Firstness is difficult to describe or conceptualize because we are not exactly
conscious of it. Peirce often characterized firstness as the possibility of an idea,
something that enters the mind as pure sensation but is never fully cognized, reflected
upon, or compared to anything else. He wrote:
Imagine, if you will, a consciousness in which there is no comparison, no
relation, no recognized multiplicity (since parts would be other than the
whole), no change, no imagination of any modification of what is
positively there, no reflexion—nothing but a simple positive character.
Such a consciousness might be just an odour, say a smell of attar, or it
might be an infinite dead ache; it might be the hearing of a piercing eternal
whistle. In short, any simple and positive quality of feeling would be
something our description fits that it is such as it is quite regardless of
anything else. 13
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Firstness is a decidedly non-cognitive quality, a “purely monadic state of feeling” 14
which has no attributable source or opposing point of comparison. It is the kind of
feeling that “retains its positive character but absolutely loses all relation (and thereby all
vividness, which is only the sense of shock).” 15 While Peirce's comparison of firstness to
an infinite dead ache” or “a piercing eternal whistle” (emphasis added) captures the
sensory monotony of firstness, we should not mistake firstness as an experience to whose
dullness we become too accustomed from long-term exposure. On the contrary, we
experience firstness at the very beginning when a percept first imposes itself on us
fresh, new and spontaneous—representing mere possibility in its immediate state of
indeterminacy. In his mind-bending cosmological speculations Peirce characterized
firstness, that time in “the infinitely distant past” when the universe began, as a “confused
dream,” a state of “original chaos” in which there was no persistent regularity. 16 And
because the reality ot things consists in their persistent forcing themselves upon
recognition in their "regularity”—the immediate and original experience of firstness
does not leave a marked impression on our consciousness. 17 Consider the hum of an
alarm clock in the early morning when one has entered that state of semi-consciousness
in which one can hear the sound but cannot yet recognize its significance or source. It
has yet to acquire any meaning for us. We hear the noise but have become aware of
nothing but its being present.
14
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Like firstness, secondness is also an experience of which we are not folly
conscious but, unlike firstness, it is relational, involving two objects that resist or oppose
each other in some fashion. It is the often startling confrontation with brute fact, the
experience of acting or being acted upon. Peirce also used the ideas of volition or
struggle as synonyms tor secondness. The experience of secondness in these physical
terms is fairly easy to comprehend. In pushing against a door, I exercise volition and
apply force while the door, whether or not successfully, resists my efforts. I do not
recognize the door or my actions upon it in general tenns; rather, I experience this
interplay between “effort and resistance” 18 as an individual and isolated event. But the
psychological manifestations of secondness are a bit different, typically evoking “shock”
or surprise in the subject when he is acted upon. Though it “is something which cannot
properly be conceived,” secondness can often be characterized as the “shock of reaction
between ego and non-ego.” 19 If the eternal whistle, for instance, should suddenly stop,
we would be surprised by the unprecedented experience of silence. Again, we would not
attribute the sudden silence to a particular event or meaning, but we would nevertheless
notice its particular effect on us. The moment we identify a reason for the abrupt
cessation of the whistle, once a general conception of the whistle and the silence that
follows enters our minds, we have moved beyond the initial experience of shock and
entered the realm of thirdness.
Peirce scholar Thomas S. Knight distinguishes thirdness from the first two
categories as follows:
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Neither firstness nor secondness is cognitive; they cannot be said to beknown; they are merely experienced. Now thirdness is cognitive; it is
what we can know. It is cognition, conception, meaning in that it at once
is and has conceptual meaning; it at once mediates firstnesses and
secondnesses and makes their mediation possible.20
An explicitly cognitive experience, thirdness entails explaining the relationship between
firsts and seconds, identifying regularities on which we can rely in our daily experience,
and conceiving general laws which become rules for action (or habits). In establishing
conceptions that link firsts and seconds together, thirdness introduces a third object to the
relationship. Thirdness establishes a relationship between two objects by way of a
third. When person A acts on object B, it will yield the set of practical effects C. If I
come across an object that is unknown to me, I will act upon the object in various ways
(seconds) to gain sensory information (firsts). Eventually I will develop a general idea
(third) about the object as I learn that certain acts of volition will regularly produce
certain perceptions. The experience of thirdness is what we often characterize as
consciousness, the awareness of general concepts or relationships in the world we
negotiate. As the example of the piercing whistle demonstrates, sometimes secondness
involves the subject being acted upon. And when we awake from our foggy slumber, our
dawning consciousness of its meaning, or thirdness, will not require us to act physically.
We will consider the relationship between the piercing sound and the ensuing silence and
eventually realize that the passing of a train probably accounts for the practical
consequences. Said Peirce: “The elements of every concept enter in logical thought at
20
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the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever
cannot show its passports at both these two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by
reason.”
22
Only by interacting with the world around us, either by acting on it or it acting
on us, and then learning from these expenences, do we develop ideas and beliefs on
which we are prepared to act habitually. Once we comprehend the meaning of the
piercing whistle, we will automatically attribute this experience to the passing train and
will continue to bet that this is the case unless new information casts doubt on our belief.
Peirce s categones were the core elements of his philosophy, the building blocks
for nearly everything else he had to say in his philosophical writings. He insisted that
this triadic analysis could be applied to any kind ot human (or nonhuman) experience.
Hardly just figments ot the mind, laws and generals impose themselves on us in our
experience, as if demanding that we become aware of them. But whether or not we know
about these generals, they are real nonetheless. To assume they are not, that instead all
generals are just convenient fictions or the mental groupings of individual events, is
analogous to having a “court without a sheriff.”
A court in that predicament might probably be able to induce some citizen
to act as sheriff; but until it had so provided itself with an officer who,
unlike itself, could not discourse authoritatively but who could put forth
the strong arm, its law might be the perfection ofhuman reason but would
remain mere fireworks, brutum fulmen. Just so, let a law of nature—say
the law of gravitation—remain a mere unifonnity—a mere formula
establishing a relation between terms—and what in the world would
induce a stone, which is not a term nor a concept but just a plain thing, to
act in conformity to that uniformity? All other stones may have done so,
and this stone too on former occasions, and it would break the uniformity
for it not to do so. But what of that? There is no use talking reason to a
9 o
stone. It is deaf and it has no reason.
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In other words, stones have no choice but to fall to the ground because the sheriff-in
this case, gravity—compels them. Our awareness of this concept (or sheriff) stems from
its practical effects, which we have observed for many years, but it indeed existed before
Newton discovered it and gave it a name. No doubt, human beings have long noticed the
effects of gravity and have developed habits from their observations that unsupported
objects always fall to the earth. We do not see gravity per se, just like we do not really
see electricity or ultraviolet rays in and of themselves, but we know they exist chiefly by
their effects. Similarly, we know the sheriff is in town not when we see someone
walking down the street with a star pinned to his vest but when we notice that law-
breakers are arrested and brought to justice. In fact, we may never meet the sheriff in
person, but this does not prevent us from knowing he is real. For we know he is real
when we observe the practical effects of his regularly performing sheriff duties—safer
streets and crowded jails, perhaps. Representing the irreducible elements of experience,
the Peircean categories show how each of us applies the pragmatic maxim in our search
to make sense of the world around us. We turn next to Peirce's epistemology, his ideas
about how people can collectively acquire reliable, if not infallible, knowledge about
reality. An independent reality may indeed exist, but Peirce reminded us that man can
never know for certain that he has grasped this reality. But, as we shall see, there are
ways to reduce the degree of uncertainty.
57
I.
At the heart of Peirce's epistemology is the idea of fallibilism, the idea that no
individual or group of individuals can assert with complete confidence that they have an
accurate knowledge of reality or a finn grasp of the truth. It “is the doctrine that our
knowledge is never absolute but always swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty
and indeterminacy.”24 While he thought that we can generally trust our ideas in our daily
lives, the fallibilist is always prepared to “dump his whole cart-load of his beliefs, the
moment experience is against them.”25 Even the “accepted propositions” of science are
but opinions at most, and the whole list is provisional.” Perhaps representing the
fallibilist par excellence in Peirce’s estimation, the “scientific man is not in the least
wedded to his conclusions. He risks nothing upon them. He stands ready to abandon one
or all as soon as experience opposes them.”26 As a realist, Peirce argued that there is an
objective reality about which all human beings, especially scientists, busied themselves
trying to learn, but he also maintained that we were poorly equipped for attaining truth.
But he never suggested that our deficiencies should prevent us from engaging in this most
noble of enterprises. On the contrary, he is famous for admonishing, “Do not block the
way of inquiry."" 7 The fallibilist always searches relentlessly for truth, acknowledging at
every point along the road that his beliefs, no matter how satisfactory they appear to us,
may be entirely wrong. He accepts neither the rigidity of absolutism nor the hopelessness
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of skepticism. Falling quite comfortably between these two extremes, he is sanguine
about the possibility of attaining knowledge about reality but remains forever open to
new ideas and humble about what he alone can achieve. Unlike the absolutist, he is
always willing to reassess his beliefs and revise them as new information is brought to
light; unlike the skeptic, he believes humanity has both the capacity and the responsibility
to seek out the truth, even though we will never know for sure when we have found it.
Implicit in his discussion of fallibilism is the idea that truth is probabilistic. One
man can never know for sure that his perception of reality corresponds with objective
reality, so he instinctively applies “tests of externality,” the most important of which is to
call in other observers from his community. 28 If upon walking into my apartment I
experience something out ot the ordinary, I immediately call my friends and family and
ask them to verify that I have not imagined this strange event or somehow perceived it
incorrectly. As the community of inquirers grows, presumably confirming my perception
ot the extraordinary experience, I become more certain that I am right and will eventually
be willing to bet on it. According to Peirce, logic dictates that we operate this way, for
his analysis of the three categories shows that we develop thirds by identifying persistent
relationships between firsts and seconds. Or, in other words, we arrive at general
conceptions or truths by observing uniformities in our experience, the unfailing
connections between our sense percepts and our actions. This means that limiting
ourselves to only our own subjective experiences as we try to identify these uniformities
defies logic. We must draw on the experiences of other people in our community before
we can embrace any general concept with confidence.
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Peirce invoked lessons drawn from astronomy, in which a community of scientists
pooled their observations to determine the most probable locations of stars. No single
telescopic observation can locate a star reliably because it is prone to subjective error, but
a sample of observations measured by different people, and often from different
observatories, can reveal the most likely location. Astronomers in the eighteenth century
realized that a graphical distribution of every observed location always took the shape of
a bell-shaped curve, and then drawing on statistical theory, concluded that the arithmetic
mean, around which this curve converged, represented the most probable real location of
the star. This solution became known as the method of least squares, whereby the most
likely location was determined by minimizing the sum of the squared differences between
it and each of the observed locations. When an object is at rest, calculating the arithmetic
mean accomplishes this task. Applying the method of least squares to estimate the
location of a moving celestial object, such as a comet, was discovered at the end of the
eighteenth century and involved far more sophisticated computational techniques. But
the principle remained the same, pinpointing the location “around which repeated
observations ineluctably converge.”29 The idea here is that individual knowledge is
fallible but that collective knowledge is less so.
The method of least squares is a prime example of what Peirce called inductive
logic, and he argued that this is the only way in which a community of inquirers can infer
general truths. An accomplished student of logic, Peirce wrote extensively on the
subject, parsing it into its three main types—abduction, deduction, and induction. To
differentiate them succinctly, Peirce said: “Deduction proves that something must be;
29
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Induction shows that something actually is operative; Abduction merely suggests
something may be.”30 Almost all truth inquiries begin with abduction, generating a
hypothesis or guess that could possibly explain the occurrence of a surprising event. We
then turn to deduction to infer particular conclusions that necessarily follow from that
hypothesis. Finally, the purpose of induction is to test these conclusions, to determine
whether the hypothesis and the conclusions that necessarily follow from it are empirically
true. The process of induction involves drawing on a set of specific examples from
which one can inter general truths—truths that are “operative” in the real world. The
final step, the actual test, is to compare these general and operative truths inferred by
induction with the initial hypothesis and the deduced conclusions. While all three types
of logic have an important role to play in the search for truth, Peirce placed particular
emphasis on induction, for it is the only one that can tell us what really is true—not just
what may be true or what must be true if we accept some dubious premises.
Peirce identified three kinds ot induction—crude, qualitative, and quantitative
—
and clearly found the latter the most reliable. He defined induction as
an argument which proceeds upon the assumption that all the members of
a class or aggregate have all the characters which are common to all those
members of this class concerning which it is known, whether they have
these characters or not; or, in other words, which assumes that this is true
of a whole collection which is true of a number of instances taken from it
at random. This might be called statistical argument. In the long run, it
must generally afford pretty correct conclusions from true premises. 31
No matter what kind of induction one may apply, it always involves at some level taking
a random sample of cases from a defined population, observing certain characteristics in
30
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that sample, and infemng that the whole population has the same characteristics. In other
words, induction assumes that the sample is an adequate reflection of the whole. While
both crude and qualitative induction draw on a very limited number of cases, quantitative
induction involves taking a large enough sample to infer general truths with a certain
level of statistical confidence. Our confidence grows along with the size of the sample:
as it approaches infinity, our degree of doubt approaches zero. Peirce provided the
following example to illustrate the logic of induction:
Case.—These beans are from this bag.
Result.—These beans are white.
Therefore, Rule.—All the beans in this bag are white. 2
We cannot be entirely certain about the inferred rule, but as the sample of beans increases
in size, we become more confident that it is representative of all the beans in the bag. But
with an infinite sample, we can be completely sure.
This preference for inductive logic, especially the quantitative variety, led Peirce
to make his famous formulation: “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to
by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this
opinion is the real.” 33 Fate was a statistical concept for Peirce. It represented a kind of
destiny “which is sure to come about although there is no necessitating reason for it.
Thus, a pair of dice, thrown often enough, will turn up sixes some time, although there is
no necessity that they should. The probability that they will is 1 : that is all.”34 Just as
sixes are destined to come up sometime if you throw a pair of dice an infinite number of
32“
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times, the final opinion of an infinitely large community is destined to represent the truth.
In both cases, said Peirce, the probability is 1
. Once understood in these statistical terms,
Peirces famous formulation cannot mean-as some have suggested-that truth is merely
a social construction, whatever the community of inquirers arbitrarily opine. To the
contrary, Peirce did not claim that truth is subjective but rather that a community of
inquirers is destined to formulate a final opinion that corresponds with the objective
truth that is, if they pursue their investigation into the infinite future.
The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning
would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries
ot me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows
that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY,
without definite limits, and capable of a definite increase of knowledge. 35
As Peirce saw it, reality is indeed independent of what you or I or some finite number of
people may think about it, and an infinite quest conducted by an unlimited community is
“destined to lead, at last, if continued long enough to a belief’ in that independent
reality—in the truth.
36
This is an explicitly statistical epistemology: As the size of the
community approaches infinity, its opinion converges asymptotically on the truth. This
unlimited or infinite community whose opinion merges with the truth is a hypothetical, an
unreachable endpoint for which we should nevertheless always strive in hopes of
reducing subjective error as much as possible. It is important to note, however, that this
does not imply that only an infinite community can know the truth, for even one man
may be fortunate enough to find it. But an infinite investigation is necessary “to know
35
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that we know the real object." 57 In practical terms, this means we can never be certain
we are nght, even when we are, for infinite investigations are unattainable. Peirce's
fallibilism drew explicitly on this notion of statistical error.
This statistical logic led Peirce to believe that the search for truth is a social
endeavor which filters out the idiosyncrasies and peculiarities of individual observers and
corrects the "limitations in circumstances, power, and bent” of each human being who
cannot help but perceive the objective world through a radically subjective lens. Peirce
gave an example ot a deal man and a blind man who both witness a murder. “One hears
a man declare he means to kill another, hears the report of the pistol, and hears the victim
cry, the other sees the murder done. Each witness has an incomplete understanding of
the event, but should they talk with one another and share their subjective information,
“their final conclusions, the thought the remotest from sense, will be identical and free
from the one-sidedness of their idiosyncrasies.”38 Peirce suggested here that if the
community ot investigators in this case, the deaf man and the blind man—deliberate
long enough, their disparate individual beliefs will eventually converge around one
shared belief. As he saw it, this is the way scientific inquiry works, with investigators
searching collectively for solutions from different angles and then ultimately gravitating
toward one “destined center” upon which they will all agree. 39 While this reasoning
draws on statistical logic, it also speaks to the public and deliberative quality of the
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scientific method, openly sharing information with other inquirers in the community and
building on their prior work. According to Peirce, the selfless devotion with which
scientists pursue knowledge leads
to their unreserved discussions with one another, to each being fully
mfoniied about the work of his neighbour, and availing himself of that
neighbors results; and thus in storming the stronghold of truth one mounts
upon the shoulders of another who has to ordinary apprehension failed, but
has in truth succeeded by virtue of the lessons of his failure. This is the
veritable essence of science. 40
In other words, the community of inquirers is just that, a community, not a collection of
independent agents who pursue the truth alone and contribute their data to some
repository where final results are tallied and released to the world. The scientific method
settles belief more satisfactorily than other approaches because it is self-corrective,
incrementally improving on the failures and successes of others and creating consensus
along the way.
Tying in both the logic of statistics and the virtues of deliberation, Edward C.
Moore described this self-corrective’ element of Peirce’s epistemology wonderfully.
The method is self-corrective because, although one observer, or a large
group of observers, may examine an object and come to a false conclusion
about it, the object continually constrains each successive observer to see
it as it really is, and if this process is continued over an infinite period of
time the method will correct the error, since, by continually referring back
to the object, an infinite number of observers must sooner or later discover
and remove any subjective elements in the conception of the object and
eventually perceive the object as it really is. 41
A successful application of the scientific method never ends, pushing each investigator to
build on the work of his predecessors and to get that much closer to the truth. But Peirce
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acknowledged that, realistically, a community of inquirers, whose size and time is
decidedly finite, may not correct itself and may remain divided on many questions. No
matter how hard they try, participants will often not be able to make significant progress
or reach any kind of consensus on a particularly difficult question. Nevertheless, this
reality check should not dash all hope that we can collectively find answers to those
particular questions with which our inquiries are busied.”42 What mattered most to
Peirce was the process, striving for consensus through painstaking deliberation and
cooperation, even when the fruits of this labor are not immediately evident.
The importance of community for Peirce cannot be overstated. His aversion to
nominalism in large part stemmed from its assumption that reality can only be
experienced on a particular basis, that the acquisition of any kind of truth is an individual
endeavor. But no one can determine what is right on his own. The certainty of death.
said Peirce, limits the number of experiences from which any one person can infer any
kind of general truths. Because the very idea of probability and of reasoning rests on the
assumption that this number is indefinitely great,” logic dictates that
our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate, but
must embrace the whole community. This community, again, must not be
limited, but must extend to all races of beings with whom we can come
into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, however
vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would
not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me,
illogical in all his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social
principle.
43
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Pe,rce was a great critic of individualism and believed that it blocked not only the road of
inquiry but also of human progress. To assume that one can leam autonomously, by
solely looking into the dark recesses of the self in the Cartesian fashion, was the4
vulgarest delusion of vanity,”44 and to suggest that “progress takes place by virtue of
every individual’s striving for himself with all his might and trampling his neighbor
under foot whenever he gets a chance to do so...may accurately be called the Gospel of
Greed. Peirce called tor a return to the gospel of Christ which states that “progress
comes from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his neighbors.”
No doubt, he believed that the widespread practice of the scientific method constitutes
this return.
II.
Peirce embraced tallibilism not only because he thought that man has a native
inability to know anything with absolute certainty but also because the natural world man
seeks to understand is always changing. In other words, nature itself is just as unreliable
as man's perception of it. The problem with infallibilism is that it cannot accommodate
this growing and evolving world—a world where events occur spontaneously and
unexpectedly and where nature and its laws are never stable.
The infallibilist naturally thinks that everything was substantially as it is
now. Laws at any rate being absolute could not grow. They either always
were, or they sprang instantaneously into being by a sudden fiat like the
drill of a company of soldiers. This makes the laws of nature absolutely
blind and inexplicable. Their why and wherefore can’t be asked. This
44
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absolutely blocks the road of inquiry. The fallibilist won’t do this. He
as s may these forces ot nature not be somehow amenable to reason?May they not have naturally grown up? After all, there is no reason to
think they are absolute. It all things are continuous, the universe must be
undergoing a continuous growth from non-existence to existence.46
We can never pursue the meaning of law if we simply assert that it either always existed
or appeared one day in its fixed condition out of nothing. Either supposition “blocks the
road of inquiry,” according to Peirce, because they do not offer any kind of explanation
for the existence ot laws. Instead of defining law in dichotomous terms—as either
absolute or non-existent—Peirce found it more reasonable to understand law in dynamic
terms, moving along a continuum that ranges between two asymptotic poles. Law begins
at a point of complete indeterminacy in the infinitely distant past and ends at a point of
absolute certainty in the infinitely distant future. “[Conformity with law,” Peirce
concluded, “is a fact requiring to be explained; and since law in general cannot be
explained by any law in particular, the explanation must consist in showing how law is
developed out of pure chance, irregularity, and indeterminacy.”47 This is not much of an
argument, but Peirce did not contend that this dynamic view of the universe unfolding
from chaos to regularity is absolutely true. He only suggested that it is a more reasonable
hypothesis, whose conformity with our experiences can actually be tested.
A belief in the immutability of natural law presupposes that instances of cause
and effect will occur with exact precision and infallible regularity. If we observe
imprecision or irregularity in our laws, we have reason to believe that our laws are not the
product of a vast and unchanging mechanism but are instead subject to spontaneous
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deviation or chance variat,on-or what he called tychism. Petree contended that there
were many examples of tyehism of which scientists are parttcularly aware. The
inexactitude of emp.ncal observattons in the laboratory, for example, confirms the
hypothesis that the universe and its laws are evolving.
To one who is behind the scenes, and knows that the most refined
comparisons of masses, lengths, and angles, far surpassing in precision all
other measurements, yet fall behind the accuracy of bank accounts, and
t aat the ordinary determinations of physical constants, such as appear from
month to month in the journals, are about on a par with an upholsterer’s
measurements of carpets and curtains, the idea of mathematical exactitude
being demonstrated in the laboratory will appear simply ridiculous.48
While some scientists would attribute these variations and imprecisions in measurement
completely to human error, Peirce claimed that this is a quixotic attempt to defend a
mechanistic view of the universe, the notion that events unfold in a necessary and logical
sequence. At this point, we have no way of knowing whether events are detennined in
this way, and we should not make this assumption when our experiences seem to belie
such a hypothesis. Men of science usually have the sense to remain more humble than
those crude mechanists who believe they hold the secret of the universe. Said Peirce: “I
have not found that it is the men whose lives are mostly passed within the fours walls of a
physical laboratory who are most inclined to be satisfied with a purely mechanical
metaphysics."
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They know from empirical observation that though the world may
appear mechanical to the untrained eye, it is in fact teeming with chance occurrences and
irregularity.
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Pe,rce argued that tychtsm is the only reasonable explanation not only for
observable inrpreciston in the laboratory but also for the growth toward tncreastng
complexity and variety in the universe.
By... admitting pure spontaneity of life as a character of the universe,
acting always and everywhere though restrained within narrow bounds by
the law, producing infinitesimal departures from the law continually and
great ones with infinite infrequency, I account for all the variety and
diversity of the umverse... mechanical law cannot account for this in the
least, that variety can spring only from spontaneity, and yet denies without
any evidence or reason the existence of this spontaneity, or else shoves it
back to the beginning of time and supposes it dead ever since. The
superior logic of my view appears to me is not so easily controverted. 50
Quite simply, mechanism cannot account for the observable increase of diversity in our
world, and “wherever diversity is increasing, there chance must be operative.” 51 Peirce
drew explicitly on Darwinism to make this argument. Darwin contended that evolution
begins with chance variation, the random change in the traits of an individual, which it
then passes on to future generations. Of course, anyone with a passing knowledge of
Darwinism knows that sometimes this trait may prove conducive to the survival of a
particular species or spell its future doom. But Peirce was more interested in how
tychism, unlike mechanism, can explain both the increase in variety within a species and,
on rarer occasions, the creation of new species. Although tychism introduces this
element ot spontaneity to the universe, adding to its richness and variety, this does not
mean that the universe has no order or regularity at all. To the contrary, laws always
constrain chance variation “within narrow bounds. Tychism merely suggests that the
universe produces innumerable “departures from the law,” most of which are
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“infinitesimal” such as those small but measurable inexactitudes observed in the
laboratory but some of which, on extremely rare occasions, prove “great” and
monumental. This means that laws have a certain uniformity and order to them but that
they are always subject to the possibility of variation. Just as fallibilism rests on the
notion of probability, so does tychism. We can think of law as a statistical mean around
which a distribution ot events, shaped like a bell-curve, can be drawn. While large-scale
(or “great”) deviations are statistical outliers and thus will occur infrequently, minor (or
“infinitesimal”) deviations are quite common and will occur frequently.
Understood in statistical terms, laws are variable, giving us predictions that are
likely but never precise. While Peirce speculated that laws are becoming less variable
over time and will become absolutely certain and mechanistic in the infinite future, this
means that for all practical purposes he had to replace the mechanical metaphor with an
organic one. The Peircean universe is not a machine but a conscious organism or a living
mind. This organism, bom in a state of utter confusion and indeterminacy, must develop
modes of behavior in order to establish a sense of order. Laws, then, do not follow the
unalterable logic of machines but instead resemble habits, those patterns of behavior that
any life form develops over time after countless repetitions. Laws and habits were
actually the same thing in Peirce’s estimation. As the universe evolves over time, it
develops laws or habits which give it an increasingly recognizable and predictable form.
Habit is responsible for creating any kind of intelligibility in the universe, endowing it
with a predictability and coherence with which it did not start. Nevertheless, until that
day in the infinite future, habits have that peculiar quality of “not acting with
71
exactitude,"52 of responding to certain circumstances in generally reliable, but never
precisely uniform, ways.
Peirce’s discussion of habit had important implications for his ideas about human
nature. Because laws were not immutable in Peirce’s view, neither were human beings.
In his search tor ideas and beliefs that serve as “rules for action,’’ man develops habits,
modes of behavior that in his experience prove useful time and again. Eventually, he
employs these habits without thinking about them too much, and they come to define
him. But no matter how mechanical his habits may appear, they are not hard-wired
irrevocably.
But no mental action seems to be necessary or invariable in its character.
In whatever manner the mind has reacted under a given sensation, in that
manner it is more likely to react again; were this, however, an absolute
necessity, habits would become wooden and ineradicable and, no room
being left for the formation of new habits, intellectual life would come to a
speedy close. Thus, the uncertainty of the mental law is no mere defect of
it, but is on the contrary of its essence. The truth is, the mind is not
subject to law in the same rigid sense that matter is. It only experiences
gentle forces which merely render it more likely to act in a given way than
it otherwise would be. There always remains a certain amount of arbitrary
spontaneity in its action, without which it would be dead. 53
Like the natural laws which provide form to the universe, mental habits are not
necessary or invariable. In tact, mental habits are even more uncertain than natural
laws, for they are only under the influence of “gentle forces" which guide our actions in a
certain directions without ever removing an element of “arbitrary spontaneity.” We may
be creatures of habit, but these habits can always be altered.
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A believer in the epistemological superiority of the unlimited community, Peirce
believed that human beings could only develop good habits-or habits that accord with
the truth—in a social context. Peirce was a great critic of nominalism in large part
because he believed that in denying the existence of universal truth it promoted an ethos
of individualism, selfishness, and greed. Peirce’s realism, on the other hand, teaches
people that universal truth actually exists and that a community of inquirers can become
quite confident, though not completely certain, of having attained it. That said, people
have to adopt the right social habits to form such a community and become productive
members of it. We have the choice, said Peirce, between two real options. We can either
embrace "Americanism, the worship of business, the life in which the fertilizing stream
of genial sentiment dries up or shrinks to a rill of comic tit-bits,” or we can come to terms
with our own insignificance as “mere cells of the social organism” and “recognize a
higher business than [our] own... a generalized conception of duty which completes
[one s] personality by melting it into the neighboring parts of the universal cosmos.” If
he chooses the latter, “man prepares himself for transmutation into a new form of life, the
joyful Nirvana in which the discontinuities of his will shall have all but disappeared.”54
The suggestion here is that man has the freedom to choose between subjective
individualism and objective truth, between the habits of greed and the habits of social
cooperation. In recognizing his duty to something larger than himself and becoming an
integral part of the unlimited community, man has the power to transform himself, both
in terms of knowledge and ethics, and make his personality complete.
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III.
The mutability of law and human nature may seem to imply that men have free
will, but Peirce claimed that this is not necessarily the case.
[T]he propositions that laws of nature are not absolute and that important
physical events are due to human reasoning are far from proving that
human action is (in any important degree) free, except in the sense that a
man is a machine with automatic controls, one over another, for five or six
grades, at least. I, for my part, am very dubious as to man's having more
freedom than that... 55
This passage, taken from a letter to British pragmatist F. C. S. Schiller, seems to suggests
that Peirce was actually a determinist. Indeed, in a letter to William James, Peirce also
said that he did not think “the will is free in any appreciable measure,” because
occurrences of chance variation or spontaneity “can only amount to much in a state of
things closely approximating to unstable equilibrium”—as in, when our habits cease to
work and we are irritated with doubt. The exercise of will, on the other hand, occurs in a
state of stable equilibrium, long after we have alleviated any doubts. In other words, we
exercise will in a largely mechanical or habitual way. That said, Peirce still upheld a
doctrine of limited freedom. In his letter to James he continued: “The freedom lies in the
choice which long antecedes the will. There a state of nearly unstable equilibrium is
found.”56 We exercise freedom during those moments of doubt when we must make
conscious choices in our struggle to develop new habits. Peirce suggested here that the
term “free will” is a misnomer and should be replaced with “free choice.” In his
understanding, the will actualizes those choices we made at an earlier time. These
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actualizations do not always reflect our earlier choices perfectly, in large part because
habit often gets in the way. There is no avoiding the ongoing battle between conscious
choice and pre-established habits—hence, Peirce’s doctrine of limited freedom.
A discussion of Peirce’s three categories and their relation to his ethics may shed
more light on the subject of freedom. Ultimately concerned with human action or
volition, ethics turns first to aesthetics to identify “what state of the world [is] most
admirable” and then investigates how we should bring this ideal world about. 57 Logic,
the study of how to reason correctly, emerges out of ethics. This last point may strike
one as counter-intuitive, but we must recall that, according to Peirce, we only think
because we must act. This becomes clear when we recall the three categories. The
creation of any general idea requires that we first experience sense perceptions (firsts)
and then react in particular ways (seconds). As we make sense of the world around us by
perceiving and acting, we grow aware of connections between the two and eventually
arrive at general ideas (thirds) out of which habits emerge. At that moment when our
habits have not yet been established, we have a choice to make. We are free to decide
which firsts we would like to experience and choose which seconds we will employ to
bring about those firsts. Our choices have important ethical implications because they
ultimately shape our ideas and beliefs which in turn become rules (or habits) for future
actions.
According to Peirce, there are such things as good and bad habits. Just as the
person who practices good logic must engage with the “unlimited community,” so must
the ethical person. The ethical person will exercise self-control and develop good habits
57
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Which promote social cooperation and deliberation. As these good social habits are vital
to good reasoning, the suggestion here is that the logical person is by definition an ethical
person. Peirce would probably have agreed with this simple formulation. He wrote:
Etlucs is the study ofwhat ends ofaction we are deliberately prepared to
adopt. That is right which is in conformity to ends which we are prepared
deliberately to adopt...The righteous man controls his passions, and makes
them conform to such ends as he is prepared to adopt as ultimate. If it
were in the nature ofman to be perfectly satisfied to make his personal
comfort his ultimate aim, no more blame would attach to him for doing so
than attaches to a hog for behaving in the same way. A logical reasoner is
a reasoner who exercises great self-control in his intellectual operations;
and therefore the logically good is simply a particular species of the
morally good. 58
Cntics have often assailed pragmatism for promoting moral relativism, but they have
obviously misread or overlooked the work of Peirce. Doing the right thing, acting
morally, was not a matter of subjective opinion for Peirce. Peirce rejected subjectivist
morality, such as the ethos of hedonism, on the basis that there are many times in our
lives when simply satiating our instinctive desire for sensual pleasure is not what we
really desire to do—and certainly not what we ought to do. Acting solely on the basis of
sensual instinct will often make us very dissatisfied, which is why we must turn to reason
or logic to ascertain what is morally right. The ethical person “deliberately.
. .controls his
passions, and makes them conform to such ends as he is prepared to adopt as ultimate.”
The goal here is not to satisfy temporary passions but to find an objective morality that
exists independently of individual gratification. Ethics teaches us how we can do this. It
“tells us that we can have a power of self-control, that no narrow or selfish aim can ever
prove satisfactory, that the only satisfactory aim is the broadest, highest, and most general
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possible aim. To do right in this world, we must control our individualistic habits and
cultivate a sense of community and wider social responsibility. It is well within our
power to achieve this highest of aims.
Although human beings do not enjoy radical freedom in Peirce’s estimation, they
do have the capacity to alter their habits. He firmly believed that men could find greater
happiness and wisdom if they could only learn the virtues of thoughtful reflection and
public deliberation, engaging with the larger community to solve problems. Whether
they would ever learn these virtues was another question to which he conceded there was
no easy answer.
The question whether the genus homo has any existence except as
individuals is the question whether there is anything of any more dignity,
worth, and importance than individual happiness, individual aspirations,
and individual life. Whether men really have anything in common, so that
the community is to be considered an end in itself.
. .is the most
fundamental practical question in regard to every public institution the
constitution of which we have it in our power to influence. 60
Even if Peirce never fully considered the political implications of his philosophy, the
democratic tone of his hopes is unmistakable. He was committed to the idea that people
could come together and achieve a higher ideal than American individualism. While the
house of participatory democracy had yet to be built, Peirce most certainly helped to lay
down its foundation.
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CHAPTER III
THE LONELY COURAGE OF WILLIAM JAMES
In 1898, William James (1842-1910) delivered a paper at the University of
California at Berkeley, in which he credited his friend Charles Peirce for introducing
pragmatism to the world over twenty years before. Peirce’s difficult personality and
untoward lifestyle prevented him from ever landing a permanent academic position, and
his inability to finish most of the projects on which he worked tirelessly left his
philosophical contributions largely unnoticed. James, whose professorship at Harvard
and well-received publications gave him a celebrity status in academic circles, never
forgot his friend and tried many times to lift him out of philosophical obscurity.
Although certainly appreciative of his friend’s generous efforts, Peirce did not treat
James s philosophical works with equal kindness. He faulted James for being imprecise
and unsystematic, relying too heavily on psychology and not enough on logic in his
formulation of pragmatism. In tact, Peirce was so dismayed by the direction in which
James and others were taking pragmatism that he sought to distance himself from them
by naming his philosophy “pragmaticism,” a term “ugly enough to be safe from
kidnappers.” 1
Without a doubt, James’s version of pragmatism differed considerably from
Peirce's. He initially turned to pragmatism as a means to justify faith in God and free
will, and he often presented this school of thought as a way for individuals to avert
metaphysical crises—as, in fact, he did for himself. The virtue of pragmatism, as he saw
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it, was that it provided a harmonious balance between the “tough-mindedness” of
materialism and empiricism and the “tender-mindedness” of spiritualism and
rationalism. 2 It could meet the factual and methodological rigors of science and at the
same time appeal to our subjective need for something more meaningful and permanent
in our lives. The end result was a philosophy that placed considerable emphasis on the
dignity of the individual and his freedom to change himself and the world around him.
At times James seemed to neglect the importance of community in the search for truth,
and his philosophy seemed to languish in radical subjectivism and relativism, in which
truth amounted to nothing more than the desires of each individual.
But, as we shall see, critics of James have overstated his individualism. James did
not subscribe to liberal dogma which delineated a clear divide between the individual and
the collective; he understood that they shared a symbiotic relationship. James’s
philosophy proved friendly to democratic principles, for which he often showed public
support, and his work helped lay the groundwork for participatory democratic theory.
Not surprisingly, then, all three democratic tenets are recognizable in his writings. In
arguing that people can only acquire knowledge experientially and socially, that their
truth claims are always working hypotheses, James espoused a democratic epistemology.
He also revealed a democratic psychology in maintaining that human nature is flexible
and subject to social construction and that, as mere bundles of habits, people are
transformable. And, finally, he held faithfully to a democratic theology, the belief that
human beings have free will and can thus choose their destiny.
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Unlike Peirce, James understood more clearly that political lessons could be
denved from pragmatist philosophy. Though he did not match Dewey in calling for a
participatory democracy, he struck a decidedly democratic tenor not only in his
philosophical writings but also in his approach to teaching, his personal relationships, and
his political commitments. He was an exceedingly magnanimous and tolerant man,
whose reputation for open-mindedness attracted the more unorthodox students at
Harvard. W. E. B. Dubois, Alain Locke (the first African-American Rhodes scholar),
and Gertrude Stem were among his most enthusiastic students. James was a champion of
the underdog, the lost soul and the nonconformist, and he held large and elite institutions
in contempt for trampling on even the most unconventional expressions of individual
genius. It should come as no surprise that James was one of the few who was able to
overlook the eccentricities and appreciate the mind of Charles Peirce. Walter Lippmann
called his former professor "so very much of a democrat”3 and wrote just a few months
after his death that “[i]t is an encouraging thought that America should have produced
perhaps the most tolerant man of our generation.”4
Forever concerned with the plight of others, James ardently opposed reckless
American intervention abroad and saw the moral bankruptcy of colonialism, imperialism,
and excessive militarism. In the wake of the Spanish-American War and the occupation
of the Philippines, he became the vice president of the Anti-Imperialist League and wrote
countless letters to the editor denouncing American foreign policy. His opposition rested
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primarily on his belief that American imperialism betrayed a blindness to alternative
perspectives and ways of life. He was just as critical of excessive greed and materialism
at home, blaming luxuriant living and “the exclusive worship of the bitch-goddess
SUCCESS” for our “moral flabbiness.” 5 Sinking almost a Marxist tone, James claimed
that men who are enthralled by luxury are corrupt, cowardly, and morally lethargic. Only
a “man for whom poverty has no terrors becomes a freeman.”6 His sympathy for the
poor led him to support the re-distribution of wealth and moving toward a “socialist
equilibrium, but he adamantly opposed all things big, including big government.
Indeed, his political philosophy grew increasingly anarchistic, and he came to believe that
only small communities could govern themselves justly and sanely and provide ample
opportunity for the exercise of civic courage.
While Peirce's democratic temperament appeared most strongly in his
epistemology, James displayed his democratic colors brightly in all three tenets. Peirce
placed a great deal of weight on his belief that truth is probabilistic, best approximated by
deliberative communities. James agreed with Peircean epistemology, but his
individualistic streak tended to downplay the importance of communal learning in his
thought. With far more pomp, he stressed an ardent faith in the educability of all men,
not just members of the elite, and in their immense capacity for strenuous action and
control of their destinies. The heart of James’s democratic thought lies in his call for
civic action. We turn now to James's pragmatist philosophy to identify the origins of this
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political orientation and see how he played a crucial role in this story of participatory
democratic thought in America.
I.
Surprisingly enough, the story begins with a metaphysical crisis. Throughout the
1860s and early 1870s James suffered from intermittent bouts of depression. Some
evidence suggests that these dark periods may have stemmed in part from either his
upbringing or a genetic predisposition tor melancholia, 7 but the prevailing philosophical
doctrines of the Victorian age, determinism and materialism, seem to be the primary
culprits. As a young man trying to choose his vocation in life, James proved
frustratingly indecisive. The prospect of living in either a preordained or nihilistic
universe (or both) made choosing a vocation rather pointless to him. He finally settled on
teaching psychology and philosophy almost accidentally after dabbling for many years in
chemistry, anatomy, medicine, and even art. A temporary teaching appointment at
Harvard in 1 872 awoke within him unknown reserves of energy and confidence. But his
experience did not suddenly lift him out his crisis, for he would suffer from relapses of
paralyzing self-doubt throughout his life. Teaching represented James’s way out of his
funk, perhaps not a calling so much as a respectable career for which he happened to
have a particular talent and also received just compensation. But finding a fairly
rewarding and lucrative vocation was not sufficient to prevent those nagging specters,
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determinism and materialism, from haunting him. James gravitated to psychology and
philosophy in particular because they helped him challenge these paralyzing doctrines,
gave him the resolve to fight back and find meaning in life, and ultimately turned him
into a vigorous and admirably productive person.
But before he could become that man, James had to contend with determinism, a
doctrine which ‘professes that those parts of the universe already laid down absolutely
appoint and decree what the other parts shall be. The future has no ambiguous
possibilities hidden in its womb. ..Any other future complement than the one fixed from
eternity is impossible."
9
Determinism comes in two forms, material and spiritual, neither
of which was satisfactory to James. In 1 869, he wrote his old friend Tom Ward in
despair over the bleakness of materialistic (or mechanistic) determinism. If this vision
were true, he observed, we inhabit a universe of “instable molecules trembling in their
own preappointed way.” “I feel,” he continued, “that we are Nature through and through,
that we are wholly conditioned, that not a wiggle of our will happens save as the result of
physical laws. 1 While this vision was hardly uplifting, neither was a Calvinist or
Hegelian universe, in which our lives were preordained by an all-powerful Absolute.
Spiritual determinism provided no comfort for James.
Beauty and hideousness, love and cruelty, life and death keep house
together in indissoluble partnership; and there gradually steals over us,
instead of the old warm notion of a man-loving Deity, that of an awful
power that neither hates nor loves, but rolls all things together
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meaninglessly to a common doom. This is an uncanny, a sinister a
nightmare view of life... 11
Whatever its form, determinism suggested a chillingly amoral universe, for man was
powerless to control his own destiny, subject to the caprice of matter or god, each equally
insensitive to his plight and the evils he endured.
The problem of evil was a particular sticking point for James. In the throes of his
metaphysical crisis in February of 1870, James wrote in his diary:
Can one with full knowledge and sincerity ever bring one’s self so to
sympathize with the total process of the universe as heartily to assent to
the evil that seems inherent in its details?... though evil slay me, she can’t
subdue me, or make me worship her. The brute force is all at her
command, but the final protest of my soul as she squeezes me out of
existence gives me still a certain sense of superiority. 12
James could not passively accept the existence of evil in the universe. Nor could he
fathom a benevolent and loving god who would abide the many evils that befell
humankind if he had the power and knowledge to prevent them. God as traditionally
understood, both omniscient and omnipotent, could only include evil in his plan of the
universe if he were profoundly indifferent to our pain and suffering. 13 Many absolutist
philosophers—including James’s eventual colleague and rival at Harvard, Josiah
Royce
—
posited a higher truth that mattered far more than our temporal experience and
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that, it made known to us, could explain how evil fit into God’s scheme. But the only
explanation open to them, according to James, was an unsatisfying form of subjectivism
in which the preordained untolding of the universe is understood as “a contrivance for
deepening the theoretic consciousness of what goodness and evil in their intrinsic natures
are. Not the doing either of good or of evil is what natures cares for, but the knowing of
them.” 14 James thought this explanation trivialized earthly experience and reduced it to
mere theater. Such an unconscionable philosophy “wrenches my personal instincts,” he
wrote. It transforms life from a tragic reality into an insincere melodramatic
exhibition.” 15 It has the audacity to suggest that the world we experience day to day, with
its many trials and miseries, is not real
,
when it is the only reality we can be sure of.
[Wjhile Professors Royce and Bradley and a whole host of guileless
thoroughfed thinkers are unveiling Reality and the Absolute and
explaining away evil and pain, this is the condition of the only beings
known to us anywhere in the universe with a developed consciousness of
what the universe is. What these people experience is Reality. It gives us
an absolute phase of the universe. It is the personal experience of those
best qualified in our circle of knowledge to have experience, to tell us
what is. Now what does thinking about the experience of these persons
come to, compared to directly and personally feeling it as they feel it?
The philosophers are dealing in shades, while those who live and feel
know truth. 16
As James saw it, the world we experienced, with all its evil and pain, was the reality we
were dealt; our job here on earth, however brief our time might be, was not to acquiesce
quietly but to fight it with every ounce of energy we could muster.
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The problem, however, was that a deterministic universe did not endow men with
the free will to engage in this fight. Passive acceptance seemed our only option. James
found this world view profoundly pessimistic because it at once reduced man to an
ineffectual spectator, eliminated the possibility of hope or redemption, and made ethics
irrelevant. As mere spectators, men do not have the capacity to reshape the world around
them or to ameliorate the problems and evils they face. “Determinists, who deny [free
will], who say that individual men originate nothing, but merely transmit to the future the
whole push of the past cosmos of which they are so small an expression, diminish man.
He is less admirable, stripped of this creative principle/’ 17 Without this creative capacity,
man can find no hope in the dawning of a better day and must resign himself to the
inevitability of what the future holds. Perhaps most disturbingly, a universe devoid of
free will requires us to reserve moral judgment, no matter how repugnant and hideous the
behavior we observe may be. As he saw it, we cannot pass judgment on anyone and hold
him accountable for his behavior if he could not have chosen to act differently. Though
Royceans would suggest that even a determinist universe should awaken our moral
sympathies and deepen our knowledge of good and evil, James simply could not
reconcile determinism with ethics. For determinism meant that human effort does not
make an ounce of difference in the future.
While determinism made James increasingly despondent as a young man, he also
had difficulties grappling with materialism. 18 Some of James’s contemporaries, including
the English philosopher Herbert Spencer, claimed that materialism can still inspire one to
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appreciate, even worship, the sublime and wondrous creations of nature. The fact that
they originate from blind physical forces and not a grand designer makes no difference.
they said, for nature remains just as fascinating and refined. But James understood
intuitively that a universe composed solely of matter had no intrinsic meaning or moral
structure. As a seasoned philosopher many years later, James would articulate quite
succinctly what was at stake in this debate: “Materialism means simply the denial that
the moral order is eternal, and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the
affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope... spiritualistic faith in
all its forms deals with a world of promise, while materialism's sun sets in a sea of
disappointment.” 1 '' In a number of publications James found occasion to offer a “picture
of the last state of the universe"2" by quoting Arthur James Balfour, an English
philosopher and politician who would become Prime Minister in 1902. His Foundations
ofBelief { 1895), an introduction to the study of theology, pulled no punches in its
portrayal of the materialist abyss.
The energies of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be
dimmed, and the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race
which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into the
pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy consciousness which in
this obscure comer has for a brief space broke the contented silence of the
universe, will be at rest. Matter will know itself no longer. ‘Imperishable
monuments' and ‘immortal deeds,' death itself, and love stronger than
death, will be as if they had not been seen. Nor will anything that is, be
better or worse for all that the labor, genius, devotion, and suffering of
man have striven through countless ages to effect. 21
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For James, Balfour captured what is so unsettling about materialism. It implies that man
is but an accidental interruption, a momentary flicker of consciousness in an otherwise
cold and indifferent universe. When the last light of humanity is extinguished, all our
triumphs and ideals, the many evils we endured and inflicted, will disappear
unremembered, as if we never were. Evoking a universe devoid of morality and
meaning, this image proved intolerable for James.
It is exceedingly ironic that critics of James have accused him of flirting with
nihilism when he devoted his career to constructing a philosophy that would enable men
in a scientific age to reconcile their empirical impulses with their need for something
more meaningful and permanent in life. James scholar George Cotkin argues that the
philosopher “was convinced that the failure of individuals to believe in either God or
their own free will confined them to lives of depression and debility, doubt and ennui.
James wanted to reach the hearts of this class of thinkers. “ Certainly identifying with
those thoughtful men who had trouble making their way out of this philosophical thicket,
James felt it was incumbent upon him and any philosopher to restore their faith in free
will and God and at the same time remain in accord with science. It was for this reason
that James was drawn to pragmatism, which he saw as a method of finding satisfactory
truths, both intellectual and emotional. Whereas Peirce saw the pragmatist method as an
outgrowth of logic, James tapped into its psychological roots.
Unbeknownst to the young and angst-ridden James, his first experience with the
pragmatist method occurred in 1870 after he read the second volume of Charles
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Renouvier's Essais de critique generate. He argued that while we may indeed inhabit a
determined universe, to embrace it would be absurd given its implications. The only
rational choice is to believe in our free will and act accordingly. Of course, we can never
know for sure that our belief is true, according to Renouvier, but we should not despair
from our doubt, for “[cjertainty is not and cannot be absolute. It is.. .a condition and an
action of human beings. ..Properly speaking, there is no certainty; there are only people
who are certain.''- 1 Renouvier’s defense of free will was a revelation to James, who
overnight became a believer in free will even though there was no definitive proof of its
existence. On April 30, 1870, he wrote in his diary:
I finished the first part of Renouvier’s 2 nd Essays and see no reason why
his definition of free will the sustaining of a thought because I choose to
when I might have other thoughts—need be the definition of an illusion.
At any rate I will assume for the present—until next year—that it is no
illusion. My first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.24
Going far beyond "next year,” James would sustain his belief in free will for a lifetime.
This affirmation helped James ascend from the depths of his depression and, though he
would suffer from melancholy and doubt on and off throughout his life, planted the seeds
of an idea that would serve as both a personal coping mechanism and a philosophical
method. James learned from this experience that we have every right to embrace beliefs
for which there are no definitive proofs, so long as they are reasonable, given what we do
know, and more satisfactory to us than the alternatives. It was an object lesson on which
he would draw for the rest of his life.
23
Renouvier, quoted in Menand, The Metaphysical Club
,
219.
Perry, Thought and Character of William James , 323.
89
Over twenty-five years after James experienced his revelation, he still justified the
belief in free will as he did in his 1 870 diary entry. Echoes of it can be heard in his
discussion of free will in The Principles ofPsychology (1890).
If, meanwhile, the will be undetermined, it would seem only fitting that
the belief in its indetermination should be voluntarily chosen from
amongst other possible beliefs. Freedom’s first deed should be to affirm
itself. We ought never to hope for any other method of getting at the truth
it indeterminism be a fact. Doubt of this particular truth will therefore
probably be open to us to the end of time, and the utmost that a believer in
free-will can ever do will be to show that the deterministic arguments are
not coercive.'
In the “Dilemma of Determinism,” an article published in his book The Will to Believe
(1895), he reiterated this sentiment when he maintained that “our first act of freedom, if
we are free, ought in all inward propriety to be to affirm that we are free.”26 James was
well aware of the empincist dictate that a rigorous thinker should never accept a belief
based on insufficient evidence. A contemporary of his, William Kingdon Clifford, even
called it “sinful.” But James argued that when faced with a “living option”—an
inescapable choice between two or more beliefs which intellect alone cannot resolve—we
have the right to accept the most satisfying one as true without sufficient evidence.27 In
reality, we all make assumptions and accept beliefs for which we have not received
conclusive evidence. The empiricist, for example, assumes there are truths and realities
which we can discover by testing hypotheses with data collected from our experience.
His life's work rests on an unprovable belief in the existence of objective reality.
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You believe in objective evidence, and I do. Of some things we feel that
we are certain: we know, and we know that we do know. There is
something that gives a click inside of us, a bell that strikes twelve when
the hands of our mental clock have swept the dial and meet over the
meridian hour. The greatest empiricists among us are only empiricists on
reflection: when left to their instincts, they dogmatize like infallible
popes.
As James saw it, we all exist on ‘“dogmatic' ground,” embracing those belief systems
that we find intuitively appealing and vital to our way of life. The scientist, just as much
as the believer in free will or God, believes certain foundational ideas which can be
neither proven nor disproven. The intellectually honest thing to do is to admit as much
and come clean about those unsubstantiated beliefs—our dogmas—to which we all cling
at certain pivotal moments in our lives. The free will dogma was especially important for
James, tor it functioned as the basis of his philosophical system and a world view that
was satisfying on a personal level. It was a platform from which everything else would
spring.
James found free will a liberating belief, opening the universe to infinite
possibilities and unseen vistas that remained forever closed in a deterministic universe.
Free will implies that the universe is subject to novelty and spontaneous change, that we
can expect the unexpected, including valiant efforts on our part to ameliorate the many
problems and evils we face in this world. It means that life is a “real fight, in which
something is eternally gained for the universe by success,” not a “game of private
theatricals from which one may withdraw at will.”29 In Pragmatism
,
James made the
distinction between pessimists and optimists, the former believing the world’s salvation is
28
Ibid., 466.
29
Ibid., 502.
91
impossible and the latter believing it is inevitable, and finds neither one satisfactory. 30
This may be surprising to those who assume that when James’s belief in free will
unshackled him from the dark dungeon of pessimism, he ran straight to the sunny valley
of optimism. But, for James, either option represented a closed system, a “block
universe whose story is foretold from the beginning of time. Optimism, like pessimism,
means a pre-determined world, and even if salvation awaits us, the same old questions
about the existence of evil and the dignity ofman arise. The only alternative left,
according to James, is the doctrine of meliorism, which “treats salvation as neither
inevitable nor impossible. It treats it as a possibility...”31 Meliorism means that the
world’s salvation ultimately depends on us, on the free choices we make, on the amount
of grit we bring to the cause.
James found a melioristic universe, in which humanity can play an active role in
its salvation, far more comforting than the alternatives. This meant that the universe was
not a block, a pristine geometric shape with all the parts interconnected and unified.
Embracing chance and spontaneity, James envisioned a universe with many uncertainties
and disjointed parts, with many unpredictable, even thrilling, stories that bear no
particular relation to each other. His was a Darwinian universe with no Author or
Designer; we the actors wrote the stories willy-nilly as we went along, never sure of the
outcome but determined to make our mark. James understood that faith in free will and
meliorism led inexorably to the conclusion that the universe was pluralistic.
30
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Indeterminism thus denies the world to be one unbending unit of fact. It
says there is a certain ultimate pluralism in it; and, so saying, it
corroborates our ordinary unsophisticated view of things. To that view,
actualities seem to float in a wider sea of possibilities from out of which
t ey are chosen; and, somewhere, indeterminism says, such possibilities
exist, and form a part of truth.32
A pluralistic universe does not accept the possibility of absolute truth, because what may
be true in one part of the universe may be decidedly false in another. Instead, there are
many truths being created independently in various segments of the universe, and we
have no way of reconciling them in a neat and universal way. “All that my pluralism
contends for," James wrote in a letter to a friend, “is that there is nowhere extant a
complete gathering up of the universe in one focus, either of knowledge, power or
purpose."
33
In keeping with this spirit
,
James often said that the terms “multiverse” or
pluriverse were more precise reflections of the diverse and complex world in which we
lived.
Unfortunately, solving the dilemma of determinism in this manner opened the
door to his fear of nihilism and godlessness. It seemed to invite a Balfourian view of the
world. But James found a way out of this conundrum by once again exercising his right
to believe in god, but a god his pluralistic universe could accommodate. Although
pluralism cannot make sense of a traditionally understood god—at once all-knowing, -
powerful, and -loving—it can certainly make room for a god that “works under some
dark and inscrutable limitations.”34 As he saw it.
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the only way to escape from the paradoxes and perplexities that a
consistently thought-out monistic universe suffers from as from a species
of auto-intoxication the mystery of the ‘fall’ namely, of reality lapsing
into appearance, truth into error, perfection into imperfection; of evil, in
short, the mystery ot universal determinism, of the block-universe eternal
and without a history, etc.;—the only way of escape, I say, from all this is
to be frankly pluralistic and assume that the superhuman consciousness,
however vast it may be, has itself an external environment and
consequently is finite... that there is a God, but that he is finite, either in
power in knowledge, or in both at once. 35
As mentioned earlier, James believed that an all-powerful God could only abide evil and
human misery if he were amoral, completely unmoved by our experiences. This god
does not deserve our reverence. A “finite God,” on the other hand, does not have to be
tolerant of evil or its creator; in fact, we can imagine him working tirelessly, if not always
successfully, to defeat it. “If there be a God," remarked James, “he is no absolute all-
experiencer, but simply the experiencer of the widest conscious span.”36 This is
undoubtedly a wise and just god to whom we must often turn for strength and guidance.
But, for some unknown reason, he also requires our assistance, the human exercise of
free will to “strengthen his hands" in the battle against evil.
17
James described our
relationship with god quite succinctly: “He helps us and we can help him.”38 This
higher being, whose finitude makes our role in the universe far more crucial, is the only
kind of “God worthy of the name.”39
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Of course, James could never demonstrate that god has limited powers, or that
there is a god in the first place. He was once again faced with a “living option,” this time
a choice between three reasonable but unprovable beliefs—that there is no god, that there
is an all-powerful god, and that there is a finite God-and, in accordance with what he
considered to be his right, he embraced the most satisfying belief as true. While James
could quite comfortably justify his faith in this way, he knew that persuading a larger
audience would require him to develop his idea farther and engage in a systematic study
of the nature of truth. Hoping to reconcile the age-old tension between science and
religion, James devoted the last decade of his life to developing his pragmatic conception
of truth. He asserted that ideas or beliefs are only true insofar as they work for us in our
concrete experience. Even our unsubstantiated beliefs, including faith in God and free
will, are true if they work for us, if they prove somehow beneficial in our day-to-day life.
After the release of his book Pragmatism in 1907, James would have to endure an endless
onslaught of criticism from a wide range of philosophers and intellectuals—including
even the friend from whom he borrowed most heavily, Charles Peirce—and would spend
the rest of his life defending this rather curious understanding of truth.
II.
In 1898, James introduced pragmatism to the world in a paper entitled
“Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results,” in which he credited Peirce for
making a simple but profound formulation: ideas are really just rules for action. As we
saw in the last chapter, Peirce was especially interested in how we derive the meaning of
an object. Our concept of an object is nothing more than the total sum of the practical
95
consequences of our experiences with it, both real and imagined. Take a pear, for
example. We act on the pear in a variety of ways, gaining a large quantity of sensory
information about it. Our preliminary idea of it will be tantamount to the percepts our
actions produce. Some of these sensory experiences, especially the more satisfying ones,
may inspire habitual action. Tasting the pear may produce such a pleasurable experience
in our mouths that we are inclined to taste it again. Eventually, every time we are hungry
and see a pear, we will automatically take a bite. Our final idea of a pear, then, points to
both the sensory experiences we associate with it and the habitual actions it induces in us.
A pear will have a particular feel and appearance, and we will eat it in a certain manner
and on certain occasions. If we believe that a pear is indeed before us, we will obey those
habits and act accordingly. In other words, the idea of a pear sitting before us, our belief
in its existence, will evoke certain rules for action.
James called this the “the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism.'’ In his
paper from 1898, he wrote:
Beliefs, in short are really rules for action; and the whole function of
thinking is but one step in the production of habits of action. If there were
any part ot a thought that made no difference in the thought’s practical
consequences, then that part would be no proper element of the thought’s
significance...Thus to develop a thought’s meaning we need only
determine what conduct it is fitted to produce; that conduct is for us its
sole significance...To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object,
then, we need only consider what effects of a conceivably practical kind
the object may involve—what sensations we are to expect from it, and
what reactions we must prepare. 40
Ideas or beliefs are only significant insofar as they have concrete and perceptible
consequences. This is why James maintained that “there can be no difference which
Writings 1 878-1899, 1079-80.
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doesn't make a difference-no difference in the abstract which does not express itself in a
difference of concrete fact, and of conduct consequent upon the fact, imposed on
somebody, somehow, somewhere, and somewhen.”41 I may refer to a particular object as
a wrench while my less verbal friend calls it a thingamajig, but if we both use the object
in precisely the same way, to tighten loose bolts and assemble bicycles and futon frames,
our ideas of the object are identical. The abstract distinction is nominal and has no
bearing on how we relate to the object, on what it really means to us in practical terms.
To this point, James and Peirce shared similar ground, but James began to diverge
from his friend when he derived meaning not only from our percepts and actions but also
from our subjective feelings and emotional responses. James found this perfectly
justifiable, arguing in his 1884 essay “What Is an Emotion?” and developing further in
his two-volume opus, The Principles ofPsychology ( 1 890), that our emotions consist of
nothing more than the physical changes or responses a particular stimulus may induce.
Often called the James-Lange Theory of Emotion—named after William James himself
and another psychologist, Carl G. Lange, both of whom formulated this theory around the
same time and independently of each other—the idea was startlingly simple yet difficult
to accept. It stated that emotions do not trigger a physical response; they are the physical
response. Take the emotion of sadness as an example. We do not cry because we are
sad; we are sad because we cry. We cry and feel a constriction in our throats not because
we are in a state of sadness beforehand but rather because, for some unknown reason, we
have developed the habit of producing these physiological responses in certain
41
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mstances. - All this
.mplies that emottons and feelings are merely percepts, awakened
when we confront certain objects. A tulip may evoke joy in the same way that it evokes
the color red; the full meaning of a tulip has to include both these sensory experiences.
Once he equated emotional experiences with percepts, James steered his version
of pragmatism down a more subjective path, for emotions are variable, unique to each
individual. But James believed that introducing this element of subjectivism to the
pragmatic method sometimes helps us understand what an object really means to us.
Consider the idea ot God. The difference between materialism and theism, according to
James, is practical: the former denies the existence of an eternal moral order and makes
us feel depressed or anxious, while the latter gives us hope and gives us joy. For many of
us, the idea of God becomes tied up with the emotional feeling ofjoy, which is why so
many people have embraced it for millennia. Indeed, its meaning has generated such a
wellspring of good feeling that people have naturally taken the next step and come to
believe it is in fact true
43
The subjective element in James’s pragmatism led him to take
this next step, too, eventually declaring, much to his friend Peirce s chagrin, that ideas or
4
“ Ibid., 352. James says here (in Psychology: Briefer Course): “Our natural way of
thinking about these coarser emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites
the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the
bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changesfollow directly
the perception ofthe excitingfact, and that ourfeeling ofthe same changes as they occur
IS the emotion. Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a
bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The
hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one
mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must
first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry
because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry,
strike, or tremble because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.”
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beliefs are true insofar as they prove satisfactory-er, as James put it, -the truth of an
idea is determined by its satisfactoriness ”44 Our belief in God, then, can be true if it
satisfies us emotionally. 45 It should come as no surprise, then, that James’s harshest
critics accused him of radical relativism or subjectivism, suggesting that truth is whatever
we want it to be.
But this criticism betrays a superficial understanding of James's pragmatic
conception of truth. James never said that we can assert any truth that suits our fancy.
James subscribed in part to what philosophers call a coherence theory of truth, the notion
that new truths must accommodate as many old truths as possible. This means that our
belief in God is true not just because it is satisfactory emotionally but also in every other
aspect of our lives. The “hypothesis of God" is only true if it can “combine satisfactorily
with all the other working truths” to which we adhere.46 This is why James maintained
that
the greatest enemy of any one of our truths may be the rest of our truths.
Truths have once tor all this desperate instinct of self-preservation and of
desire to extinguish whatever contradicts them. My belief in the Absolute,
based on the good it does me, must run the gauntlet of all my other
beliefs.
47
The belief in God may do me good emotionally but may prove unsatisfactory as a whole
because it fails to appeal on an intellectual level. James could never accept the
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conventional understanding of God, either emotionally or intellectually, but he eventually
amved at a theistic truth—the existence of a finite God—that could "run the gauntlet” of
all his other beliefs and values. We are all “extreme conservatives” at heart, only
adopting new truths that preserve “the older stock of truths with a minimum of
modification."4 * Failure to understand this, said James, accounted for a large portion of
the criticism leveled against pragmatism. 49
It is important to note that James combined his coherence theory with a
correspondence theory of truth. His correspondence theory did not suggest, as some
philosophers do, that truth is a mere copy of the object under consideration, but rather
that it is an ongoing verification process to test whether our idea agrees with both our
sensory and intellectual experiences. James liked to describe pragmatic truth in
metaphorical terms, sometimes calling it an idea that “works” or proves “useful,” other
times an idea that has profitability or cash-value. Though his metaphors were
sometimes vague and open to misinterpretation, James was actually expressing a fairly
simple concept. All truths have specific consequences that can be verified experientially.
In Pragmatism
,
he wrote:
The great assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means
essentially an inert static relation. When you’ve got your true idea of
anything, there's an end of the matter. You’re in possession, you know;
you have fulfilled your thinking destiny. ..and nothing more need follow
on that climax of your rational destiny. Epistemologically you are in stable
equilibrium.
Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. “Grant an
idea or belief to be true,” it says, “what concrete difference will its being
true make in any one’s actual life; how will the truth be realized? What
48
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experiences will be different from those which should obtain if the belief
were false? What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in experiential
terms?”
The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer:
True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and
verify. False ideas are those that we can not. That is the practical
difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the meaninu
of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as. 50
James’s pragmatism drew heavily on science and the scientific method and at times
sounds a lot like positivism, as indeed it does in the preceding passage. From a positivist
perspective, the virtue of pragmatism is that it resists excessive abstraction, deducing
truths from dogmatic assertions or immutable first principles, and instead asserts that we
only know what we can verify factually. Pragmatism has the additional virtue of not
standing for any particular results, for being “a method only.” 51 But unlike positivists,
James (and his fellow pragmatists, Peirce and Dewey) believed that truth acquisition
involves projecting observations of past experiences into the future and making
predictions based on that information. In other words, truth is prospective rather than
retrospective.
For James, a true idea was simply a successful prediction, a belief that turns out to
be right some time in the future. It escorts us directly to those sense experiences we
believed our actions would produce. This means that we cannot passively observe the
world around us and absorb its many truths; we must actively test whether our predictions
are correct. Based on my observations of how meter maids on campus go about their
business, I may have good reason to believe that unpermitted cars parked in the lot near
50
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my building never receive tickets after 2:30, but the verification of this hypothesis, of this
prediction, demands action on my part. I need to park in the lot at 2:3 1 for several days
in a row, and each time I leave the lot without a ticket, I confirm my hypothesis that
much more. After a month or two of success, I may begin to park in the lot after 2:30
without thinking and literally make my initial hypothesis a true idea—a rule for habitual
action. This example illustrates what James meant when he said, “The truth of an idea is
not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made
true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying
itself, its veri
-fication."
52
It is important to stress that, for the pragmatist, truth is that
which tells us something about what the future holds. Never entirely certain about the
future, he accepts that his truths are fallible—always probabilistic affairs. It is always
possible, for example, that parking services will instruct meter maids to alter their routes
so as to bring them to my lot later in the day. Because truths always have a provisional
status, they must be constantly verified and re-verified. Truth cannot abide a hiatus in the
verification process; it demands vigilance on our part and will quickly dissipate without
our active and persistent participation. If I stop parking in the lot for a while, I will not
know whether my truth still holds.
James blamed the peculiarities of our language for the conventional, and
mistaken, view that truth is a static entity preceding our experience. He saw the word
“truth as the noun form of the verb “verify,” as another word for the process of
verification, and he compared it to other nouns ending in “th” which describe processes
rather than entities. “Truth for us is simply a collective name for verification processes,
52
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just as health, wealth, strength, etc. are names for other processes connected with
life... Truth is mu*, just as health, wealth and strength are made, in the course of
experience.” Although we sometimes make the mistake of thinking that health is an
abstract concept or an a priori condition that precedes life experience, we have an
intuitive sense that health is a process, a way of life which requires eating right, taking
regular exercise, and getting an adequate amount of sleep. 5 ' Quite similarly, Jamesian
truth is a way of life, a process that continues to grow throughout our lives, so long as we
actively nurture it.
This notion ot truth as growing toward the future, always becoming and never just
being, is what separates pragmatism from positivism and empiricism. In 1875, long
before he fully developed his pragmatist philosophy, James scratched out a note in which
he defined truth along these lines: “The truth of a thing or idea is its meaning, or its
destiny, that which grows out of it. This would be a doctrine reversing the opinion of the
empiricists that the meaning of an idea is that which it has grown from.”54 This implies
that the truth is not only prospective but also dynamic. This was why James believed that
truth-building sometimes requires leaps of faith, exercising our will to believe in
unverified truths and acting on them. The very act of believing could be the first and
most crucial step in making that belief come true. Such beliefs “cannot become true till
our faith has made them so,” wrote James, citing the example of a trapped mountain
climber who must believe he can make a dangerous leap to safety if he ever wants to do
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so successfully and avert his imminent doom. This example illustrates perfectly that
there are ‘cases wherefaith creates its own verification ,”55
Crities of James were especially troubled by the dynamism of his truth. They
made the familiar accusation that a changing and man-made truth gives us license to
believe whatever we want. In addition, they detected a Nietzschean moral relativism in
which truth-making becomes a bloodsport. Rather than a noble quest for something
higher and more permanent than ourselves, James’s search for truth seems to devolve into
a violent struggle for power, the victor rising from the ashes as its final arbiter. 56 James
certainly did not help his case when he said that the pragmatist eschews “first principles”
and “turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards
power. Nor did he make things better when he equated truth with expediency. 58 But
James thought the charges leveled against him were baseless. He blamed his critics for
both misreading his work and conflating the concepts of truth and reality, which in turn
gave them the fodder for their accusations.
In a seemingly willful misrepresentation of his work, critics mistakenly charged
James with nominalism, denying the existence of a reality independent of human
experience. But he was most assuredly a realist and took pains to clarify his position on
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countless occasions. 5 '' Like Peirce, James accepted fully that the universe is full of
external realities, including objects and relations between objects, that exist whether or
not human beings come in contact with them. When we do confront these realities, they
force themselves upon us through our sensory experiences. Our percepts open a window
to this brute reality, and then our concepts bring us even closer. Unfortunately, however,
we cannot know any reality directly. All we ever really know is our percepts and
concepts, not the reality underlying them. Still, our inability to experience reality directly
does not change the fact that it exists independently of us and, as a result, places
significant constraints on the truths we can create.
This last point leads to the second mistake of which James accused his critics:
conflating the concepts ot reality and truth. In James's view, reality was simply an
irrefutable tact, something with which we must contend whether or not we like it, not
something that can be true or false. Only our ideas about it are true or false. In The
Meaning of Truth, James made the distinction as simple as possible: “Realities are not
true-, they are- and beliefs are true ofthem.'’
60
The “useful” ideas we have about reality,
those ideas that prove satisfactory in our experience, are our truths, and these, of course,
evolve over time. But reality itselt remains what it is, no matter what we may know or
think about them.
All our truths are beliefs about ‘Reality'; and in any particular belief the
reality acts as something independent, as a thingfound, not
manufactured... ‘Reality ' is in general what truths have to take account of,
59
For example, he says in The Meaning of Truth, “This is why as a pragmatist I have so
carefully posited ‘reality’ ab initio and why, throughout my whole discussion, I remain
an epistemological realist.” Writings 1902-1910, 925.
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and thefirst part of reality from this point of view is the flux of our
sensations. Sensations are forced upon us, coming we know not whenceOver their nature, order and quantity we have as good as no control. They
are neither time nor false; they simply are. It is only what we say about
them, only the names we give them, our theones of their source and nature
and remote relations, that may be true or not. 61
Arriving at useful or satisfactory truths demands that we “take account of’ reality, that
we take it seriously. We ignore it at our peril. “Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and
loose with the order which realities follow in his experience; they will lead him nowhere
or else make false connexions.”62 We cannot avoid the affects of reality; we can neither
wish them away nor make them different. With such constraints imposed on us by
reality, not to mention those enforced by our old truths, “we can not be capricious with
impunity" when constructing our beliefs. 63 Our hypotheses must pass through countless
checkpoints before they can ever reach the kingdom of truth—and even when they have
reached that glorious land, they always face the possibility of deportation if their papers
do not remain in order. Every truth requires the occasional reality check.
All this goes to show that Jamesian truth is not whatever we want it to be, for it
must accommodate both our prior truths and the oblique but unmistakable realities we
continually experience. Although truth is both man-made and dynamic, reality is
independent of us, a given fact. This distinction can help us solve, at least provisionally,
any number of epistemological puzzles. Take, for example, the problem of god. Our
given reality, which we experience indirectly through our sensory and conceptual
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expenences, provides no definitive evidence of god’s existence. Some people point to
nature and see evidence of design, while others see only blind chance. But the
satisfaction many people get from believing in him—after they have run the “god
hypothesis’ through the gauntlet of old truths and reality as they know it—makes their
belief in god a legitimate truth. Obviously, this does not mean that our believing in god
makes him pop into existence. Pragmatists acknowledge that god may or may not be
real, but this unsettled issue should not prohibit us from embracing a belief that may
enrich our lives substantially and may also become the first step in reaching out to a god
who may some day reveal himself to us. To deny the truth of god outright will only
“block the road of inquiry.” As truth-makers, James often said, we must meet the
universe halt-way. Truths will slowly unveil themselves if we seek them out, cajole and
badger them, and continually test their usefulness in our own lives. Otherwise, they will
remain forever hidden.
Another way to look at the distinction between truth and reality is to consider
James's stream of consciousness, a concept he first devised in the 1 880s when he was
writing The Principles ofPsychology. Although James admired the great British
empiricists, including John Locke and David Hume, he did not much like their account of
human consciousness. Both argued that we experience the world in fragments that our
minds then link together so that our consciousness of the world appears continuous.
James rejected this thesis because it leaves unexplained how our minds perform this
linking function, how it can unify a world initially sliced into little bits. 64 James’s
64
Rationalists usually claimed that our souls, or perhaps god or the absolute, assembled
our discrete experiences into a uninterrupted train of thought, but James was not
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solution to the problem of consciousness was ingenious. He argued that we initially
expenence consciousness not in fragments but in a confusing flux or a rushing stream of
percepts. This initial (or pure) experience resembles that “immediate flux of life" known
only to "newborn babes, or men in semi-coma from sleep, drugs, illnesses, or blows.”65
Now the trick was to explain not how we get from fragments to unity but how we get
from this confusing flux to a coherent continuity. James maintained that making sense of
this "blooming buzzing confusion”66 only required that we select, or focus our attention
on, those things in our experience that interest us most. In so doing, we turn that
“buzzing confusion" into a coherent world consisting of recognizable objects and
relations to which we attach names.
James enjoyed comparing this process to carving a block of marble into a statue.
The block represents this rush of pure experiences out of which we sculptors proceed to
make successive cuts until it becomes something quite recognizable.
The cuts we make are purely ideal. Ifmy reader can succeed in
abstracting from all conceptual interpretation and lapse back into his
immediate sensible life at this very moment, he will find it to be what
someone has called a big blooming buzzing confusion... Out of this
aboriginal sensible muchness attention carves out objects, which
conception then names and identifies forever—in the sky ‘constellations,’
on the earth ‘beach,’ ‘sea,’ ‘cliff,’ ‘bushes,’ ‘grass.’ Out of time we cut
’
days and nights,’ ‘summers and winters.' We say what each part of the
sensible continuum is, and all these abstracted whats are concepts. 67
comfortable with this solution to the problem because it led to a monism, the “block
universe” to which he was so averse.
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The world of pure experiences stands before us, monolithic and inscrutable, but we then
take our chisels and go to work, carving out shapes that prove most pleasing to us. Out of
these shapes we forge our conceptions and ideas, even our truths. This block of marble
represents a given reality that will remain forever enigmatic to us. We look upon this
block, perhaps even touch and smell it, and these initial sensory expenences constitute
our first brush with reality. But it has no intrinsic meaning for us. So that we can acquire
more knowledge of reality, we cut into it and divide it into manageable chunks. Soon we
begin to realize that knowing this reality better requires making choices, discarding those
parts of our experience for which we have no use and focusing our attention on the
interesting sections. In order to get closer to reality, we must not only let it act on us, we
must also act on it. We create conceptions and truths so that we can understand this
reality better. The truths are always ours—indeed, they are the shapes we carve out of
the block—but they always serve to increase our knowledge of a given reality, the
enigmatic block of marble.
In James s view, to know reality ultimately meant making creative use of it for
our own lives, standing in satisfactory and harmonious relation with it. He wrote:
In our cognitive as well as in our active life we are creative. We add
,
both
to the subject and to the predicate part of reality. The world stands really
malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands. Like the
kingdom of heaven, it suffers human violence willingly. Man engenders
truth upon it.68
James found this an exciting proposition, endowing people with the freedom to construct
truths that would give them more useful knowledge of reality. But his critics still only
saw danger in James's epistemology, wherein truth was subject to the whims of each
68
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individual. He may have posited a given reality, but he rejected the possibility of our
ever acquinng direct knowledge of it. Truth, for James, would always be “a human
device and not a literal transcript” of reality. 69 His critics believed that so crudely
portraying truth as a mere “human device” turned reality into a plaything, a world that
must endure "human violence willingly,” no matter the cost. After all, pragmatism could
only offer a “method” for ascertaining truth and, though results-onented, had no way of
distinguishing good ends from bad. Deciding on ends seemed to remain solely within the
purview of each individual. He alone settled on ends which his truths would then
dutifully serve. Woefully subjective and instrumental, Jamesian truth could not provide a
higher or independent standard to which we all must adhere. There may have been an
independent reality in James's pluriverse, but there was no given truth telling us right
trom wrong, instructing us how to behave toward our fellow man. James’s realism could
not deflect all charges that his philosophy invited moral relativism and radical
subjectivism.
But to a large extent critics have overstated James's emphasis on the subjective
choice of individuals in truth matters. Although it is true that James devoted much of his
philosophical energy to extolling the dignity of individuals, his epistemology is in fact
more Peircean—more democratic—than it may appear at first glance. 70 In part we can
blame James for this misunderstanding. An enviably gifted writer, he cultivated an
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I must acknowledge James Kloppenberg whose Uncertain Victory was particularly
insightful on the social aspect of James’s epistemology. I must credit him for opening
my eyes to this reading of James, with which I became increasingly sympathetic as I read
more and more of James’s work.
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access,ble style and illustrated his ideas with powerfitl metaphors. While this made for
more enjoyable reading, it sometimes compromised precision and clarity. On the other
hand, had cnttcs given James's work the close reading it deserved, they might have seen
the social aspect of his epistemology. They would have found that James considered
truth-making a probabilistic, social, and moral enterprise-a process that must draw on a
large number of verification experiences in the community, involve ongoing discussion
and persuasion, and require an enlarged capacity for tolerance, social inclusion, and
sympathy for others.
In Pragmatism
,
James revealed as much in an often overlooked caveat. After
arguing that truth is an ongoing verification process, he wrote:
For the sake of simplicity I have written as if the verification might occur
in the life of a single philosopher—which is manifestly untrue, since the
theories still face each other, and the facts of the world give countenance
to both. Rather should we expect, that, in a question of this scope, the
experience of the entire human race must make the verification, and that
all the evidence will not be fin’ till the final integration of things, when the
last man has had his say and contributed his share to the still unfinished x.
Then the proof will be complete ... 71
James said quite clearly here that the verification of a hypothesis is not a solitary activity,
as some of his simplified examples may imply, for it is a complex process which must
draw on the experience of the entire human race. Undoubtedly echoing Peirce here, he
argued that verification must continue indefinitely, that we must collect evidence until
“the last man has had his say and contributed his share to the still unfinished While
James did not pursue this theme with the same amount depth as Peirce, the implication is
that truth-making is an inductive process, drawing on a number of particular concrete
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expenences to arrive at general and more abstract principles. The other implication,
equally Peircean, is that truth is probabilistic, a working hypothesis about which we
should have some doubt until every man has contributed his expenences. A particular
truth may work tor you and me, and perhaps hundreds of others, but we cannot be
completely certain that it will work for everyone—not, at least, until everyone has shared
their expenence. Consider once again the parking lot example. I can be more certain of
my truth claim—that parking services does not ticket in the lot near my building after
2.30 if I draw on the experiences of other people who park there without a pennit. And
only when the last man' has had his say, when my sample encompasses the entire
population of illegal parkers, can I be certain ofmy truth. The failure of this truth to
work for some people will compel me to refine my truth. Perhaps further investigation
and verification will reveal that my truth only works on certain days or if one already has
a pennit for another lot.
James also suggested that truth acquisition involves social interaction and trust.
In reality, we do not have the time to personally verify every truth claim we put to use.
We often trade verifications with other people whose claims have proven useful to us in
the past. We know intuitively that other people have verified this truth in a more
systematic way, so we accept it as long as it works for us in our lives. In Pragmatism,
James compared this to a “credit system. ’ "Indirect as well as direct verifications pass
muster," he wrote.
Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our thoughts and
beliefs ‘pass,' so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes pass
so long as nobody refuses them. But all this points to direct face-to-face
verifications somewhere, without which the fabric of truth collapses like a
financial system with no cash-basis whatever. You accept my verification
of one thing, I yours of another. We trade on each other’s truth. But
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beliefs verified concretely by somebody are the posts of the whole
superstructure.
While this “credit system" does not completely resemble a deliberative scientific
community, which was the core of Peirce’s epistemology, it does share some important
elements with one. Both Peirce and James argued that our systems of truth rely on
accepting precedents established by the verifications of others. The element of trading
truths in James’s epistemology suggests that truth acquisition involves ongoing
discussion with others in our community, convincing each other that our verifications
will work for them as well. A self-proclaimed expert on the parking situation on campus.
I may have collected a sufficient amount of evidence to be confident about my truth
claim and share it with my colleagues. In turn, they may supply me with much needed
information about the placement of radar traps in our town. The scientific community
operates in a similar way: confined to a narrowly specialized area of expertise, each
scientist contributes modestly to a large body of research that they are convinced is the
pioduct of proper verification procedures—i.e., the scientific method.
Interestingly, James maintained that scientific and ethical beliefs alike require
contributions from every person in the community before one can be certain of their
truth. Utterly useless are those abstract ethical principles emanating from the scholarly
chambers ot a great philosopher. As if channeling Peirce once again, James argued that
we can only arrive at ethical beliefs inductively and socially. In his essay “The Moral
Philosopher and the Moral Life,” he argued that
there is no such thing possible as an ethical philosophy dogmatically made
up in advance. We all help to determine the content of ethical philosophy
72
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so far as we contribute to the race’s moral life. In other words, there canbe no final truth in ethics any more than in physics, until the last man hashad his experience and said his say. 73
Like science or any other area of inquiry, ethics must draw on the experience of the entire
human race before it can arrive at robust truths. Notions of good and bad cannot precede
our life expenences. After all, said James, a universe devoid of sentient life has no need
for ethics. Only in a world comprised of sentient beings, with real feelings and
experiences, do ethics become necessary.
According to James, a universe with only one sentient being would have the
beginnings of an ethical system: anything that person wants is good, and anything he
does not want is bad. But a world inhabited by many people with competing demands
finds itself in a far more difficult situation. It would be impossible to devise a system that
could satisfy all the demands of every person; satisfying some demands will most
certainly leave others unfulfilled. In the end, an ethical system has to make do with
trying to satisfy as many demands as possible. James posed the question:
Since everything which is demanded is by that fact a good, must not the
guiding principle for ethical philosophy (since all demands conjointly
cannot be satisfied in this poor world) be simply to satisfy at all times as
many demands as we can? That act must be the best act, accordingly,
which makes for the best whole
,
in the sense of awakening the least sum
of dissatisfactions. In the casuistic scale, therefore, those ideals must be
written highest which prevail at the least cost
,
or by whose realization the
least possible number of other ideals are destroyed. Since victory and
defeat there must be, the victory to be philosophically prayed for is that of
the more inclusive side—of the side which even in the hour of triumph
will to some degree do justice to the ideals in which the vanquished
party’s interests lay.
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This formulation may sound a lot like Bentham’s utilitarianism, but James took pains to
differentiate his ethical system. Bentham and his followers equated the good with
pleasure and then claimed that the most ethical system is that which provides the greatest
good for the greatest number of people. James rejected hedonism as the basis for an
ethical system and instead focused on satisfying demands, a much broader tenn that can
include pleasure but also other ideals which may not be pleasurable in any immediate
sense. He was also loath to reduce his ethics to a simple formula which might maximize
the amount of good but at the great cost of a minority’s enslavement. For James, ethics
involved a delicate balance, satisfying as many demands as possible while doing “some
justice to the ideals in which the vanquished party’s interests lay.”
The operating principle here is inclusion, creating an ideal that appeals to
everyone at some basic level. The goal is not to maximize the amount of pleasure in
society but rather to give everyone an opportunity to have their voice heard. Ethics
cannot be reduced to a mere calculation because it is an ongoing process, a drama that
has unfolded throughout history and will continue to reveal new insights as more people
contribute their perspectives. Said James:
The course of history is nothing but the story of men’s struggles from
generation to generation to find the more and more inclusive order. Invent
some manner of realizing your own ideals which will also satisfy the alien
demands that and that only is the path of peace! Following this path,
society has shaken itself into one sort of relative equilibrium after another
by a series of social discoveries quite analogous to those of science.
Polyandry and polygamy and slavery, private warfare and liberty to kill,
judicial torture and arbitrary royal power have slowly succumbed to
actually aroused complaints; and though someone’s ideals are
unquestionably the worse off for each improvement, yet a vastly greater
total number of them find shelter in our civilized society than in the older
savage ways. 75
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As the preceding passage suggests, James envisioned the creation of a social order that
may realize my particular ideals while it also strives to accommodate the demands of
others. For this to happen, every person must have the chance to challenge the ethical
hypotheses of others by sharing their experiences. We must pay heed to every voice in
the social chorus and listen attentively for the discordant sounds of complaint. That our
civilization has made any moral progress at all has been due to our ability to remain
sympathetic to the voice ofcomplaint—even when reactionary forces sought to mute
them. Someday, when the voice of “the last man” is finally heard, the social order will
have reached that inclusive ideal.
What becomes clear in James’s work is that his ethics were closely tied to his
epistemology. In his view, learning the truth required individuals to enlarge their
capacities tor sympathy and to see the world from varying perspectives, even in the most
unlikely places. He warned his readers, in “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings,”
that the inability to feel for the plight of others, to truly appreciate what they are going
through, accounts tor ethical shortcomings. He was quite aware that most people are
preoccupied with practical affairs, that our manic lives do not afford us the time to ponder
deeply the experiences ot others and to derive any meaningful insights from these
reflections. Indeed, he conceded that only “your mystic, your dreamer, or your insolvent
tramp or loafer, can afford so sympathetic an occupation.” A lifetime dedicated to these
profound musings may make someone a “prophet” but certainly not a “worldly
success.” James cited Walt Whitman as one of those rare men whose heart felt with
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acute sensitivity the joys and suffenngs of his fellow men. The great poet could spend an
entire day observing with indolent rapture the mundane activities of his Brooklyn
neighbors. What most would consider time wasted was a sublime and treasured
afternoon for Whitman. For the rest of us, James claimed we could all do with less
worldly success. Cultivating a poetic consciousness, an ability to reflect with great
sympathy on the human condition and to love humanity at its most glorious and its most
abject, paved the road to truth. He was most likely thinking of Whitman when he wrote:
If you say that this is absurd, and that we cannot be in love with everyone
at once, I merely point out to you that, as a matter of fact, certain persons
do exist with an enormous capacity for friendship and for taking delight in
other people s lives; and that such persons know more of truth than if their
hearts were not so big.
77
People with bigger hearts know more of truth simply because they look beyond their own
narrow lives and tap into a larger set of experiences to glean knowledge and
understanding. Selfish and uncaring people will only have knowledge of their limited
experience. Thus, James admonished his readers “to tolerate, respect, and indulge those
whom we see harmlessly interested and happy in their own ways, however unintelligible
these may be to us. Hands off: neither the whole truth, nor the whole of good, is revealed
to any single observer... Even prisons and sick-rooms have their special revelations.”78
People in even the most dire or peculiar situations can provide invaluable insights from
which we can all learn.
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III.
While James held to a democratic epistemology, arguing that men acquire
provisional truths best in a social context, he also subscnbed to a democratic psychology,
Like Peirce, he maintained that man was hardly a finished product but rather a lump of
clay, malleable and moldable. Rather than human nature, it is more accurate to speak of
human habit. We all can be described as “bundles of habits,”79 mere collections of
learned behaviors which we can execute without conscious thought. As was discussed
earlier, our verified truths eventually translate into rules for action; if these actions
continue to work for us, we will perform them repeatedly until they become habits.
Habits, then, are time-tested truths, hardened rules for action that have proven to work
again and again. James maintained that it is impossible to overstate the significance of
habit in our daily lives. Our ability to function at a most basic level demands that we
cultivate habits, for those things we do most efficiently and competently are automatic.
Said James:
The great thing, then, in all education, is to make our nervous system our
ally instead ofour enemy. It is to fund and capitalize our acquisitions, and
live at ease upon the interest of the fund. For this we must make
automatic and habitual, as early as possible, as many useful actions as we
can, and guard against the growing into ways that are likely to be
disadvantageous to us, as we should guard against the plague. The more
of the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless custody of
automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set free for their
own proper work. 80
The implication here is that education is really just the process of habit formation,
repeating a practice over and over until it becomes second nature. That which we do
/v
Ibid, 751.
80
Ibid, 146.
118
with difficulty the first time” will “with sufficient practice” be accomplished “semi-
mechanically, or with hardly any consciousness at all.”81 These habits ultimately define
us: they manifest the ideas, or rules for action, that help us cope with life.
This process ot defining ourselves through repetition applies to both good and bad
habits. Whether we are taking up smoking or flossing, our first forays into these
activities are typically fraught with awkwardness and halting movement. The novice
smoker fumbles with the lighter and coughs violently after inhaling, while the
unpracticed flosser will feel like he is all thumbs and find the whole process exceedingly
frustrating. But before long the novice achieves fluency, whether in lighting cigarettes
and inhaling smoke with the grace of a 1950s movie star, or in dexterously wedging the
floss between his teeth on a nightly basis. Save for those occasions when we are
introduced to something new in our lives, almost everything we do is habitual. “All our
life, so far as it has definite form, is but a mass of habits
—
practical, emotional, and
intellectual—systematically organized for our weal or woe...”82 Even though some of
our habits are bad for us, we still become attached to them and find it increasingly
difficult over time to renounce them.
But the moment our habits cease to work for us, when we become acutely
conscious that they contribute in some way to our “woe,” we immediately search for new
habits that will restore our ability to function in the world around us. Though hard-wired
into us after years of repetition, our old habits always remain vulnerable to erasure.
“New habits can be launched,” said James,
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on condition of there being new stimuli and excitements Now life
abounds in these, and sometimes they are such critical and revolutionary
experiences that they change a man’s whole scale of values and system of
i eas. In such cases, the old order of his habits will be ruptured- and if the
new motives are lasting, new habits will be formed... 83
While James conceded that habit often serves as a “conservative agent,”84 preventing us
from recklessly changing course when our current behavior seems to work well enough,
he believed that the “plasticity' of our “nervous system” allows human beings to change
their modes of behavior in accordance with the demands of experience. 85
The plasticity of man notwithstanding, James also claimed that human beings
inherit certain instincts at birth. Within every man dwell impulses or tendencies which
undoubtedly influence his behavior, but he is never a slave to them. Our learned
behavior can always work to counteract these impulses, either inhibiting them completely
or, at the very least, restricting their range of influence. In most cases nature endows man
with contrary impulses ’—such as friendliness and belligerence—between which our
habits ultimately mediate. I may be inclined to both friendliness and belligerence, but my
habits will determine which impulse emerges victorious in a given circumstance. As
reflective creatures with the power of memory and inference, we remember the
consequences of our having acted on our impulses the first time. Depending on what we
thought of these consequences, we cultivate habits that either inhibit or reinforce these
impulses. In other words, our habits can strengthen our more laudable instincts and
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weaken the more shameful ones “ James also pointed out that many instincts are
transitory. They may figure prominently at an earlier stage in a person’s life and then
slowly wane in potency over time-or the reverse. The transitoriness of some instincts
only adds to the variability of human nature. 87
But, according to James, human nature is not always so variable. Some instincts
are neither transitory nor easily contained. No matter what inhibitive habits we unleash
on them, they prove alarmingly recalcitrant. Especially troublesome to James was the
imperial impulse of man, the “bellicose constitution ofhuman nature” which makes
“people want war.”88 In a letter to a friend, James declared that “human nature is
everywhere the same... at the least temptation all the old military passions rise and sweep
everything before them."* 9 He asserted in a letter to another friend that man “is
essentially an adventurous and warlike animal.”90 According to James, human beings
inherited these warlike characteristics through the evolutionary process. At one time in
man s evolutionary development, bloodlust was a necessary trait for survival. Civilized
man, however, has no use for this ancient instinct; he has reached the point, both
technologically and socially, where it can only lead to his destruction.
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Fortunately, James saw a way out of this dangerous predicament and suggested
that the first step was to be realistic. We should acknowledge that the imperial impulse is
a deep-seated part of human nature, an evolutionary characteristic that has taken root in
the heart ot man. In a number of talks, including his famous “The Moral Equivalent of
War,” James ridiculed pacifists for dreaming that men will change and renounce their
imperial impulses. “Our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and
thousands of years of peace won't breed it out of us.”91 Dashing these naive hopes once
and for all, James argued that we should embrace the bellicose and aggressive nature of
man and find ways to channel this energy in socially constructive ways. The problem
with the pacifists, according to James, was that they refused to see any virtue in man’s
martial spirit. They saw only death and destruction, while James understood that this was
the same instinct that fostered heroic action—“intrepidity, contempt of softness,
surrender of private interest, obedience to command...”92 Abolishing the martial spirit, if
it were at all possible, would mean the elimination of these virtues without which
humankind would never achieve anything noble or heroic. The pacifist's utopia
championed mediocrity.
To the contrary, James envisioned a society in which martial virtues were
reaffirmed as ‘absolute and permanent human goods but were expressed in something
other than a warlike form.
Patriotic pride and ambition in their military form are, after all, only
specifications of a more general competitive passion. They are its first
form, but that is no reason for supposing them to be its last form. Men
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w are proud of belonging to a conquering nation, and without a murmur
they lay down their persons and their wealth, if by so doing they may fend
otf subjection. But who can be sure that other aspects ofone ’s country
may not with time and education and suggestion enough, come to be
regarded with similarly effective feelings of pride and shame? Why
should men not some day feel that it is worth a blood-tax to belong to a
collectivity superior in any ideal respect?...The war-function has graspt us
so far; but constructive interests may some day seem no less imperative
and impose on the individual a hardly lighter burden.93
Until now, men had committed the martial virtues to war, but this did not have to be the
case forever. James suggested that men can sublimate their warlike instincts and redirect
them toward more constructive ends. This process of rechanneling our martial spirit
involves the formation of new habits—requiring “time and education and suggestion
enough ’—that would “inflame the civic temper as past history has inflamed the military
temper. He called for the creation of a mandatory national service program, which
would promote the “manly virtues” in the country’s youth but would enlist their energies
lor a war “against Nature' rather than other men. His hope was that this program would
be the first step in redefining the civic virtues that animate heroic action, summoning our
young not to battlefields but to the sites of working-class toil—our “coal and iron mines,
to freight trains, to fishing fleets in December, to dish-washing, clothes-washing, and
window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stoke-holes, and
to the frames ol skyscrapers. Having “done their own part in the immemorial human
warfare against nature," our young men would return to society like the soldiers of yore,
proud and strong, but also “with healthier sympathies” for their fellow men from other
93
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walks of life. ' Through hard and painstaking labor our young men would become
heroes and learn to appreciate the many unsung heroes already walking amongst us.
These experiences would be transformative, toughening our young men to face life’s
many challenges with silent courage, instilling in them a strong sense of moral and civtc
responsibility at home, and providing them an invaluable education in the hardships with
which working class people struggle on a daily basis.
James s moral equivalent of war" resembles programs organized by the federal
government many years after his death, including the Civilian Conservation Corp of the
New Deal and the Peace Corps and AmeriCorps of today. Granted, none of these
programs has done much to abate the lust for war or to broaden our sense of civic virtue,
but James envisioned something far more ambitious in scope and still untried. Besides,
the viability of his specific program is less important than the idea he sought to express:
man s pugnacious instincts need not always manifest themselves so destructively. He
can harness those energies and dedicate them to a new set of civic and patriotic principles
which strengthen human ties rather than tear them asunder. Despite all evidence to the
contrary, we should never resign ourselves to the idea that man is a slave to his wretched
nature and, instead, we should rejoice in his unlimited potential for transformation.
IV.
The fact that man is a mutable mass of habits does not necessarily mean that he
has the free will to adopt those habits himself. It is always possible that his habits are the
product of invisible forces, either material or spiritual, in a preordained universe. But, as
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we have already seen, James supported indeterminism and free will on faith alone,
reveal,ng a robust democratic theology. He exercised his nght to believe in an idea that
provided more satisfaction and relief than the detennin.st alternative. The overriding
concern for James was ethical: we cannot hold people accountable for wrongful action if
we think they had no control over what they did, and life becomes rather bleak and
meaningless if we have no chance of altenng the course of events through our willful
actions. Positing a world full of possibility, where individual choices have a significant
impact on future events, made life worth living for James. It vested in man a creative
power with which he could perform wonderful acts of beneficence or the most dastardly
of deeds, the world becoming decidedly better or worse as a result. The only trick, for
James, was to make sure that he could firmly situate this belief within the constellation of
other truths he held dear. He found this quite easy to do. His reading of Darwin and
study of human psychology and cognition provided useful insights that fit quite
comfortably with, and even supported, his faith in free will.
Initially, Darwin s The Origin ofSpecies contributed to the younger James’s
metaphysical crisis. Depending on how one looked at it, a Darwinian universe could
accommodate either the doctrine of complete randomness, where events were determined
by a cosmic roll of the dice, or the doctrine of materialistic determinism, where homo
sapiens represented just another species in the chain of life which began eons ago in a
pond of primordial slime. While the former gave life neither form nor meaning, the latter
denied human beings freedom. But, eventually, James saw that he could appropriate
Darwin to support his faith in a finite god and free will. 6 What most excited James about
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Darwinism was that it welcomed indeterminism and novelty and lent credence to the
notion that the universe is teemtng with possibility. Spencer and other detenninists
argued that human beings, great and small, are the produet of the, r environment and
biology, and thus are not free to defy the inevitable sweep of history. Drawing on
Darwinian logic, James believed that the universe supplies an array of evidence to the
contrary. Constantly observing physical events that occur without warning or
explanation, scientists must modify their theories and laws in compliance with these
unexpected findings. The spontaneity of events seems to suggest that we inhabit an
evolving universe where things are probable but never certain. Said James: “It is folly,
then, to speak of the ‘laws of history,' as of something inevitable, which science has only
to discover, and whose consequences any one can then foretell but do nothing to alter or
avert. Why, the very laws of physics are conditional, and deal with ifs If even the
laws of physics are not subject to the doctrine of necessity, there is little reason to believe
that conscious human beings, who often agonize over the decisions they must make and
feel deeply regretfiil about choices that have bad results, cannot act with spontaneity and
inspiration.
According to James, chance variation can account for the emergence of “great
men” whose actions have a profound impact on history and the development of
humankind. People of all stripes—rich and poor, brilliant and slow-witted, young and
perform novel acts every day, and those elect few who are selected by their social
environment will have the opportunity to put their individual genius to significant use.
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TMs means tha, so-called “great men“ are merely fortunate enough to possess certatn
qualities their soctety finds important; accordingly, they are catapulted into post.ions of
authority and prestige with whteh they can mfluence generations of their fellow men.
The causes ofproduction of great men lie in a sphere wholly inaccessibleto the social philosopher. He must simply accept geniuses asSTw*Darwin accepts his spontaneous variations. For him, as for Darwin the
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^^^ environment? Now, I affirm that thelation of the visible environment to the great man is in the main exactly
at it is to be variation in the Darwinian philosophy. It chiefly adopts
or rejects preserves or destroys, in short selects him. And whenever h
adopts and preserves the great man, it becomes modified by his influencein an entirely original and peculiar way. He acts as a ferment, and changes
s cons ltution, just as the advent of a new zoological species changes thefaunal and floral equilibrium of the region in which it appears
.
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In James’s mind, the individual and society shared a symbiotic tension. Society could not
progress without the input of great individuals, and great individuals could not emerge
without the sympathies of their community to make their genius known
.
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But it is
important to note that, for James, the individual drives social progress, while society
merely serves as the vehicle.
The expression of individual genius, whether selected by the community or not,
begins with man's ability to pay attention to the world around him. As was discussed
earlier in this chapter, James believed that people make sense of the rushing stream of
sensoiy experiences with which they are deluged by focusing their attention on what
interests them and ignoring the rest. Or to draw on the now familiar metaphor, we each
play the part of a sculptor, cutting away the irrelevant chunks of the block and preserving
vs
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those sections that are more meaningful and useful to us. In many cases, this process of
selection, attending to that which interests us, will lead to an idea of movement on our
part. If the anticipated consequences of this movement are to our liking, we will act
without pause. James called this process ideo-motor action: “Wherever a movement
unhesitatingly and immediately follows upon the idea of it, we have ideo-motor action.
We are then aware of nothing between the conception and execution...We think the act,
and it is done.” 100 For instance, I see my cup of freshly-brewed coffee on my desk,
contemplate enjoying its warmth and deliciousness, and then reflexively pick it up and
take a sip. These reflexive actions, which can be instinctive or habitual, represent the
normal state of affairs. But on those occasions when we turn our attention to two or more
competing ideas, we cannot act automatically because we are undecided about which idea
is best. So long as we continue to entertain two or more of these conflicting ideas, we
will be paralyzed with indecision; once we are able to focus our attention on only one of
these ideas, we will act accordingly. At some point, one idea will prevail over the others,
usually because we succumb to habit and focus our attention on the idea with which we
are most familiar, but sometimes we must make a difficult choice. This process of
choosing among many ideas, attending to one at the expense of the others, is what James
called “voluntary attending”—and it is the very basis of free will.
There are times when focusing our attention on a particularly difficult object, such
as a doctoial thesis, requires us to summon reserves of mental energy dwelling deep
within us. While I savor the thought of watching the Red Sox-Yankees game tonight, I
also know that an unfinished dissertation awaits me and will continue to loom ominously
100
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in my life until , fin.sh it. Attendmg ,o my dtsserta.ion in this case is especially difficult
because it does not prov.de immediate gratification like a baseball game does. According
to James, the ability to focus my attention on a difficult object like my d.ssertat.on is the
essence of free will. In The Principles ofPsychology, James wrote: "The essentia,
achievement of,he mil, in short, when it is most 'voluntary,
' is ,o attend to a difficult
object and hold itfas, before the mind. The so-doing is theflat. . .Effort ofattention is
thus the essentialphenomenon of will.”' 0 ' The exercise of will, then, is a psycholog,cal
affa.r, a struggle that must be resolved in the mind. "The whole drama,” said James, “is a
mental drama. The whole difficulty is a mental difficulty, a difficulty with an ideal
object ot our thought. It is, in one word, an idea to which our will applies itself, an idea
which if we let it go would slip away, but which we will not let go.” The essence of will
occurs in the mind, before any actions are performed. In fact, James argued that
whether the act then follows or not is a matter quite immaterial,” citing the example of a
paralyzed man who tries to move his leg but never succeeds in doing so. 102
In most cases, however, if we can attend to this elusive object long enough, hold it
firmly in our minds and dove out any competing ideas, the ensuing action is a foregone
conclusion. Despite the strong appeal of watching a baseball game between the historic
rivals, I focus my attention on the task at hand and here I am, organizing my thoughts and
typing these words into the computer. Exercising free will always involves attending to
an idea that is less agreeable than some alternative. Sometimes the idea is far more
hazardous than writing a dissertation.
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The strong-willed man, however, is the man who heard the still small
comes
U
“aS Wh°’ When^ dea,h-brin8i '’8 considerationloohs at its face, consents to its presence, clings to it affirms itand holds ,t fast, in spite of the host of exciting mental images which riserevolt against it and would expel it from his mind. Sustained in thisway by a resolute effort of attention, the difficult object erelong begins tocall up its own congeners and associates and ends by changing^ 8
disposition of the man's consciousness altogether. And with his
consciousness his action changes, for the new object, once stably in
effecTs
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‘nfambly Produces its motor
This passage shows that the “strong-willed man" must only sustain his attention long
enough so that he expenences a change of “consciousness” which “infallibly produces”
the desired “motor effects.” Possibly faring a "death-bringing” task, the average person
will not be able to expel terrifying images of a pamful death and other unpleasantries, but
the strong-willed person will overcome this instinctive reaction and, focusing his mind on
a courageous act, stamp out his fear. And before he knows it, he will perform the
courageous feat to which he put his mind.
James argued that a direct corollary of his theory of emotion was that we can
control our emotions by changing our behavior, and the implication in this example is
that the man who can ignore his fears and act bravely has successfully changed how he
feels. The reader will recall that, according to James, our emotions do not lead to certain
physiological responses; our physiological responses are our emotions. Our emotions are
merely habitualized physiological responses to certain objects or events, which means we
can always change our emotions by cultivating new habits. “Action seems to follow
feeling, but really action and feeling go together; and by regulating the action, which is
under the more direct control of the will, we can indirectly regulate the feeling, which is
Ibid., 419.
130
not. By refusing to run away from pernicious situations and facing them with
equanimity, a man consumed with fear and trembling can transfonn himself into a man
who embodtes daring and courage. In other words, he can exerctse his will ,0 change his
habitual response to these situattons, and instead of acting cowardly, he can act bravely
and thereby become a brave and fearless man. Said James: “So to feel brave, act as if we
^ braVe
’
USe a" °Ur Wili 10 ,hat end
'
and courage-fit will very likely replace the fit of
fear.’’
lw
After acting bravely a few times, the former coward will find that courage
comes more easily to him. What at first required a resolute concentration of will begins
to become automatic.
According to James, this was the essence of free will: to dedicate enough thought
and effort to an idea that it yields the desired response on our part and to continue to do
so until the response becomes habitual. Forming habits is vital not only because they
change our emotional responses but because they also determine who we are on a deeper
level. In the Principles
,
James wrote: “Sow an action, and you reap a habit; sow a habit
and you reap a character; sow a character and you reap a destiny.” When a man exercises
his free will to develop habits, he has taken the first step toward forming his character
and ultimately sealing his fate. Though habit implies reflex and will freedom, James
could never easily separate his discussions of these two concepts because they
represented opposite sides of the same coin. Man has the free will to formulate new
habits which in turn liberate him further to focus more attention on other concerns.
The more ot the details of our daily life we can hand over to the effortless
custody of automatism, the more our higher powers of mind will be set
free tor their own proper work. There is no more miserable human being
131
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The
-miserable human betng” who fails to fonn any useful habits in his life might well
allude to James himself as a younger man. His years of acute depression were
accompanied by periods of abulia-or “obstructed wilf’-which rendered him unable to
make choices without hesitation or painful deliberation. What becomes apparent is that,
for James, the man without habits is enthralled—to either his instincts or his indecision-
and the only way out of this pnson is to develop his atrophied will and to make a habit of
using this faculty. 106 Once a person has developed a sufficiently robust will and made a
habtt of exercising it regularly, he can then devote his attention to forming other useful
habits. Toward the end of his chapter entitled “Habit” in The Principles ofPsychology,
James advised lus reader on how to cultivate good habits, laying down a number of
maxims he thought would help him do so. He maintained that turning an idea into a
reflex action requires one to initiate what Cotkin describes as a training “regimen
whereby, through an initial effort of attention and repetition, a new, more efficacious
habit might become ingrained.” 107 The degree to which we perform our action with
uninterrupted frequency determines how deeply the tendency become ingrained in us.
Each one of us embodies these ingrained habits, and they in turn define who we are. If
we do not cultivate our own habits willfully and instead let them grow willy-nilly, or
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leave them to wilt and die, we fail to live up to our capacity aS human beings. Instead,
we exist at the mercy of our physical and social environment or our biology-an
unacceptable option for James.
In his essay entitled “What Makes a Life Significant,” James revealed Ins distaste
for a life devoid of vigorous and willful action in his desenption of Chautauqua, New
York, a small town he visited on his “Talks to Teachers” lecture tour in 1 894. A model
utopia in which not even a hint of squalor or injustice was evident, Chautauqua
represented a "foretaste of what human society might be, were it all in the light, with no
suffering and no dark comers”-but, to his own astonishment, James found this "middle-
class paradise, without a sin, without a victim, without a blot, without a tear,” so stifling
that he longed to escape and return to "the dark and wicked world again.” After just a
week of enjoying the many pleasantries and wholesome activities the town had to offer.
James could no longer abide the "atrocious harmlessness” of it all and caught himself
desiring something “primordial and savage, even though it were as bad as an Armenian
massacre.”
108 He preferred to take his chances in the wicked world, replete with all "the
heights and the depths, the precipices and the steep ideals, the gleams of the awful and
the infinite," than to spend another minute in "this dead level and quintessence of every
mediocrity.” In a letter to his wife, he revealed an even darker side of his reflections,
wishing for the flash of a pistol, a dagger, or a devilish eye, anything to break the
unlovely level of 10,000 good people, a crime, a murder, rape, elopement, anything
would do.” 109 What Chautauqua lacked was drama, the extremes which could indeed
108
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make life painful and treacherous bu, also exhilarating and invigorating. Supposedly a
friend of civilization and social progress, James was profoundly disturbed by his visceral
reaction. Why could he not apprectate the social hannony on d,splay before him? Did he
really need exposure to the violence and
the expense of human suffering?
savagery of life to feel alive, even if it came at
Atter meditating on his Chautauquan experience for a while, he realized what was
mtssmg there. This idyllic town seemed to prov.de no opportunities for strenuous action
against the forces of evil and thus deprived its inhabitants of a meaningful life.
What excites and interests the looker-on at life, what the romances and the
atues celebrate the grim civic monuments remind us of, is the everlasting
battle of the powers of light with those of darkness; with heroism, reduced
to its bare chance, yet ever and anon snatching victory from the jaws ofdeath. But in this unspeakable Chautauqua there was no potentiality fordeath in sight anywhere, and no point of the compass visible from whichdanger might possibly appear. The ideal was so completely victonous
already that no sign of any previous battle remained, the place just resting
on its oars. But what our human emotions seem to require is the sight of
the struggle going on. The moment the fruits are being merely eaten
things become ignoble. Sweat and effort, human nature strained to its
uttermost and on the rack, yet getting through alive, and then turning its
back on its success to pursue another more rare and arduous still this is
the sort of thing the presence of which inspires us.
.
.
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For James, Chautauqua represented a world in which men had already defeated the forces
of evil and were free to enjoy the fruits of heroics long past. While at first it may have
sounded delightful, the notion that the very image ofjustice and harmony emerged from
the efforts of great men in an earlier age, a closer look revealed a sickeningly insipid
world, a world so complete that it no longer demanded vigorous action to ward off
dangers or even to remedy the most minor social ills. Sadly, this was a world without
Writings 1878-1899, 864.
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heroes, wtthou, the need for heroes. James feared that Chautauqua foretold the future for
all of human, ty, that its bourgeots ntedioenty and blandness would creep slowly i„,0
every confer of the world, eventually tunttng it into “a ntere Chautauqua Assetnbly on an
enormous scale. Much to his alarm, he saw that an “irremediable flatness is coming
over the world. Bourgeotsie and mediocrity, church soctables and teachers' conventtons,
are takmg the place of the old hetghts and depths and romantic chtaroseuro.” Observing
the eagerness for fairness and compromise within his own country, James lamented that
the “higher heroisms and the old rare flavors are passtng out of life.” 1 12 Wha, James
witnessed dunng his bnef stay in Chautauqua was the dawning of modernity, a new
world order that foreclosed opportun.ties for heroism and vigorous action, a tune when
the exercise of free will became increasingly scarce.
An eternal optimist, James could not despair over these modem trends for long.
On the tram heading toward Buffalo, he experienced a kind of revelation, in which it
dawned on him that true acts of heroism occurred all the time and in every town and city
in America. Looking for heroism in its traditional forms, James had failed to see
wonderful displays of it exhibited right before his eyes in the
daily lives of the laboring classes. Not in clanging fights and desperate
marches only is heroism to be looked for, but on every railway bridge and
fire-proof building that is going up to-day. On freight-trains, on the decks
of vessels, in cattle-yards and mines, on lumber-raffs, among the firemen
and the policemen, the demand for courage is incessant; and the supply
never fails. There, every day of the year somewhere, is human nature in
extremis for you. And wherever a scythe, an axe, a pick, or a shovel is
111
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H |S ear ' ier observati°^ notwithstanding, James came to realize that working-class
herotes abound in this world, even in Chautauqua. We so often overlook these daily
displays of heroism, sa.d James, because they do not follow a vocalized ideal, as a
soldier's sacrifice so clearly does. The laboring hero w.elds his shovel or axe to earn a
wage. no. to realize a larger vision, for he lacks the imagination and the education to
devote arduous action to something higher. On the other end of the spectrum is the
educated man, refined and effete, who has plenty of ideals bu, fails to support them with
the manly vigor performed regularly by the laboring class. A truly significant life,
according to James, must achieve a marriage between our strenuous actions and our
ideals. "Ideal aspirations are not enough, when uncombined with pluck and will. But
neither are pluck and will, dogged endurance and insensibility to danger enough, when
taken alone. There must be some sort of fusion.
. . for a life objectively and thoroughly
significant to result.” 1 14 The hero always acts with “pluck and will” but never for their
own sake. He adheres to an ideal that is “intellectually conceived”—which means it
must carry with it that sort of outlook, uplift, and brightness that go with all intellectual
facts and that is somewhat novel, challenging preconceived notions, routines, or
conventions. 115
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Unfortunately, the most common display of ostensible heroism in our world
involved ill-adv.sed and unconscionable acts of tmperialtsm by modem states. A great
opponent of American imperialism, James considered it a modem expression of our
ancient impulse for war, no, a true display of heroism. True herotsm could no, res, on
outdated
.deals about martial valor, national glory or Mantfes, Destiny, and i, required
something other than the courage to face mortal danger with vigorous action. Indeed, the
James, an hero had to resist the prevailing social order in the name of a higher ideal.
James expressed this idea most eloquently in May of 1897 when he delivered an oration
at the unveiling of a war monument dedicated to the slain Civil War hero Robert Gould
Shaw who led the famous black F.fty-Fourth Regimen,. Before a large crowd assembled
at the Boston Music Hall, James declared that we should not honor Shaw for his military
valor on the battlefield—especially since the “survivors of one successful massacre after
another are beings from whose loins we and all our contemporary races spring”—but for
the
lonely courage which he showed when he dropped his warm commission
in t 'le glorious Second to head your dubious fortunes, negroes of the Fifty-
Fourth. That lonely kind of courage (civic courage as we call it in peace-
times) is the kind of valor to which the monuments of nations should most
of all be reared, for the survival of the fittest has not bred it into the bone
of human beings as it has bred military valor; and of five hundred of us
who could storm a battery side by side with others, perhaps not one could
be found who would risk his worldly fortunes all alone in resisting an
enthroned abuse. 116
We should exalt and admire Shaw because he resisted conventional practices and gave up
his comfortable commission for an ideal, that black Americans should enjoy the same
opportunities as their white brethren and not be denied the honor of serving in the war
116
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agams, slavery. In many cases, the most heroic actions will no, be recognized as such in
their own time because they cu, against the gram of popular opinton, bu, we should do
our best to lionize those who perform them, even if posthumously.
Whtle Shaw was immortal,zed for his martial feats and his unhmely death at For,
Wagner, his most significant achievement resembled what the many heroes in our midst
do every day. Great nations are saved no, by martial valor, a common trai, that has been
bred “into the bone of human beings,” but rather by lonely acts of “civic courage”
performed with little fanfare.
The nation blest above all nations is she in whom the civic genius of thepeople does the saving day by day, by acts without external
picturesqueness; by speaking, writing, voting reasonably; by smiting
corruption swiftly; by good temper between parties; by the people
knowing true men when they see them, and preferring them as leaders to
rabid partisans or empty quacks. Such nations have no need of wars to
save them.
We should always lavish men like Shaw with everlasting praise, said James, because they
do not seek publicity for their actions but instead quietly perform their duties as citizens
of a democracy. Shaw was “faithful” to what James called “the American religion”-the
democratic belief that “that a man requires no master to take care of him, and that
common people can work out their salvation well enough together if left free to try.” 118
We honor him and his compatriots in the Fifth-Fourth for fulfilling the democratic ideals
of participation and brotherhood, reminding “us that in such an emergency Americans of
all complexions and conditions can go forth like brothers, and meet death cheerfully if
need be, in order that this religion of our native land shall not become a failure on
I 17
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earth From James’s point ofview, we dimin.sh Shaw and his comrades in arms if we
understand them as mere pawns in the grand sweep of h,story. For there was nothmg
necessary or inevitable about what they did. Their deeds exemplified the great extent
which men can transcend soctal and political nonns-and, through then herotc actions,
redefine them.
James’s personal and philosophical travails led him to embrace a strong
democratic ethos. He believed that all men must participate in the process of acquiring
truths and remaking the world in accord with their ideals, and he had great disdain for
stultifying institutions and self-proclaimed experts who claimed to have a monopoly on
truth and method. He was especially disdainful of the modem trend toward the large
bureaucratic organization, which he believed undermined the open search for truth and
individual autonomy.
I am against bigness and greatness in all their forms, and with the invisible
molecular forces that work from individual to individual, stealing in
through the crannies of the world like so many soft rootlets, or like the
capillary oozing water, and yet rending the hardest monuments of man’s
pride, if you give them time. The bigger the unit you deal with, the
hollower, the more brutal, the more mendacious is the life displayed. So I
am against all big organizations as such, national ones first and foremost;
against all big successes and big results; and in favor of the eternal forces
ot truth which always work in the individual and immediately
unsuccessful way, under-dogs always, till history comes, after they are
long dead, and puts them on the top. 120
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James found such large organizations to be hopelessly
“mendacious” because they
worked against the “eternal forces of truth,” subjectmg individuals rigid procedures
winch prevented them from expressing their genius. Instead, James favored small
democrats communities in which people were free from the dominating forces of
government and business and also empowered to contribute to the commonweal
themselves. In a letter to a friend, James admitted to sharing affinities with “lovers of the
ideal [of freedom] to found smaller communities.” After all, “through small systems,
kept pure, lies one most promising line of betterment and salvation”' 2 '
It is important to note that James did not see an inherent tension between the
individual and his community as liberals often do. His enthusiasm for individualism was
often mistaken for a de facto contempt for groups and communities, but James actually
believed that individual freedoms were best protected within a nurturing community that
gave people the opportunity to exercise civic courage and work to put their ideals into
practice. Indeed, only a small community that tolerated—even welcomed—eccentricity,
diversity, and a certain amount of chaos could provide the right atmosphere for the
incessant challenging of all truth claims and social conventions. It might be fair, if not
paradoxical, to characterize James's political philosophy as “individualistic
communitarianism 2 for its antipathy toward centralized bureaucratic organizations, its
friendliness toward the small and motley community, and its ultimate championing of the
James to Ernest Howard Crosby, Letters, quoted in Cotkin, William James, Public
Philosopher
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George Cotkin misleadingly characterizes James’s political philosophy as “anarchist
communalism” (174). While James welcomed diversity and favored smaller social
systems, he never advocated the abolition of all forms of institutional organization, only
those large and faceless bureaucracies that stunted individual action.
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individual. Providing a method for amving a, useful iruihs socially and a support
environment for the exercise of civic courage, mdividualistic communifarianism would
pave the way for a eonstderably deepened democracy where citizens engage freely i„ an
endless process of social experimentation and verification.
Because he believed that self-governing communities of this kind were best
equipped to make wise decisions, James had no doubt that they would move toward the
kind of ‘-socialist equilibrium” he envisioned for any just society. 123 A contemporary
cntic of the Gilded Age, James was acutely aware of the “abuses which the institution of
pnvate property covers” and lamented “that one of the prime (unctions of the national
government is to help the adroiter citizens to grow rich.” 124 He understood that social
progress demanded our accepting the provisionality of all sacred truths—such as the right
to property—and recognizing that “there is nothing final in any actually given
equilibrium ot human ideals,” for our “present laws and customs have fought and
conquered other past ones” and “they will in their turn be overthrown by any newly
discovered order.” 125 If we were to challenge dogmas like the nght to property, it would
only be a matter of time for the capitalist equilibnum to make way for a socialist
equilibrium. In all likelihood, this new equilibnum would not be the final word on social
justice, but at the very least it would take us one step closer to that truth that emerges
when the last man has his say.
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There is a distinct element of participation^ in James's democrat ethos, an
anti-e'itist claim that the peop.e are capable of governing themselves without the
assistance of technical expertise and bureaucratic institutions. Bu, James did no, go so
far as to formulate a theory of participatory democracy per se. Unlike partrdpatory
democrats today, he maintained a strong belief in the importance ofw.se leadersh.p in a
democracy. In his essay entitled the “Social Value of the College-Bred," he argued that
.he mam purpose of a college education is to prepare students to judge the character and
competence of other men. Our colleges become especially vital in a democracy, in which
citizens must "be able to divine the worthier and better leaders.” 126 The clear implication,
then, is that if our democracy is to succeed in choosing the best leaders, its citizens must
e,ther be college-educated or persuaded by those who enjoyed this educational advantage.
By drawing a line between the college-educated and the rest of society, even suggesting
that the former were the "only permanent presence that corresponds to aristocracy in
older countries," James seemed to accept the notion of class difference. The college-
bred, he insisted, must make their influence felt for democracy to prevail.
On the other hand, he also contended that the college-bred must broaden their
outlook and embrace a larger number of perspectives. For this to occur, our colleges and
their progeny must adopt a message with a broad-based appeal. 127 This means that our
colleges must open their doors to more than just children of the elite, and they must
produce graduates who can persuasively communicate their ideals to the wider public.
As colleges open their doors wider, they will necessarily enhance their ability to reach a
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larger aud.ence and influence the broader culture. In short, democracy can only work if
ils institutions, educational and otherw.se, move toward a
-more inclustve order ” This
requires the gap between the eollege-bred and the labonng class to narrow. As the
college-bred are introduced to the hardsh.ps and heroics of phystcally demanding work
through a national service program, the labonng class will broaden their horizons
educationally and become more idealistic. The former will learn to back up their ideals
W.th manly action, and the latter will see that their hard work can achieve something far
higher than a meager wage.
What becomes clear from a close reading of James is that inclusion is at the heart
of his political philosophy, for it removes all bamers to the road of inquiry. An inclusive
society promotes the fluid exchange of information among people with a diverse range of
perspectives and, arousing our sympathies for others and their alternative perspectives,
enhances our knowledge about each other and the world around us. At the same time, a
more inclusive order provides its citizens the ever-important opportunity to exercise free
will, to engage in the process of truth acquisition and to act decisively on those truths.
The final result is the creation of a citizenry engaged in strenuous but enlightened
action-or what James called civic courage. These civically engaged citizens constitute a
happy medium between an obstructed will (or abulia) and an overactive will, between
effete intellectualism and blind imperialism. James often praised religion for being
especially effective at inspiring men to act strenuously, but he understood that its more
traditional forms often led to chauvinism and foreign aggression. His alternative was the
religion of democracy, whose future was uncertain but held great promise.
...democracy is a kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its
failure. Faiths and utopias are the noblest exercise ofhuman reason, and
143
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Though we may not call James a participatory democrat, we can certainly credit him for
building on the founda.ton laid down by Petrce and erect,ng a skeletal structure with
whtch Dewey would go on to flesh out a full-fledged theory of participatory democracy.
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CHAPTER IV
JOHN DEWEY'S PRAGMATIST JUSTIFICATION FOR DEMOCRACY
Will,am James boasted that pragmatism would rival the Protestant Reformation in
its impact on the way people think and understand their place in the world. By the first
decade of the twentieth century, as James and Peirce were reach,ng the twilight of their
careers, „ became obvious that John Dewey (1859-1952) was their heir apparent and
would assume the mantle of the pragma!, s, revolution. Dewey owed a serious intellectual
deb, to his pragmatts, forebears, for much of his scholarly work restates or expands on
what they said before him. Petrce and James taught him that pragmatism gave
humankind a method of solving problems in the absence of a universally accepted
authonty. He readily embraced their ideas about the fallibility of truth claims and the
malleability of human nature, and he was equally optimistic about the potential
application of scientific method to promote social progress. They convinced him that we
do not uncover pre-existing absolute truths so much as we make and remake provisional
truths-or what he would call “warranted assertions”—through the endless process of
experimentation and deliberation; and that this process, to work effectively, must involve
every competent person in the community whose experiences proved relevant to the
particular question or problem. Although Peirce and James deserve much of the credit
for putting pragmatism on the map, the nascent “school of thought”—as James
enthusiastically hailed it in 1903—would come to achieve universal recognition (or
notoriety) largely under the labors of Dewey. Perhaps the most renowned and important
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Philosopher in Anrencan history, Dewey enjoyed an extraordinarily long and illustrious
career, wnting voluminously for a stretch of nearly seventy years
.
1
Wha, distinguished Dewey from hi, predecessors was his ability to make good on
the pragmatist promtse by taking philosophy down from the clouds and applying it to
concrete political and social problems. He undoubtedly made important and original
contributions to more traditional subfields of ph.losophy, espec.ally ep.stemology,
metaphysics and ethics, but the true significance of his work lies in its relevance to those
real-world yet endunng questions which have continued to vex humanity. The prev.ous
chapters on Peirce and James have shown how the classical pragmatists laid the
philosophical foundation for a strong, if somewhat inchoate, democratic ethos in
American thought. Both subscribed to what I have called the three democratic tenets.
Peirce was especially instrumental in laying the epistemological groundwork of
democracy by arguing that communities can arrive at better truths through a deliberative
and inclusive process of inquiry, and James can be credited for highlighting the
transformative powers of willful participation in the community. But neither of them
explored fully the political implications of their ideas. Dewey, on the other hand, was the
first to see the logical connection between pragmatism and democracy. He recognized
that pragmatism called for a widespread application of scientific method, and that
democracy represented nothing other than the scientific method writ large, the ongoing
1
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unpublished writings and letters.
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socal expenmen, conduced no, only by scientists and other experts bu, by everyone
the community. The pragma, ie approach culminated in parttcipatory democracy. 2
No, surprisingly, Dewey believed that i, was incumbent on him to live up to the
pragmatts, ideal and part, c,pate in the ongoing social expenmen,
,
no, merely observe i,
from a safe distance. Writing prodigiously on a wide range of topics that had a direct
impact on the lives of average Americans and devoting considerable time and energy to
social and political causes, Dewey came to personify the term “public intellectual.” Of
Dewey's importance in the American intellectual and cultural landscape, histonan Henry
Steele Commager wrote: “So faithfully did Dewey „ve up to his own philosophical creed
that he became the guide, the mentor, and the conscience of the American people; it is
scarcely an exaggeration to say that for a generation no issue was clarified until Dewey
had spoken." 3 Indeed, Dewey voiced opinions on nearly every important issue of the
day, publishing hundreds of articles in mainstream periodicals such as The New Republic
(of which he was a co-founder) and giving public lectures throughout the country—and
the world. He became immensely active in a number of political organizations and social
causes, even helping to found the American Association of University of Professors (for
which he served as president for a time), the American Civil Liberties Union, the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and the New School. The
list of the organizations with which Dewey became involved makes one wonder how he
2 Dewey never used the term “participatory democracy”—if the reader recalls, Arnold
Kaufman coined it—but I use the term frequently in this chapter because, as I will go on
to argue in considerable detail, it accurately and succinctly reflects his conception of
democracy.
3 Commager, The American Mind
,
19.
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could possibly have found the time to fulfill his teaching obligations and wnte so many
scholarly books.
Deweys social and political commitments were many, usually putting his
progress,ve propensities on display. Tins is not the place for a detailed account of his
cv,c activity, but a few examples will give a sense of the kinds of .ssues Dewey found
compelling. He dedicated himself tirelessly to education reform throughout his career,
beginning in his days a, the University of Chicago where he founded a laboratory school,
and continuing during his long tenure at Columbia University, where he influenced
generations of scholars at Teachers’ College. He expressed his firm belief that the future
of Amencan democracy depended on significant educational reform: schools had to stop
treating students as empty and passive vessels in which teachers poured knowledge, and
should, instead, sharpen students’ critical thinking and problem solving skills and
promote learning by doing, not just memorizing. Deeply affected by the Pullman strike
when he first moved to Ch.cago in the summer of 1 894, Dewey became sympathetic with
the labor movement in America and would champion its causes publicly for the rest of
his life.
4
The growing inequality in America during the Gilded Age alarmed him greatly,
and he not only advocated greater government involvement to alleviate poverty but also
became involved in efforts to educate the lower classes and help them become self-
reliant.
5
His sympathy for the downtrodden notwitsthanding, he actively opposed
4
See Menand, The Metaphysical Club; Martin, The Education ofJohn Dewey.
Most notably, Dewey volunteered to deliver lectures at Hull House, founded in
Chicago s westwide by Jane Addams to help poor immigrants acclimate to American
society, provide them skills necessary for life and work, and introduce them to the
refinements of education and high culture. Dewey’s relationship with Addams and
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communism for its ideological ngid„y. Nor was he an advocate ofNew Deal liberalism,
for he believed i, undermined democracy by promoting the growth of an administrative
state whose bureaucrats and experts would make crucial decisions on behalf of the
country-s c.tizens with little or no accountability. He never endorsed the candidacy of
Franklin Delano Roosevelt in Ins four presidential elect,on bids, throwing his support
behind the socialist candidate Nonnan Thomas instead.
Dewey's civic engagement also extended beyond domestic concerns. When
America's involvement in World War I seemed a foregone conclusion, Dewey jumped on
the bandwagon, justifying his position on the grounds that the war could be an effective
means by which to spread the cause of democracy abroad and to galvanize civic
engagement and democratic sympathies at home. But the overly punitive Versailles
Treaty, which merely handed the spoils of war to the victors, and the violations of civil
liberties in the United States dunng and after the war, often inflamed by nativist reactions
against immigrants, proved bitterly disillusioning for Dewey. This experience convinced
him that war could never be a means to foster peace, understanding, and democracy and
could only serve to encourage narrow-mindedness and reactionary politics. Accordingly,
he took a leading role in the Outlawry ofWar movement in the 1 920s, for which he
received much (and probably just) criticism. He stayed true to this cause for the rest of
his life, even opposing American entry into World War II because he feared, as he
volunteer work at her famed settlement house deeply influenced his thinking on social
issues.
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expressed in an op-ed article, that “if the United States is drawn into the next war, we
shall have in effect if not in name a fascist government in this country.”
6
Dewey's opposition to all war-even a war we seem in retrospect to have been
morally obligated to f,ght-was naive at best and obtuse a. worst. Nevertheless, his fears
proved somewhat prescient. the wake of World War II, Amenca would have to adjust
to its new role as a superpower whose military possessed an unparalleled capacity for
mass destruction. In his 1961 farewell address. President Eisenhower would want his
fellow Americans of the encroaching powers of the
“military-industrial complex" which
could "endanger our liberties or democratic processes" if not held in check by “an alert
and knowledgeable citizenry."’ Most Amencans would argue that defeating fasctsm was
rth the rise of the military-industrial complex, and perhaps Dewey would have agreed
in retrospect, tor once American involvement became inevitable after Pearl Harbor, he
threw his support behind the war effort. Nevertheless, his anti-war stance highlights the
concern that animated all of his political and social commitments: Amenca would fa, I to
tnumph and become a worldwide beacon of freedom if its citizens did not actively
partake in the democratic life and resist the forces of absolutism and intolerance. It
should not be surprising, then, that as much as he supported those causes and policies he
believed would promote participation, he staunchly opposed anything he thought stymied
it.
Some traditionalists may have seen his many extracurricular activities as
diversions from his scholarly work, but Dewey saw them as natural or logical extensions
6
“No Matter What Happens—Stay Out,” Later Works
,
14:364.
7
Eisenhower, “Farewell Address to the Nation.”
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Of pragmatism, the truly democratic philosophy. The pragmatist understood that truth
emerged not from the scholarly hemritage of a great phtlosopher bu, rather from sptrited
public debate and social inquiry. To be true to his creed, the pragmatist had to participate
in that conversation and do anyth,ng he could to keep i, going. Because the professtonal
philosopher did no. have the capacity to dtscover or unvetl a priori truths, Dewey thought
hts chief purpose, besides acting as just another participant, was to gu.de and facilitate the
aocal pursuit of knowledge. His role was more critical than revelatory, explaining how
and why our soctety failed to meet the standards of seien.tfic method, and delineating
those standards more precisely. This role as social critic became an invitation to engage
in political theory, and most of Dewey’s work, even his writings on education and on
more esoteric philosophical topics, can be read in this way. They offered philosophical
support for his participatory democratic enterprise and penetrating critiques of the current
political system and liberalism. Dewey understood that the democratic enterprise was
difficult to achieve, perhaps more an ideal for which we should forever stnve than an
attainable goal. Democracy, he said.
is an ideal in the only intelligible sense of an ideal: namely, the tendency
and movement of some thing which exists carried to its final limit, viewed
as completed, perfected. Since things do not attain such fulfillment but are
in actuality distracted and interfered with, democracy in this sense is not a
fact and never will be.
Unfortunately, our current political and social system came nowhere near this ideal, and
he feared that our failure to approximate it could have grave consequences. In The
Republic
,
Plato compared the polis to a sailing vessel whose “true captain” (or
philosopher king) would possess superior navigational skills to lead his men safely to
£
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their deS,mati0n
' °n Dewey ' s sh
'P- there is no “true captain” No one person ean choose
the destination or the best way to ge, there, for there are no pre-existing maps to consul,
or stars or compasses to gutde us. Together we are cast adrift in the vast ocean of
modernity, and the philosophers job is to remind us of the democratic ideal, that only by
workmg together and acquinng knowledge from our shared expenence can we possibly
avert catastrophe.
It there were any doubts at the beginning of the twentieth century about the
predicament man faced in the modem world. World War I would dispel them for good
The crisis of modernity was upon us: our knowledge of ourselves lagged far behind our
knowledge of nature and technology, and this was like putting a lighter and a stick of
dynamite in the hands of a child (or, to continue the analogy from the preceding
paragraph, giving a child sole control over the rudder and throttle of a powerful speed
boat). Many critics blamed science for our plight and called for an ethics and politics that
would stem the tide of modernity by invoking traditional values and ancient truths. But
Dewey argued that this solution only exacerbated the modem predicament, that the only
way to close the gap between our knowledge of ourselves and our knowledge of nature
was to understand human experience as part of nature. This required a radical expansion
and redefinition of what he called the “scientific attitude,” applying its methods of
inquiry to social, political, and ethical problems. This meant, of course, that we had to
reject all foundational truths, sacred myths, and dogmatic assertions and to put our trust
only in truth claims that hold up to the rigors of empirical testing. More importantly, it
also meant that we had to reconceptualize our notion of scientific method as the very
definition of community, as the embodiment of social cooperation and intercourse, open
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mindedness and tolerance, mutual sympathy and compassion. Dewey inststed that
sc, emit',e method is not an eso.enc art that the average person could no. master, for i,
merely refined the fiuitfu. ways m which we already think, solve proh.ems, and assoc,ate
with our fellow man on a daily basts.’ Hardly cold-blooded or Vulcan-like, Dewey's
not,on of scientific method evoked the spirit of community life and shared values. Both
Pe,rce and James hinted a, the connection between science and ethics, bu, Dewey
explicitly advocated a value-laden understanding of science.
Indeed, Dewey assailed positivism for endorsing the specious distinction between
facts and values, equal,ng any ethical or political position with mere subjective opinion or
desire. He argued that we must not separate the world into simplistic, ready-made
dual,sms. Values do not have an existence independent of the facts but rather grow out
of the facts, out of our concrete experiences. Social scientific inquiry could yield
reasonable ethical positions and political solutions so long as the process remained deeply
democratic, both inclusive and fraternal. It is for this reason that Dewey constantly
referred to democracy as a “way of life.” More than a form of government, Deweyan
democracy penetrated the very fabric of our culture, tapping into the experiences of
everyone in the community, reshaping our habits, and transforming the way we
understand ourselves, our social relationships, and our obligations to the community.
This democratic faith allowed Dewey to maintain an unflagging optimism even in the
face ot modem bleakness. He saw the carnage and destruction, the ennui and alienation.
that afflicted man in the twentieth century as problems to be solved in a communal spirit.
See "Science as Subject-Matter and as Method,” Middle Works, 6:78; and How We
Think
,
Middle Works.
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not as the inevitable consequence of modernity. Insist,ng on the distinction between facts
had no method of intelligence by wh.ch to ameliorate the problems of modernity. Dewey
beheved he had found this method in participatory democracy, and he sough, to defend i,
on philosophical grounds.
Dewey's philosophical defense ofdemocracy relied heavily on the three
democratic tenets, which he was able to bring together in a more cohes.ve whole than his
pragma!, st predecessors had ever done. Like Peirce and James, he believed that truth was
both probabilistic and socially-constructed, that human nature was malleable, and that
man enjoyed the freedom, at least some of the time, to exert his will independently of
social and biological forces. Drawing on these tenets, Dewey would construct his
Part’cPa'ory democratic theory. He argued that participatory democracy sen-ed as both a
method by which the most useful truths could emerge and as a school in which its
students could best learn these truths by subjecting them to a rigorous and endless process
of venfication. Moreover, he maintained that this democratic education would not only
produce more learned individuals but also transform its participants, instilling in them the
value ot scientific inquiry, communicating and deliberating thoughtfully with one’s peers.
Finally, Dewey insisted that human beings enjoyed the freedom to choose a democratic
way of life and would undoubtedly do so if they were exposed to its many delights, for
collaborative and intelligent effort further liberated individuals to act in useful and
productive ways. Hilary Putnam, Richard Bernstein, and James Kloppenberg have all
called attention to the tact that Dewey justified participatory democracy on
epistemological grounds, and their work is of considerable help. But they seem to have
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pa,d insufficient attention to the other two key ingredients-,he denroerafic psyehoiogy
and theology which are also necessary to concoct a coherent theory of participatory
democracy. This oversight leads to an incomplete understanding of Dewey’s
participatory democratic thought.
But before discussing Dewey’s reliance on the democratic tenets, it will be useful
to lay out a succinct exegesis of his political theory-his cntidsm of the assumptions
underlying individualism and of the inadequacy of merely safeguarding negative
liberties, his conception of a posit.ve liberty, his search for a coherent public and the
state, and, finally, his participatory democratic solution. After examining the house of
Dewey s political thought, we may descend into the cellar to inspect the foundation upon
which his house was built.
I.
Like many of the participatory democrats who would come after him, Dewey was
a great critic of liberalism, exposing its specious assumptions about humankind and
nature. Interestingly, Dewey often called himself a liberal, but it would be difficult to
find a liberal with whom he could have allied himself completely. He had great contempt
for the classical liberalism of John Locke and Adam Smith, recognized the deficiencies in
the utilitarian liberalism of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, and greatly admired
the idealist liberalism of T. H. Green but could not abide its Hegelian overtones. If
Dewey was a liberal, he represented a curious variant, one that tried to demystify the
traditions of liberalism by placing them under the glaring light of historical context. As
he saw it, the history of freedom illustrated that we could not say someone was free just
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because the state successfully protected an a priori list of rights. Though he agreed with
traditional liberals
.ha, we could indeed locate freedom in the individual, the nature or
quahty of that freedom depended on the kinds of associations (or relationships* in which
that individual was engaged, on the very consequences of those associations. Testing
these consequences mean, constantly redefining freedom, which in tun, requtred constant
vigilance and a supple intelligence on the par, of the state. Dewey betrayed his radical
colors most brightly when he equated liberty not with protection or security bu, with
power, anticipating the idea with which postmodern thinkers in the second half of the
twentieth century would become fixated.
Dewey s radical conception of freedom began with a critique of liberal
assumptions that he considered woefully ahistoncal and insensitive to social realities. To
him, liberal thought first went astray in its specious assumptions about the human
condition, positing each individual as an isolated and autonomous creature with little
need or desire for contact with other human beings in his natural state. Liberals would
have us believe that this solitary creature only associates with others in a larger social
sphere because he fears he cannot protect himself on his own from those who may
threaten his life or encroach upon the “natural” means of sustaining his own life (i.e.,
pnvate property). Accordingly, we have every reason to suspect others of such treachery,
for men are vainglorious, acquisitive, aggressive and despicable creatures who, if they
saw profit in it and thought they could get away with it, would stab you in the back as
soon as look at you. We associate with others by means of a social contract, agreeing to
respect the life and property of everyone in society, and creating a limited government
whose sole function is to ensure that no one violates this agreement. Eventually, we
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come to recogmze life and property as natural “rights” or liberties upon which nothing,
no, even the soveretgn state, can rightfully impinge, and we eonstder society an artificial
construct, a necessary evil, from which the individual will naturally withdraw whenever
he can. Invoking nature once again for infallible guidance, we grow to believe an
overactive state saps the competitive and acqutst.ive tmpulses of man which unleash his
innovative energtes and, in turn, fuel economte gam and prosperity for all.
Having experienced, or at least heard about, state abuse ofpower in the past-
including arbitrary executions, torture, and expropriation of land-we regard warily any
government or social movement whose designs grow beyond the modest function of
securing our nghts. No, surprisingly, we are suspicious of nearly all meliorative action
by the state and seek to limit its role to the protection of negative freedom-freedom
from bodily harm, intrusions on our property, and constraints on our activity. With the
state held in check, we unleash the hounds of radical individualism, self-interest run
amok, the dogged pursuit of material wealth no matter the social costs. The principal
flaw in this liberal model, according to Dewey, is that it always searches for universal
causal forces or truths within nature from which to derive political pnnciples, and it fails
to acknowledge the varieties of human experience throughout history.
Liberalism would have fared much better, said Dewey, if it had eschewed abstract
conceptions of man leading a solitary life in a state of nature and, instead, sought to
understand him in his actual social context. He thought we are literally bom into
associated life, immediately dependent on other human beings for succor and love, and
our relationships continue to nurture us and shape who we are for the rest of our lives.
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Likewise, our behavior has a profound effect on the lives of others. The solitary
individual imagined by liberals was a complete fiction.
Such thinking treats individualism as if it were somethino ct-m i .
^erS
artistic or educational, are monstrosities. It is absurd to suppose that the
’
tes which hold them together are merely external and do nm react into"
disposition. '»
C'er
’
Pr°dUCinS tHe framework of Personal
Dewey descnbed the individual unencumbered by any fomr of assoetahon as a
•‘monstrosity" to make his point clear and unmistakable. The notton of a solitary human
being is absurd, because despite idyllic descriptions by Locke of man subsisting quite
contentedly ,n a state of nature (not to mention Rousseau's primitivist delusions), such a
creature does not and cannot exist, and if it did, it would not be human. Ever smitten
with organic metaphors, Dewey compared an individual human being to an individual
cell in the body. Just "as the activity of each cell is conditioned and directed by those
with which it interacts, so the human being... is moved and regulated by his associations
with others; what he does and what the consequences of his behavior are, what his
experience consists of, cannot even be described, much less accounted for, in isolation.” 11
It is important to note here that, organic metaphors notwithstanding, Dewey did
not swing too far the other way and argue that the individual was a fiction, shaped by
external social and historical forces over which he had no control. That would have made
him guilty of embracing another abstraction, “society” or “history” rather than “the
10
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individual.” Dewey identified two types of political theories-,hose that exaggerated the
importance offerees denved front the native capaeit.es of
.ndiv.duals, and those that
exaggerated the "conditions prov.ded by the envnonmen,” in which
.ndividuals are
situated and he found both inadequate and far too simplistic.' 2 Classical liberalism, of
course, represented an example of the former, assuming that each ind.v.dua, human being
was a completely self-eon,ained and self-activating unit whose ach.evements did no,
require nurturing from society. The best example of the latter can be found in Marx.sm
Wh.ch, m its most horrify,ng manifestations, regarded individuals as insignificant and
dispensable eomponents of a eollect.ve and inexorable march towards the end of his,ory.
Between these two extremes Dewey offered a via media (a middle way) which he
considered a more accurate understanding of the human condition. In his view, both the
individual and society are real, each sustaining the other in a never-ending series of
transactions.'’ We cannot speak ofone without referring to the other, for they are
inextricably connected.
Once we accept that man cannot understand himself outside a social context and
cannot achieve anything without support from, or interaction with, other people, our
notion of individuality changes. We come to realize that we are not bom with our
individuality; we achieve our individuality through our associations. “Individuality
cannot be opposed to association,” said Dewey. “It is through association that man has
acquired his individuality and it is through association that he exercises it. The theory
12
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Which sets the individual over against society, of necessity contracts itself.” 14 This is
why Dewey maintained that the liberal state “must be deeply concerned about the
structure of human assoctahon. For the latter operates to affect negattvely and positively,
.he development of individuals.- Thts mean, tha, human beings were not inexorably
flawed creatures. They were no, thrown into this world, ready-made and complete, their
characters etched in stone from the outset. To the contrary, they were as wonderful or
wtcked as their associations allowed them to be. As a result of the, r ongoing interaction
with others, human beings grow and change over time.
Class,cal liberals acknowledged that society evolved and often made significant
advances, but they argued that only individuals who are left alone to make their way in
the world could drive progress. Unlike those who are forced into cooperative
arrangements which offer no incentives to compete, the solitary individual will work
assiduously to defeat those who challenge his chances for success. Living in a perpetual
state of uncertainty, this lonesome figure will never slacken his resolve lest he suffer the
bitter consequences of failure, especially of the material kind. This lingering fear
unleashes a natural competitive drive and the energy to create new innovations,
technological breakthroughs, and other novelties that contribute to social progress.
According to conventional wisdom, the virtue of private markets is that they effectively
reproduce the natural conditions in which the competitive impulses come alive and thus
14
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serve to drive innovation and social
irrefutable economic law.
progress. Many liberals came to accept this as an
Dewey considered (his ,o be hogwash. Classical liberals, he said, “ascnbe all (he
material benefits of our present civilization to this individualism-as if machines were
made by the desire for money profit, no, by tmpersonal sctence; and as if they were
dnven by money alone
’
“<* "ot by electncity and steam under the direction of collective
technology.- In his view, we are mistaken to attnbute our capacity for mnovation to the
quest for money profit.” He instead credited “impersonal science” for the advent of
machines, suggesting that social progress stems from the collective efforts of scientists
who seek answers to hypotheses for their own sake and only later dtscover the possible
applications of their discoveries. That said, even the profit-minded innovator, perhaps
the scientist who applies his research to design marketable products, cannot work alone,
unaffected by external influences, including his education and professional relationships.
He would never accomplish his goals if he did not interact with the right people,
exchanging information, learning from them, and receiving assistance when needed. The
classical liberal would agree that these experiences help the individual achieve his aims,
but he would consider them incidental to the power of individual initiative. In Dewey’s
view, this is an incalculable mistake. If anything, social progress provided more evidence
that human relationships are a given, a reality from which we cannot abstract the
individual.
The problem with social contract theory was that it did just that: It operated under
the specious assumption that man came into, and continues to pass through, the world
16
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W,.h his individuality solitary and intact. Front this assumption liberals have concluded
that man has no innate interest in cultivating social relationshtps bu, does so for the sole
putpose of protecting his self-contained tnd,vidua,
„y from harm. A man’s life and
property represented the “natural" means-or the nghts-by which he could preset his
individuality, and he grudgmgly entered the social compact to safeguard those natural
rights. This was an absurd proposition for Dewey who had little use for the concept of
natural rights. “Natural rights and natural liberties,” he said.
exist only in the kingdom of mythological social zoology. Men do not
thC
h
y thf theSe laws- - accord with a scheme ofatural rights. They obey because they believe, rightly or wrongly, thathe consequences of obeying are upon the whole better than the
consequences of disobeying If the consequences of existing rule becometoo intolerable, they revolt. 17
The struggle for freedom throughout history has not been a search for some abstract
condition we enjoy in our “natural” state. We cannot precisely defme freedom in a
universal way; we can only experience freedom under certain conditions—meaning, at a
certain time, a certain place.
Applying the “concept of historic relativity” will show that “liberty is always
relative to forces that at a given time and place are increasingly felt to be oppressive.
Liberty in the concrete signifies release from the impact ofparticular oppressive forces;
emancipation from something once taken as a normal part ofhuman life but now
experienced as bondage." 1 '" Dewey suggested that we must historicize our notion of
freedom and always remember that oppression and its harmful consequences will forever
1
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change and assume different forms. That which once emancipated us from oppression
can betray us and become our worst enemy as social conditions change. We leave
ourselves vulnerable to this betrayal when we draw on pas, expenses with oppress.on
«o construct universal truths about liberty, and then insist on abiding by these truths for
time immemorial.
Dewey liked to cite the example of early liberalism. In the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries, people understandably saw the state as the
only senous threat to liberty. Indeed, the church had been vanquished, and the large
corporation was yet to be known, wh.le the state was developing a long and distinguished
record of oppression, seizing property and torturing and executing its subjects arb.tranly.
In the early nineteenth century, people also grew to see the state as no, only a potential
force of oppression but also as a mainstay of economic stagnation and injustice. Liberals
attacked the old feudal economic relationships and political customs which the state
continued to support out of deference to the landed aristocracy, arguing rightly that these
archaic institutions, with their unintelligible mass of customs and laws, unfairly erected
barriers before those who wanted to invest their capital in manufacturing or banking.
This system denied people an opportunity to prosper economically and inhibited
economic growth more generally. It is no surprise that in this historical context many
deemed the state an arch-villain, a violator of individual rights and a roadblock to
progress. The solution at the time seemed quite simple: create a limited government,
thereby enabling individuals to flourish and reach their full potential, intellectually,
artistically, and economically, and opening the doors to unprecedented social progress.
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Unfortunately, wha, ntay have been the ngh, solut.on to partteular problems in the past
morphed into umversal truths about indtvtdual and economic rights. 1 ’
Thts story took on tragic proportions when the late nineteenth century introduced
a slew of problems
.ha, no one could have foreseen, the most stgniftcan, ofwhtch was the
nse of the corporate. Liberals of an earlier age “had no glnnpse of the fae, that prtva.e
control of the new forces of production, forces which affect the life of every one, would
operate in the same way as pnvate unchecked control of political power.”20 But by the
end of the nineteenth century, the power of economic forces was unmistakable.
The forms of associated action characteristic of the present economic
order are so massive and extensive that they determine the most
significant constituents of the public and the residence of power
Inevitably they reach out to grasp the agencies of government; they are
controlhng factors in legislation and administration. Not chiefly because
of deliberate and planned self-interest, large as may be its role, but
because they are the most potent and best organized of social forces In a
word, the new forms of combined action due to the modem economic
regime control present politics, much as dynastic interests controlled those
of two centunes ago. They affect thinking and desire more than did the
interests which formerly moved the state. 21
Faced with the consequences of these burgeoning economic forces—urban squalor,
abject poverty, growing inequality, dangerous working conditions in factories,
exploitation of child labor, uprooting of local communities, etc.—liberals should have
reassessed their conceptions of freedom, but many clung stubbornly to outdated notions
about individual and economic rights. “The tragedy,” lamented Dewey, “is that although
Ibid. This paragraph draws heavily on the first chapter, pp. 5-22.
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these liberals were the sworn foes of political absolutism, they were themselves
absolutists in the social creed they formulated/’22
The good news, aecordmg to Dewey, was that liberalism did not have to ignore
consequences and exalt untversals. He credited the utilitarian liberal Jeremy Bentham for
being the first philosopher to declare that “all organized action is to be judged by its
consequences, consequences that take effect in the lives of individuals,” no, by whether i,
conforms to some abstract political principle.23 Though Bentham believed the condittons
of his time demanded a laissez-faire state, he opened the door for a future liberalism that
would endorse positive state action to redress emerging social problems.
While Bentham personally was on the side of the classical economists hisprinciple ofjudgment by consequences lends itself to opposite
application... When he disallowed the doctrine of inalienable individual
natural rights, he removed, as far as theory is concerned, the obstacle to
positi ve action by the state whenever it can be shown that the general
well-being will be promoted by such action. 24
Eventually, the term liberalism became disconnected from its laissez-faire origins and
associated instead with positive governmental action to assist the poor and other
unfortunates, thus giving them the opportunity to realize their full potential. This did not
mean that the old liberalism had withered away and died. It was alive and well, merely
assuming different names, such as classical liberalism, conservatism, or traditionalism.
Much to Dewey's dismay, the old liberalism continued to resonate in the first halfof the
century, persuading people that the state should not respond intelligently to specific
22
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problems but should instead accord with universal laws about man, society, and
economics.
Defeating the old liberalism once and for all required that we embrace a new
conception ofwhat i, means to be an indtv.dual in a world increasing dominated by big
bus,ness and industry. Global in its reach, the modem corporation was changing the face
ot societies everywhere. The age of subsistence living was long gone, and so were the
days of feudalism. People now existed at the mercy of a technology-driven economy,
inconceivably vast and byzantine, and relentlessly fast-paced. They had only the faintest
knowledge about where they fit in the grand scheme of things. All they knew for sure
was that their society had grown far beyond their local communities and provided them
mynad opportunities and access to information and goods and services, of which they
would not have dreamed in years past. The irony behind this corporal,zing society was
that ,t increased the number and complexity of associations in society, connecting
millions upon millions of people in an unimaginably vast network, but “its animating
motives and compensations are so unmitigatedly private.”25 In other words, pnvate
individual gain fueled corporatization but its effects were unmistakably public.
Feverishly driven to acquire a stockpile of material goods for his own private enjoyment,
the individual became ill-equipped to navigate the interconnected and integrated society
ot which he is a part. He felt lost in the crowd, aware of his own helplessness before the
vicissitudes of impenetrable social and economic forces. 26
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People would regam their bearings and feel more secure in a society that
discarded the exclusively solita^ and profit-mmded conception of indtvtdualtsm and
replaced it with an mdividualism that restored the “enduring" but temporarily lost idea
that liberty meant giving the individual an opportunity to develop his “inherent
capacities."27 A foe of communism. Dewey never supported providing equal shares of
wealth to everyone in society, but he did favor redistributing wealth to the extent that i,
would promote equality of opportunity, which meant that
each individual would of necessity be provided with whatever is necessary
or his realization, for his development, whatever is necessary to develop
'
him to enable him to function adequately...He must have certain
opportunities provided for him. He must have just the same provision
an
a
ytody
e
eL7has
e
^
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While old liberals cautioned that guaranteeing equality must always come at the expense
of individual freedom, Dewey dismissed this as a false dichotomy and insisted that
equality was actually a necessary precondition for the exercise of liberty. Merely
securing negative liberty, as old liberals proposed, did not suffice, for it failed to provide
people with the tools to develop fully their “inherent capacities” and to take charge of
their own lives. “The freedom of an agent who is merely released from direct external
obstructions is formal and empty. If he is without resources of personal skill, without
control of the tools of achievement, he must inevitably lend himself to carrying out the
directions and ideas of others."29 Negative liberty has little meaning for someone without
27
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.he skills or resources to direct his life as he destres. a world where economics forces
affect our lives so profoundly, people need more than jus, empty promises, formal
guarantees that hold no more strength than the
To the contrary, they require “a social
ancient paper on which they were written,
organization that will make possible effective
liberty and opportunity for personal growth in mind and spirit in all individuals” and that
will guarantee everyone sufficient “matenal secunty” so that they can “share in the
wealth of cultural resources that now exist and may contnbute, each in his own way, to
them further enrichment.”’" Faced with a bew.ldering world, people need a helping hand
that will assist in their “personal growth in mind and spirit” and, in turn, empower them
to partake in existing “cultural resources” that add to the “enrichment” of their lives.
This called for a far greater role for the state, a role old liberals were loath to grant it.
Dewey s conception of positive—or what he often calls “effective”—liberty
becomes apparent here. Freedom for Dewey simply meant “power, the effective power
to do specific things.” Classical liberals would have us believe that the free person
enjoys protectionfrom harm, intrusion, or restraint; but Dewey argued that a person is
only free when he exercises thepower to do what he wants.
There is no such thing as liberty in general; liberty, so to speak, at large.
11 one wants to know what the condition of liberty is at a given time, one
has to examine what persons can do and what they cannot do. The
moment someone examines the question from the standpoint of effective
action, it becomes evident that the demand for liberty is a demand for
power, either for possession ol powers of action not already possessed or
lor retention and expansion ol powers already possessed. 31
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Th,s suggests that we can understand the hearty defense of negative nghts by “the
beneficianes of the existing econonttc system..,s a dentand for preservation of powers
hey already possess.- In other words, their ostensibly pnncipled stand is a ruse, a
ve.Ied attempt to retain the immense power they have enjoyed under the current
economic system. A liberal soctety, which a,ms to guarantee freedom for everyone, must
find a way to dtstribu.e power throughout soctety equitably and no. allow a particular
person, class, or clique to monopolize it for themselves or hold a disproportionate share.
After all, “the possession of effective power is always a matter of the distribution of
power that exists at the time,” for “there is no such thing as the liberty or effective power
ot an individual, group, or class, except in relation to the liberties, the effective powers,
of other individuals, groups and classes.”33 For Dewey, the relationality of power
suggested that one person’s power to accomplish certain things relies heavily on the
power of others. "No one can do anything except in relation to what others can do and
cannot do.”34 Whether we like ,t or not, we live in a world teeming with associations and
interdependencies, and other people have powers that affect our lives, and vice versa.
We all stand to benefit from cooperating and working together to understand the
intricacies of our interconnected lives. In short, this means that the cause of freedom, the
power to do things, requires collective effort. Society cannot distnbute power equitably
if every man embraces the old individualism and decides to go it alone. Dewey
32
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summarized his argument succinctly when he sa.d: “Man is free only as he has
and he can possess power only as he acts in accord with the whole.”35
II.
What remains unclear a. this point is the specif.c role that the Deweyan state must
Play to effect this equ,table distribution of power and to promote cooperative effort
among the people. That the state had to play a far more active role than i, did before was
a given, but understanding Dewey's position more clearly requires a discussion of
perhaps his most important work on political theory, The Public and Its Problems
,
in
which he discussed at length the state and its relationship to society. Dewey maintained
that most political theorists in the Western canon have made the mistake of trying to
locate the origins of the state in primeval causal forces. Christian theologians believed
that God authorized the state to embody his will and direction. Hegelians said that the
state manifested the dialectical unfolding of history and the logic of the Absolute.
Marxists also subscribed to a dialectical understanding of history but argued that
changing economic relationships, not some unseen Absolute, determined statehood.
Classical liberals, of course, called attention to the social contract out of which the state
emerged to protect the natural rights of isolated individuals. Though each group
identified a different cause, they all attributed the emergence of the state to a single
universal cause. 36
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Dewey found it far more useful to understand the state as an institutional response
«o specific conditions experienced by the public. As with the attempt to define liberty,
the secret to local,ng the state was no, to look backwards for untversal causes bu,
forwards to spectfic consequences of human association. Dewey maintained that there
were two kinds of consequences, public and private.
We take then our point of departure from the objective fact that humanacts have consequences upon others, that some of these consequences areperceived, and that their perception leads to subsequent effort to controlaction so as to secure some consequences and avoid others. Following
us clew, we are led to remark that the consequences are of two kinds
8
diose which affect the persons directly engaged in a transaction, and thosehtch affect others beyond those immediately concerned In this
publto”
0" We f,nd tHe 8emi °f "le distinc, 'on be,ween the private and the
When two or more people engage in a private transaction, each of them does so
willingly, expecting to experience certain consequences in the process. As a result of this
transaction, some people may suffer unintended consequences-tor what economists call
"externalities.- These people constitute the public, and the state emerges to address their
problems. The public,
' said Dewey, "consists of all those who are affected by the
indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to
have those consequences systematically cared for. Officials are those who look out for
and take care of the interests thus affected."38 Theoretically, if private transactions never
had indirect consequences of this sort, the public would not exist and there would be no
need tor a state. But Dewey believed externalities are inevitable in the modem world.
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and the public will demand
.ha, officials look ou, for their interests and work tirelessly to
alleviate their undue pain and prevent it from occurring in the future.
government and the state were not
It is important to understand, however, that the
the same thing for Dewey. The government comprises various officials, both elected and
unelected, who work on the behalfof the public. The state encompasses both these
government offietals and the public they serve. “Government is not the state, for that
includes the public as well as the rulers charged with special duties and powers. The
public, however, is organized in and through these officers who act in behalf of its
interests. The role of governmental offic.als is to give form to the state, to ascertain and
articulate the needs of the public, and to ensure that these needs are met. According to
Dewey,
The lasting, extensive and serious consequences of associated activitybnng into existence a public. In itself it is unorganized and formless. By
means of officials and their special powers it becomes a state. A public
articulated and operating through representative officers is the state- there
1S ™ St
?0
te wlthout a government, but also there is none without the
public.
The implication here is that the government, consisting ofmany bureaucrats and officials
who serve for a considerable length of time, may enjoy a certain degree of continuity and
stability. Over the years we come to recognize many of the people in government and the
buildings they occupy. By necessity government takes on a familiar form. But we can
never say upfront what form the state should take, for it depends on the changing
conditions with which the public is confronted. Because society always faces new and
39
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unforeseen externalities that demand attention, the state continuity transforms itself,
assuming responsibilities and tasks which may have been ineonce.vable to pas,
generations. In other words, the State must always be rediscovered” and “re-made.”41
In Dewey's view, the great mistake of past political theorists was to cast the state in a
particular mold, as a fixed entity enshrined by timeless institutional forms and august
traditions. Asenbing a permanent form to the state impeded progress and created an
environment where only violence could effect real change. “The belief in political fixity,
of the sanctity of some form of state consecrated by the efforts of our fathers and
hallowed by tradition,” he said, “is one of the stumbling-blocks in the way of orderly and
directed change; it is an invitation to revolt and revolution.”42 Only a dynamic state.
continually redefining its function in society, could adapt and respond intelligently and
vigorously to new challenges.
Dewey was quick to point out that the state would only remain dynamically
attentive to externalities if the public kept a close eye on its officials and made sure that
they continued to work on its behalf. Because “a public is organized into a state through
its government, the state is as its officials are. Only through constant watchfulness and
criticism of public officials by citizens can a state be maintained in integrity and
usefulness.” The public could not lie dormant or rest assured that government officials
would identify its problems and remedy them, ft had to take an active stance and hold
officials accountable when they failed to address emerging social problems. In other
41
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words, the state had to be a tr.net.onal de.noeracy in which an informed and civicaiiy
engaged citizenry voted in frequent elections 44 Though this hardly sounded like an
earth-shattering or orig,nal solution, Dewey recognized that creating an infonned and
engaged cit.zenry was a tall order-a very tall order. An
.nfonned public had to acquire
a sophisticated understand,ng of the externalities affecting it, and this proved more
d.fficul, in the modem age. Indeed, we live in a soc.ety where “many consequences are
felt rather than perceived; they are suffered, bu, they cannot be said to be known, for they
are not, by those who expenence them, referred to their origins.”45 Until the public
identified the ongins of its suffering, government officials could continue to capitalize on
its ignorance and govern without accountability. This was the problem of modernity.
According to Dewey, this problem stemmed from the fact that the ongins of
external, ties were so remote, its workings so complex, and its effects so dispersed, that
the public had little chance of acquiring knowledge about them—or of itself. In the
modem world of transcontinental connections and complex interdependencies, the public
was inchoate, difficult to pinpoint with any degree of certainty.
[T]he machine age has so enormously expanded, multiplied, intensified
and complicated the scope ot the indirect consequences, has formed such
immense and consolidated unions in action, on an impersonal rather than a
community basis, that the resultant public cannot identify and distinguish
itself. And this discovery is obviously an antecedent condition of any
effective organization on its part.46
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The primary ,ssue was that the machine age had made i, possible for a seemingly
innocuous pnva.e transaction to have a profound affect on the lives of many people who
were far removed from the source of their suffenngs and from others with whom they
shared common concerns. In other words, the indtrec, consequences were becoming
more and more remote from the initial transaction. Hence, the proverb, ai example of the
busmessman in New York City who, by pressing a button or placing a phone call, lays off
thousands of workers in Detroit and creates just as many jobs in Indonesia. In addition,
having “expanded" and “complicated the scope of the indirect consequences,” modem,ty
had tom society asunder into many “publics” that are “amorphous and unart,culated.”47
To talk of the public in monolith,c terms was a misnomer, an ,mprecise linguistic
convent,on we use for the sake of simplicity and elegance. 48 Externalities abounded in
modernity, affecting various groups of people, often with vastly different and even
conflicting concerns. Finally, these various publics experienced further disintegration at
the hands ot a radical individualism that had set root in modem society. People did not
know their next door neighbors anymore, let alone the thousands or millions of people
across the country with whom they may share a common grievance. Sadly, the end result
of all this was the "eclipse" ot the public: we cannot find it, or, rather, it cannot find
itself. An eclipsed public meant a dysfunctional and undemocratic state, and this allowed
its governmental officials to wreak havoc with the power vested in them. Until the public
awakened from its slumber, democracy would remain but a dream.
Ibid., 317.
48
1 plead guilty of continuing to use this convention throughout this work, even after
discussing its inadequacy.
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Dewey argued that reinvigorating democracy in America demanded the
transformation of our Great Society into a Great Community. The Great Society
contained a vast network of undeftned publics whteh connected people together in a
number of ways bu, faded to foster communtty. ,f anyth,
„g, the Great Society, Med
"by steam and electricity," was responstbie for uprooting communities with "new and
relatively impersonal and mechanical modes of combined human behavior.”*’ Though
the picture appeared bleak, Dewey believed there was still hope for the Great
Community. Even in 1 927, when The Public and Its Problems was released, Dewey
found hope in various means of mass communication which ,n his mind could help fonn
coherent publics in American society.
We have the physical tools of communication as never before. The
thoughts and aspirations congruous with them are not communicated, andhence are not common. Without such communication the public will
remain shadowy and formless, seeking spasmodically for itself, but
seizing and holding its shadow rather than its substance. Till the Great
Society is converted into a Great Community, the Public will remain in
eclipse. Communication can alone create a great community. 50
It these "tools of communication" could work as Dewey hoped they would, the end result
would be a Great Community that remained national in scale and enormous in scope and
complexity but recaptured the intimacy of local communities. The printing press, radio,
and film all held great potential for linking isolated human beings together, raising
awareness about the many disastrous consequences of private transactions and
stimulating a nationwide conversation about these problems and the various solutions
proposed.
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Though i, may seem odd that Dewey would envision the crealion of a community
on so large a seale, i, becomes clear that when Dewey spoke ofcommunity, he always
had democracy in mind. Quite simply, democracy was the very defimt.on of community.
"Regarded as an idea, democracy is no, an alternative to other principles of assoc, ated
life. I, is the idea ofcommunity itself.” It is clear that for Dewey neither size nor seope
of the community was an issue. To merit the name, a community had to foster
democracy, a cooperative spirit in which citizens communicate shared concerns, work
together to find solutions, and share the burden of their joint actions.
Wherever there is conjoint activity whose consequences are appreciated asgood by all singular persons who take par, in it, and where the real,zahonhe good is such as to effect an energetic desire and effort to sustain it ineing just because it is a good shared by all, there is in so far a
community. The clear consciousness of a communal life, in all its
implications, constitutes the idea of democracy. 51
Bu, Dewey instated democracy could only fiinction properly if its citizens no, only shared
concerns and worked together but also had access to good information, free from
distortion and bias. A democratic society had to promote both "the freedom of social
inquiry and of distribution of its conclusions,” said Dewey, for the public cannot emerge
without lull publicity in respect to all consequences which concern it. Whatever
obstructs and restricts publicity, limits and distorts public opinion and checks and distorts
thinking on social affairs.”5 - With this illuminating information at its disposal, the public
can develop informed opinions, and they stand in a powerful position as voters to compel
government officials to remedy existing problems.
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Dewey lamented the fact that our eurren. democraey faded to harness its
techno,ogtcal capaeit.es and disseminate accurate informa,
.on on which public op.nion
could be fonned. He considered this the principal reason for our democrats woes. Bu,
many democratic reads,s and elitists, with whom Dewey squabbled throughout his career,
ma.ntained that vesting too much responsib.iity in the public was the problem. In their
view, we could no, expect intelligent and rat.ona, dec.s.on-making from the publ.c
because most people were irrational, gu.ded by then basest instincts-,heir passions,
fears, and emotions-when forming political opin.ons. The growing complexity of the
modem world demanded expanding the authority of experts who have mastered complex
.ssues of public policy and who can be expected to make decisions based on
dispassionate reason and acquired knowledge. The public, on the other hand, should only
be entrusted with the responsibility of supporting the in-party when it is happy with the
current state of affairs and the out-party when things seem to be going badly
.
53
In other
words, the public should not rule so much as they should function as a check on those
who do, preventing government officials from straying too far and abusing their power
egregiously.
Dewey maintained that this elitist position was an unfounded conceit of the
intellectual class. Although the public may not have had the skills to engage in
sophisticated social inquiry, they did have the capacity, in Dewey’s view, to make
intelligent judgments with the knowledge furnished by experts. “It is not necessary that
the many should have the knowledge and skill to carry on the needed investigations; what
53
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by others upon common
e supplied
concerns.”
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In reply to those skeptics who doubted the public’
capacity for intelligent judgment, Dewey argued that we have no evidence to dtsparage
the public so quickly. We live in a soc.ety where “the data for good judgment are
lacking,” and until that day comes when “secrecy, prejudice, bias, misrepresentahon, and
propaganda as well as sheer ignorance are replaced by inquiry and publicity, we have no
way of telling how apt forjudgment of social policies the existing intelligence of the
masses may be.” 55 For the time being, we must withhold our mistrust of the public and
focus our criticism on the media and other purveyors of grossly distorted informa,ton
upon which the public has based its opinions. While Dewey had to contend with the
“yellow journalism” of his day, one can only imagine wha, he would have though, of
today’s cable news networks and pundits.
Having defended the public from groundless aspersions cast upon them, Dewey
took the offensive against expert rule. He argued that delegating too much authority to
experts could have dire consequences. Though they have a track record of conducting
unbiased research and looking out for the interests of society at large, experts vested with
significant political power could become as corrupt as any other ruling elite.
It is assumed that the policies of the experts are in the main both wise and
benevolent, that is, framed to conserve the genuine interests of society.
The final obstacle in the way of any aristocratic rule is that in the absence
of an articulate voice on the part of the masses, the best do not and cannot
remain the best, the wise cease to be wise. It is impossible for highbrows
to secure a monopoly of such knowledge as must be used for the
regulation of common affairs. In the degree in which they become a
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specialized class, they are shut
they are supposed to serve. 56
off from knowledge of the needs which
Dewey suggested in this passage that government officials.
and well-intended they may be at the outset,
no matter how knowledgeable
remain effective only so long as they pay
heed ,o common concerns and are ultimately answerable ,o the public. Experts canno,
identify the publtc and its needs on their own. The public must find a votce and articulate
its expenences to each other and to experts who will then use this infomta.ton to conduct
research and formulate tentative policy solutions, which they undoubtedly will have to
revisit at a later date. In short, expert knowledge relies heavily on constant
communication with the public. Dewey argued that the vtrtue ofdemocracy is that it
involves “a consultation and discussion which uncover[s] social needs and troubles.”
Experts can only put their fancy techniques and vast reservoir ofknowledge to effective
use it the public talks to them. In perhaps one of his more memorable passages, Dewey
employed a vivid metaphor to make his point: “The man who wears the shoe knows best
that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker is the best judge of how
the trouble is to be remedied."57 The shoemaker cannot improve his product and attract
new customers without soliciting input from the wearer and then making the appropriate
adjustments. 58
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III.
To this point, we have seen that the public in a Deweyan democracy must hold
government officials accountable for their acfions. For this to happen, experts and the
media must provide the public accurate and useful mfonnation with which i, can make
sensible judgments about the best course of action to solve its problems. But the story
does not end here. Dewey argued that the public needed to play a far more active role in
polifics. Keeping current on the rssues and voting every two years in November electrons
were not sufficient to rouse it from its slumber. Though the Great Community certainly
rehed on experts and government officials to address common concerns, Dewey believed
that the demands of the public can only be met fully in a democracy where all citizens,
not just elites, particrpate directly in the democratic decisron-making process.
Participatory democracy represented the best means by which the state could promote the
public good and individuals could reach their full potential as human beings.
The political and governmental phase ofdemocracy is a means, the best
means so tar found, for realizing ends that lie in the wide domain of
human relationships and the development ofhuman personality. It is, as
we often say, though perhaps without appreciating all that is involved in
the saying, a way of life, social and individual. The key-note of
democracy as a way of life may be expressed, it seems to me, as the
necessity ot participation of every mature human being in fonnation of the
values that regulate the living of men together:—which is necessary from
the standpoint of both the general welfare and the full development of
human beings as individuals. 59
This passage captures in large measure the spirit of Dewey’s democratic theory. In his
view, democracy was a “way of life" in which “every mature human being” participated
59
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ation of the values that regulate the living 0 f men together.” The upshot of
democrat,
e participation was that i, promoted “both the general welfare and the full
development of human beings as individuals.” While society and the individual were
forever a, odds in the liberal paradtgm, participatory democracy demonstrated that
rumors about this conflict had been greatly exaggerated.
Dewey believed participatory democracy created a win-win situation. First, the
democratic community embodied a social intelligence far greater than any one person or
group of people could ever achieve, and this is the ktnd of intelligence that counts in
social and political matters. Each person may contnbute a different amount of
intelligence, bu, “the value of each contribution can be assessed only as i, enters into the
final pooled intelligence constituted by the contributions of all.” This “pooled
intelligence” or what Dewey has also called “embodied intelligence”—is "much more
important for judgment of public concerns than are differences in intelligence
quotients.”60 Participating citizens are far more likely to find solutions that promote the
commonweal than a single person or a select group ever could. Secondly, each
individual participant in the democratic community also has something to gain from this
expenence. In the process of working cooperatively toward democratic ends, he
discovers within himself vast reserves of energy and joy, and he begins to associate his
own well-being with the good of the whole. The idea is that an individual was far more
likely to find happiness from active participation, working with others to achieve certain
agreed-upon ends. “There is no way,” said Dewey, “to escape or evade this law of
happiness, that it resides in the exercise ot the active capacities of a voluntary agent; and
60
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nence no way to escape or evade the law of a common happiness, tha, it must res.de in
the congruous exercise of the voluntary activities of all concerned.”61 No mailer how
well-m,ended a leader may be. he cannot confer happ.ness or the good life on another
person. Many leaders and philanthrop.sts are often surpnsed to see that their acts of
beneficence stir •‘resentment,” bu, Dewey argued that this is an understandable response
g.ven that they failed to engage the “freely cooperative activities” of the very people they
wanted to help. "This cooperation must be the root pnnciple of the morals of
democracy. People can only find happiness and the good life from their own
participation: “the good is the act.vit.es in which all men participate so that the powers of
each are called out, put to use, and reenforced/’63
Dewey's emphasis on community and participation demonstrate how far afield he
had ventured from orthodox liberalism. Far more concerned about individual alienation
from community and the need to create more opportunities for democratic participation,
he could not possibly sympathize with liberal wariness of collectivities or with their fear
of majority tyranny. Indeed, Dewey famously declared that “the cure for the ailments of
democracy is more democracy.”64 To become a way of life for all citizens, democracy
had to reach every nook and cranny of our culture, including the family, the school,
industry, and religion. 65 Still more, it had to penetrate our souls: “unless democratic
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hab,,s of though, and action are par, of the fiber of the people, political democracy is
insecure. It can no, stand in isolation. It must be buttressed by the presence of
democratic methods in all social relattonships.”66 It is important to stress that, for
Dewey, democracy was more than a political procedure or type of government; he
constdered i, firs, a cultural, even a moral, approach to solving problems and interacting
wtth our fellow man. But, of course, the pofitical implications ofdemocracy ran deep.
The extent to which democratic habits seeped into the fiber of our culture determined
whether the problems of the public could be identified and resolved.
These “democrat,c habits” to which Dewey alluded so often resembled the
approach found in scientific communities. The virtue of scientific method, he claimed,
was that i, welcomed diversity of opinion, called for the free exchange of information,
insisted that all truth inquiry should draw on observable facts, and demanded that all
conclusions be subject to fiirther testing under public scrutiny. Though Dewey readily
conceded that no democracy had ever "made complete or adequate use of scientific
method in deciding upon policies,” this was an ideal to which democracy should aspire:
the "freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication, the
distribution of what is found out to every individual as the ultimate intellectual consumer,
are involved in the democratic as in the scientific method.”67 He wholeheartedly
believed that the exercise of scientific method did not have to be confined to experts.
Even if citizens do not acquire the specific knowledge and technical expertise of
66
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scientists, they can still adopt their general approach-tolerating other viewpoints,
exchanging infonnation freely with others, basrng truth claitns on the available enrptncal
evidence, and accepting the provisionally of any truths we happen to embrace.
While ,t would be absurd to believe it desirable or possible for every one
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The implication here is quite clear: In order for their “embodied intelligence” to meet the
challenges ofmodem life and address the concerns of the public(s), citizens must adopt
the scientific attitude in all aspects of their live. This means that every citizen must
resemble the scientist in his approach to life, and society must assume the participatory
and deliberative characteristics of a scientific community.
Because economic relationships and associations had a more profound effect on
man than anything else in the modem age, Dewey stressed the importance of extending
the scientific attitude to business and industry. Deeply influenced by G. D. H. Cole, a
British political theorist and leading advocate of “guild socialism” (or “industrial
democracy”), Dewey argued that until the worker played a significant role in managing
the floors of our factones and shops, making decisions about the means and ends of
production, democracy would never truly flourish. Though he supported democratizing
the workplace, Dewey opposed hard-line communism or socialism, especially such crude
measures as expropriating property and redistributing it equally to the proletariat. Hardly
a solution of any kind, the forceful expropriation and radical redistribution of wealth only
68
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served ,o transfer ownership from one group of people ,o another without addressing the
more important tssue of how cap,,a, can be pu, to intelHgen. use for collective ends »
d moral passivity and perversion as that in which he now lives. 70
Dewey favored guild social,sm because
„ placed more emphasis on governance than on
ownership, socializing intelligence instead of capital. Rather than giving workers an
equal share of ownership, i, proposed afford,ng them equal opportun.ty to partake in the
decision-making process at work. 71 A democratized workplace fit well with Dewey's
conception of the “planning society,” in which workers pool their intelligence to make
good and creative use of the capital at their disposal, determining on their own to what
social ends their efforts should be devoted. While they would certainly keep the interests
of owners in mind, workers also had the power to broaden the concerns of bus,ness,
paying specific attention to the many externalities for which their coloration should
accept responsibility, such as worker alienation, wage inequality, environmental
degradation, and the uprooting of local community. The problem with the hierarchical
structure of the capitalist system was that, much like communism, it sustained a “planned
society' and only served the preconceived ends of a particular class—i.e., the owners’
profits or the Party's Five-Year Plan. A healthy society, according to Dewey, must
cultivate a flexible environment in which ends continually change to meet new and
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unexpected problems; he endorsed guild socialism because he believed i, applied the
scientific attitude to the world of business and industry.
Dewey lamented the hterarehical structure of capitalism no, only because of its
inflexibility bu, also because i, prevented workers from reach,ng their full potential
intellectually and creatively. Den.ed the opportunity to use their minds or imagination,
they were also subject to the stupefying monotony of routiniza.ion favored by profit-
minded managers and owners. Because workers sold their labor for a wage, they put
themselves at the mercy ofowners who exercised sole control over the means and ends of
the production process. Th,s means that the “results actually achieved [in the workplace]
are not the ends of their actions, but only of their employers. They do what they do, no,
freely and in,ell,gently, but for the sake of the wage earned..
.The activity is not free
because not freely participated ,n.”72 Though Dewey never had the occas.on to read
Marx's Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
,
which had not yet been translated into
English, he echoed Marxist alienation theory in suggesting that work should be an end in
itself and not just a means to an end. 75 In a world where work and economy represented
an ever-growing share of our lives, man could only be a free and complete person if he
could participate in the decision-making process at work, if he could share the
responsibility of managing the workplace.
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The importance of workplace democracy notwithstanding, Dewey argued that
the only way to sustam a flourishing participatory democracy was to revive our local
communities as sites for civtc engagement. Though citizens must always remain mindful
of those concents affecting the Great Community, they can only recetve practical
democratic experience-engaging in face-to-face interaction with fellow cittzens.
listening attentively to other points-of-v,ew, working side-by-side with neighbors in
efforts to address the concerns of the common,ty-in the localities they spend most of
their time.
deepest and richest sense community must always remain a matter of
,
“ intercourse. This is why the family and neighborhood with
all their deficiencies, have always been the chief agencies of nurture the
means by which dispositions are stably formed and ideas acquired which
free and fi°il ,
^ °fchaMa
- The Great Community, in the sense oft ul inter-communication, is conceivable. But it can never
possess all the qualities which mark a local community. It will do its final
work in ordering the relations and enriching the experience of local
associations... Vital and thorough attachments are bred only in the
intimacy of an intercourse which is of necessity restricted in range. 74
In his writings on pedagogy, Dewey argued that people learn best by doing and
participating. That which remains abstract to us, remote from our palpable experience,
can never be completely understood. Though reading publicized information to stay
informed, voting in elections, and co-managing our places of work with fellow
employees provided opportunities for action and participation, they were not sufficient in
Dewey’s view. There was no substitute for local communal life, for this was where an
individual s dispositions are stably formed and ideas acquired” and where deep
attachments are bred. More than anything else, the local community nurtures and
74
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ton™ the individual, his personality, his ideals, hts worldvtew. Aecordingly, i, ls the best
Place to cultivate democratic habits. In addition, the local community, of necessity
'restricted in range," enjoyed the kind of intimate
“intercourse” required in a
participatory democracy. From afar, many larger-than-life figures “may inspire
admiration, emulation, servile subjection, fanatical part.sanship, hero worship; but not
love and understanding, save as they radiate from the attachments of a near-by union.
Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community.”75
Dewey often expressed concern that the Great Society threatened to tear human
ties and communities asunder, and he believed that the reality of these centrifhgal forces
made local democratic participation more necessary than ever. He saw it as an antidote
to the problems of modernity. Increasingly, people “find themselves in the grip of
immense forces whose workings and consequences they have no power of affecting. The
situation calls emphatic attention," continued Dewey, “to the need for face-to-face
associations, whose interactions with one another may offset if not control the dread
impersonality of the sweep of present forces.”76 One of the virtues of local democratic
participation was that it fought against the impersonal forces of modernity, providing
solid ground on which to lead meaningfiil lives. At the same time local democracy
resisted the dread impersonality of the sweep of present forces,” it also discouraged
withdrawal into a state of narrow provinciality and raised consciousness of the Great
Society to which citizens were inextricably connected. Not surprisingly, Dewey
expressed his admiration for Jeffersonian democracy, which fostered the “development of
75
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local agencies of communication and cooperation, creating stable loyal attachments, to
militate against the centnfnga, forces of present culture, while a, the same time they are
of a kind to respond flexibtly to the demands of a larger unseen and indefinite public.””
In other words, local participatory democracy offered the best of both worlds: i, ennched
our fives by teaching us how to communicate and cooperate with our friends and
neighbors and by strengthening our intimate ties within the community, bu, it also trained
US to address those concerns tha, affected the larger public of which we have become a
part in the Great Society.
This last point was especially crucial for Dewey. He strongly believed that a
thriving local democracy was necessary to make the larger national public visible and
coherent.
Whatever the future may have in store, one thing is certain. Unless local
communal life can be restored, the public cannot adequately resolve its
most urgent problem: to find and identify itself. But if it be reestablished
it will manifest a fullness, variety and freedom of possession and
enjoyment of meanings and goods unknown in the contiguous associations
of the past. Font will be alive and flexible as well as stable, responsive to
the complex and world-wide scene in which it is enmeshed. While local,
it will not be isolated. Its larger relationships will provide an
inexhaustible and flowing fund of meanings upon which to draw with
assurance that its drafts will be honored.
Dewey praised local democracy communities because, without sacrificing stability, they
were able to cultivate a sophisticated citizenry, “flexible” and “responsive to the complex
and world-wide scene in which it is enmeshed.” As he saw it, the public could only
emerge fully if citizens came together regularly, face-to-face, to share ideas and
Ibid., 177.
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expenences, express concerns, and „s,en ,o each other-regard,
ng matters of local,
nationa,, and even tntemat.ona, tmportance. Readtng pub.ications to stay infonned wi„
always be crucial tor the public to become aware of the externalities affecting their lives,
bu, Dewey believed that the many conversations in which we engage within a vibrant
’
local democratic community will serve to reinforce and enrich our understanding of these
complex issues. No one man
the public until he has talked
can understand hilly how some remote transaction affects
to other people and learned from their insights and unique
perspectives. Dewey maintained that although the social inquiry which made its way into
print is a precondition of the creation of a true public,” its “final actuality is
accomplished in face-to-face relationships by means of diree, give and take. Logic in its
fulfillment recurs to the pnmitive sense of the word: dialogue.” As a result, the public
remains “partially infonned and formed until the meanings it purveys pass from mouth to
mouth.” 7
'1
After talking with others in our community, sharing experiences and insights,
the “embodied intelligence” of our community will know no limits and we will become
better for it.
The faith in the power of local democratic community to augment social
intelligence and transform human nature lies at the heart of Dewey’s political thought.
He wrote:
The foundation of democracy is faith in the capacities ofhuman nature;
faith in human intelligence, and in the power of pooled and cooperative
experience. It is not the belief that these things are complete but that if
given a show they will grow and be able to generate progressively the
knowledge and wisdom needed to guide collective action. 80
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As this passage
, nd.ca.es, Dewey argued
.ha, democracy res.s on ,wo foundat.ona, truths
m which he had unwavering faith: “the capacities of human nature” (the democratic
psychology, and ''the power of pooled and cooperative expenence” to enhance "human
intelligence” (the democratic epistemology).*' Ltke his pragmatist forebears, Dewey had
great contempt for first principles” upon which a prescribed set of ideas can be built, and
he assailed both class,cal liberal,sm and Marxism for basing then political systems on
specous assumptions about the human condition. Yet Dewey appears guilty of
committing the same enme, basing his democrats ethos on contestable ideas derived
from the pragmatist tradition. Indeed, fairly late in his career, Dewey argued tha, "any
theory of activity in social and moral matters, liberal or otherwise, which is not grounded
>n 3 comPrehcnsive philosophy, seems to me to be only a projection of arbitrary personal
preferences."82 As Dewey would have undoubtedly conceded, pragmatism represented
the "comprehensive philosophy” in which his democratic theory was "grounded.” It gave
Inm the faith that participatory democracy would flourish “if given a show.” We turn
now to the ongins of that faith, first to Dewey’s democratic epistemology, and then to his
democratic psychology and theology.
8
1
Though Dewey does not mention freedom of choice (the democratic theology) in this
passage, we will see that he most certainly assumed this was an essential element of the
human condition.
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IV.
Dewey’s epistemology began with the plural, Stic premise that we live in a
-un,verse” fraught with "real uncertainty and contingency, a world which is not all in,
and never will be, a world which in some respect is incomplete and in the making, and in
which in these respects may be made this way or that according as men judge, prize, love,
and labor.”83 He could never abtde the monistic picture of the universe, seemlessly
connected and whole. Like James, he welcomed "an open world, an infinitely variegated
one, a world which in the old sense can hardly be called a universe at all; so multiplex
and far-reaching that it cannot be summed up and grasped in any one formula.”84
Although he saw within this multiverse an opportunity for humanity to make and remake
truths in accordance with its ideals, he also understood that throughout history men have
had good reason to fear this contingent world, teeming with hazards and pitfalls that,
more often than not, deliver man great suffering. To defend himself against the caprices
of fortune, man has searched for certainty, a set of universal principles on which he could
anchor his life. Philosophers have aided this quest for certainty with unabashed
enthusiasm, invoking reason and logic to discover absolute truths. But Dewey made it
his mission to convince his readers and listeners that this was a quixotic quest. “Upon an
empirical view,” he said, "uncertainty, doubt, hesitation, contingency and novelty,
genuine change, are tacts,” and no timeless principles or absolute truths can wash these
facts away. 85
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Insisting on this quest, Dewey warned, will not help us cope with a contingent
world and will in tact heap more unhappiness upon us. The belief in absolute truth
makes man suscept.ble to ‘•.he frozen intelligence of some pas, thinker, see, and party
cult: frozen because arrested in dogma.”86 When men hold fas, to their dogmas, their
disagreements with others turn into violent conflict. Without means to resolve their
differences of opinion peaceftilly, the final arbiter of them dispute over the truth is force.
What upholders of absolute principles always forget is the vulnerability ofeir implicit assumption that the principles which they advance are theabsolute principles which any can accept. The claim to possession of firstand final truths is, in short, an appeal to final arbitrament by force Forwhen the claim to possession of the truths by which life should be directed
wheTth l‘°
’aVe "S °UtSide ° f any,hing in ac,ual experience, andh n the c aim is asserted to be incapable of being tested by anything in
experience, and nevertheless different systems are asserted to possess
ultimate truth, there is no reasonable, no practicable way of negotiating
their differences. Stark and absolute opposition and conflict covers thew °le sltuation. The only way out is trial by force, the result of which
will give the side having superior force the ability to impose acceptance of
i s dogmas, at least for as long a time as it has superior forces. 87
This passage is especially interesting because it appears to be a direct response to
Bertrand Russell, who declared that pragmatism was culpable of eliminating any
objective standard of truth to which we can appeal and simply equating truth with
expedience or working successfully. “In the absence of any standard of truth other than
success
,
he warned, “ironclads and Maxim guns must be the ultimate arbiters of
“The Economic Basis of the New Society,” in Ratner, ed. John Dewey’s Philosophy
,43 1 . This essay was written especially for Ratner’s edited volume, which mainly
comprises excerpts from Dewey s published works.
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metaphysical truth.”88
which could settle our
Russell believed that reason represented this “standard of truth”
disputes authoritatively. A proponent of the analytical school of
philosophy, Russell maintained that author,,a.ive settlement of any dispute simply
demanded strict adherence to logic, winch he understood in algonthmic terms, a complex
bu, fixed system of rules on how one must think to amve a, tmth. Bu, Dewey maintained
that obedience to one se, of rules creates the conditions under which “stark and absolute”
conflict anses. After all, many people’s concrete experiences would belie the “truths”
deduced through reason, and, pointing to the empirical evidence at their disposal, these
people would quite rightly stand firm in their oppos.tion to the dogma of ra,tonal inqu.ry.
Luke Peirce and James, Dewey maintained that reason could not function as the
final arbiter of truth in such a formulaic way, because there is not just one method of
inquiry. For Dewey, the study of logic was no, an exercise in mathematical thinking bu,
rather a descriptive and nonnative endeavor. Its business was to tell us first how men
actually use their minds to solve problems and then identify those methods that prove
most successful in their experience. The logician should collect and study methods of
inquiry-deductive, inductive, etc.—just like the geologist does with rocks and the
entymologist does with insects. 89 His aim should be to “analyze and report how and to
what effect inquines actually proceed, genetically and functionally in their experiential
88
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the method of inquiry when the station calls for it. „ works under the assumphon that
.ntlh is absolute and divorced from concrete reality, and tha, there is only one fonnulatc
way of accessing that truth. As Dewey put it, ‘-reason destgna.es both an inherent
immutable order of nature, superempirical in eharacter, and the organ ofmind by which
'hiS U"iVerSal °rder " 8raSped both
-son is w„h respect to chang,ng things
the ultimate fixed standard-,!* law physical phenomena obey, the noon human act,on
should obey. For Dewey, truth inquiry was a never-ending process, continually
drawing on new emptncal evidence as i, becomes available. “The attainment of settled
behefs is a progressive matter; there is no belief so settled as no, to be exposed to further
inquiry. As a result, truth was not an immutable idea waiting to be uncovered by
rational means; rather, it was a provisional and eminently malleable means of addressing
specific problems.
Dewey was attracted to pragmatist epistemology because it understood knowing
not as a grasp of truth or reality but as a method of serving human ends, coping with a
hostile universe, and solving concrete problems. Unfortunately, most philosophers
mistakenly concerned themselves “with ultimate reality, or with reality as a complete
(i.e., completed) whole: with the real object.” They expended untold energy on trying to
solve abstruse philosophical puzzles that had no bearing on the world as men expenence
Experience, Knowledge and Value; A Rejoinder” in Schilpp, ed.. Philosophy ofJohn
Dewey, 533. Dewey wrote this essay to respond to the various commentaries included in
Schilpp’s edited volume.
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it. Dewey declared it was high time for ph.losophy ,o change its ways. Its
.‘recovery,'’ he
satd, would begin the moment “i, ceases to be a devtee for dealing with the problems of
philosophers and becomes a method, culttvated by philosophers, for dealing with the
problems of men.”’ 1 Dealing with the problems of men, according to Dewey, required
.he exercise of tntelligence. In his dtscussions of tnqutry, Dewey offered intelligence as a
superior alternative to reason. He saw intelligence as a way of knowing things in a
universe without certainty, a method of exercising “judgment,” choosing which ends our
actions should serve and detemrinmg the best means by which to bring about those ends.
He added:
A man is intelligent not in virtue of having reason which grasps first andindemonstrable truths about fixed principles, in order to reason
deductively from them to the particulars which they govern, but in virtue
o his capacity to estimate the possibilities of a situation and to act in
accordance with his estimate. In the large sense of the term, intelligence is
as practical as reason is theoretical. 4
Judgment is none other than the ability to devise rules for action which are most likely to
work in our concrete expenence, offering solutions to a whole number of problems we
may face in our lives. A person does not put his intelligence on display when he deduces
absolute truths from a set of fixed principles. Instead, exercising intelligence requires
one to draw on his immediate sensory experiences to gain practical knowledge with
which he can fashion provisional truths—truths that help him cope with this world.
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Knowng means putting ourselves in an act|ve re|at ,on^^^^^
intelligence to verify empirically any hypotheses we may have about it. I„ ,he process,
we make truth. Dewey gave a lucid example:
a n
r°'
Se in
l
he Street
' “ Suggests as ,ts meaning a street-car To testhis Jdea I go to the window and through listening and looking intentlv—the listening and the looking being modes ofbehavior—organize into a
.t“n,„e hi6n 'S °f eXfenCe and meaniHg -re previouslyconnected. In t is way an idea is made true; that which was a proposalor hypothesis is no longer merely a propounding or a guess If I had notreacted in a way appropriate to the idea it would have remained a mere
i ea at most a candidate for truth that, unless acted upon upon the spotwould always have remained a theory. 95 ^ ’
According to his critics, the fact that the street-car made the noise remains true, even if
Dewey never bothered to look out the window to verify his hypothesis. Bu, Dewey
thought that this reply betrayed their misunderstanding of knowledge and truth. He never
questioned the reality of the street-car making a noise, and he would have readily
conceded that this event actually occurred. He only insisted that he would never have
known the truth about the source of the noise unless he had taken pains to confirm his
hypothesis. Calling on his intelligence to make sense of his immediate sensory
expenences, he identified a connection between the noise and the street-car. The vital
point here is that this sensory data enabled him to solve a specific problem, to answer a
question that piqued his interest, but it told him nothing about street-cars in and of
themselves (or the essence of street-cars). His knowledge of the street-car will always be
limited to his relations with it: the noises wafting through his apartment window and
disturbing his thoughts, the various routes it may take throughout the city, its arrival and
departure times, and anything else which may prove relevant to his life. He will ground
95
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any firture truths about the street-car in these kinds of eoncrete expenenees, and he will
know the street-car only to the extent that he interacts with it. As Dewey hoped to show
in this example, truth-seeking (-making) must serve the more modest function of solving
the immediate problems ofmen" and no longer indulge the ethereal speculations of
philosophers.
Dewey believed that intelligent inquiry occurs in a manner similar to his street-car
example, in which a person turns to emptneal evtdence and facts to substant.ate truth
claims. Science had adopted this method long ago and put it to effective use for many
years, but humanity had failed to apply this method in other aspects of life. Dewey
maintained that politics and ethics, still adhering stubbornly to tired dogma, needed to
embrace scientific method if they wanted to meet the challenges posed by modernity.
The solution to many of our woes merely required us to concentrate more on the means to
attaining truth. Too often we hold truths as self-evident and then resort to any means
necessary to bring about those ends we have blindly accepted. So as to avoid this kind of
Machiavellian approach to politics and ethics, Dewey instructed that we should "place
method and means upon the level of importance that has, in the past, been imputed
exclusively to ends."% As he saw it, the principal mission ofpragmatism was to spread
the gospel of scientific method, to convince people that its techniques had general
applications. "If the pragmatic idea of truth has itself any pragmatic worth, it is because
it stands for carrying the experimental notion of truth that reigns among the sciences,
technically viewed, over into political and moral practices, humanly viewed.”97 Indeed.
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Dewey believed «ha« scientific method was no, jus, usetb, in pursulng an abstruse subjec ,
for purely technical reasons.” Instead:
equipment indispensable for success in pursuit. 98
Stiemific method was not an arcane technique, useful only to a select few with highly
specialized and technical concerns; it was an approach to solving problems and
ascertaming truths of any kind, and required a spirit of cooperation, deliberation and
expenmen,a,ion.
-There is bu, one sure road of access to truth-,he road of pa,ten,,
cooperative inqutry operating by means of observation, experiment, record, and
controlled reflection."'''' No matter the question or problem with which man was faced-
whether it was ethical, political, or social—scientific inquiry had the best chance of
finding answers.
Though they certainly made odd bed-fellows, both traditionalists and positivists
denied that humankind could apply science so broadly. But Dewey saw the danger in this
refusal to allow human beings any intelligent means by which to devise practical
solutions to social problems and to make judgments about good and evil. Denying that
there are "any natural and human means of determining judgments as to what is good and
evil will work to the benefit of those who hold that they have in their possession super-
98
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human and super-natural means for infallible ascertainment of ultimate ends.”™ Most
troubling, the stakes become much larger as sctence continues to make technological
advances winch the powerfiil use to serve their “ultimate ends.” Indeed, the hopes of
humankind remamed dim if scientific method continued to play an mcreasingly important
role in producing and regulating the “concrete conditions of life,” while the social
consequences of these technological developments were left “a. the mercy of iirational
habits, institutions, and a class and sectarian distribution of power between the stronger
and the weaker.'""' For Dewey, society could only be saved if it began to apply scientific
method to itself and not just nature. The only cure to the ills of scientific method, and he
conceded there were many, was more scientific method.
Dewey's praise of scientific method elicited an onslaught of criticism, especially
from traditionalists who charged him with extolling a philosophy of means which had
nothing to say about the ends we ought to seek. The waves of invective crashing against
Dewey’s pragmatism seemed to become more intense during times of war—when, all of
a sudden, these philosophical disputes ceased to be parlor games and seemed to have
real-world consequences. Robert Hutchins, the renowned president of the University of
Chicago who instituted its Great Books curriculum, proved an especially animated foe of
Dewey's pragmatism in the late 1 930s and early 1 940s. In his view, Dewey overlooked
the fact that we live in a world where people cannot agree on values, the ultimate ends for
which humanity should strive. It we could all agree on ends, resorting to the scientific
method to achieve those ends would make sense. But the rise of Nazism and Soviet
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communism showed us all too clearly that humankind had
kind of consensus about values, and
not come close to reaching any
science had no way of resolving these conflicts.
Hutch, ns wrote:
-The deference between us and Mr. Dewey is that we can defend Mr.
Dewey’s goals and Mr. Dewey cannot. All he can do is say he is for them. He cannot
say why, because he can only appeal to science, and science cannot tell him why he
should be for science or for democracy or for human ends.” 102 Though Dewey and
Hutchins may have shared many of the same values. Dewey embraced a philosophy that
provides only a method by winch to reach cetfatn ends, no, a justification for those ends.
In the end, said Hutchins, only moral philosophy and religton could supply this
justification.
Dewey endured similar assaults after he publicly supported American entry into
World War I. His former student and acolyte, Randolph Bourne, unleashed the most
compelling tirade against Dewey’s pragmatism in a series of articles originally published
in a journal called The Seven Arts. Bourne suggested that pragmatism was an adequate
peace-time philosophy, a reasonable approach to life when society was not embroiled in
cnsis. But he declared that Dewey and his fellow pragmatists laid the groundwork for a
chillingly amoral instrumentalism, greasing the engines of an unjustified war without a
moment’s hesitation.
The war has revealed a younger intelligentsia, trained up in the pragmatic
dispensation, immensely ready for the executive ordering of events,
pitifully unprepared for the intellectual interpretation or the idealistic
focusing of ends...The formulation of values and ideals, the production of
1 02
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articulate and suggestive thinking, had not
to any extent whatever, with their technical
in their education, kept
aptitude. 103
pace,
Bourne accused Dewey of inspiring a new generation of intellectuals who developed
impressive technical abilities but no moral preparatton for formula,mg ends. Dewey
unwittingly prepared his “disciples” to become “efficient instruments of the war-
technique, accepting with little quest,on the ends as announced from above.” His
disciples never anticipated that instrumentalism would lead to the apotheosis of
technique, for they embraced a se, of progressive values-or
“private utop,as”-to wh.ch
they sincerely believed their technical skills would contnbu.e, bu, their exclustve focus
on means led them to support, with immense energy and gusto, an unnecessary war.
Dewey also meant his philosophy, when taken as a philosophy of life, to start with
values. But there was always that unhappy ambiguity in his doctnne as to jus, how
values were created, and it became easier and easier to assume that just any growth was
justified and almost any activity valuable as long as it achieved ends.” 104 Pragmatism
had much to say about how to achieve certain ends, applying the scientific method to
answer the questions that vex us and carrying out our mission with great efficiency, but it
had nothing to say about why we should embrace those ends, the values that guide our
actions and give our lives meaning. Pragmatism told us much about how but nothing
about why. It produced wonderful technocrats and functionaries but failed to be morally
instructive. One cannot help wondering if Dewey felt the sting of betrayal from his
former student, for he responded, quite out of character for the usually unflappable
Bourne, “Twilight of Idols,” Radical Will
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philosopher, by using his mfiuence t0 make sure^^ ^^^
for The New Republic and to remove him from the editorial board of The Dial
.
105
Perhaps Bourne aroused Dewey’s anger to sueh an extent because his words resonated so
powerfully.
Ironically, Bourne would become a victim of the war he opposed with such
virulence. He contracted influenza from Amencan soldiers who returned to New York
C.ty after the war, dying prematurely at the age ofthirty-two in December of 1918. His
untimely death notwithstanding, Bourne left behind a fotmtdable legacy. Throughout the
res. of his career, Dewey would have to contend with his powerfully resonant criticism in
one form or another, often emanating from the most renowned public intellectuals in the
country, sueh as Lewis Mumford, Waldo Frank, and Morttmer Adler, as well as Robert
Hutchms. The upshot of this barrage of criticism was that it impelled him to clarify his
philosophical position, showtng his skeptics that pragmatism actually did have something
to say about values and moral ends, about why we should do some things and not others.
His critics dismissed the notion that science could say anything about moral truth, but
Dewey begged to differ. Indeed, scientific method was our only hope of attaining moral
truths that addressed the actual problems with which men dealt in their daily experience.
But the crucial point to understand was that, for Dewey, the scientific method could only
solve the problems of men if applied properly—that is, democratically. In order to create
adequate moral values, societies must replicate on a large scale the methods of
intelligence and cooperation employed in scientific communities.
See Westbrook, John Dewey and American Democracy
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A number of scholars have recently identified Dewey’s democratic epistemology.
The contemporary pragmatist philosopher, Htlary Putnam, argues that Dewey made an
explicit
-epistemologicaljustification ofdemocracy."™ He suggests further that
Dewey’s democrats epistemology rested on three crucial assert,on. First, the best way
to arrive a, provtstonal truths (’’warranted assertions”) and fix our beliefs (alleviate our
state of doubt) is through scientific inquiry by a community of competent inquirers.
Second, this method of science could be expanded to other areas of inquiry, including
ethics and politics. Third, the degree to which ethical and political inquiry is democrat,,
including in the conversation all members of the community who have relevant
experiences to share, determines how effective its provisional truths will be. Putnam
finds this last point a particularly original insight on the part of Dewey, who saw
democracy as "not just one form of social life among other workable forms of social life;
it is the precondition for the full application of intelligence to the solution of social
problems.” 107 The public good can only emerge when everyone in the community
contributes their insights and experiences to a larger discussion about the social good.
Even the most benevolent despot will never succeed in promoting the social good and
public welfare because, no matter how hard he may try to sympathize with the plight of
his subjects, he can never truly know of their circumstances, their needs and desires. The
implication of this argument, according to Putnam, is that “an an ethical community—
a
community which wants to know what is right and good—should organize itself in
accordance with democratic standards and ideals, not only because they are good in
106
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prerequisitesfor the application of
themselves (and they are), but because they are the
intelligence to the inquiry
James Kloppenberg reads Dewey similarly, suggesting that his “democratic
community replicates the community of broadly conceived scientific enquiry... Free and
creative individuals, in democratic as in scientific communities, collectively test
hypotheses to find out what works best. These communities set their own goals,
determine their own tests, and evaluate their results in a spirit of constructive
cooperation. ’ 0 He argues that Dewey's critics often “misinterpreted” his “enthusiasm
for science as a “narrow concern with technique to the exclusion of ethical
considerations,” but insists that Dewey actually
valued the scientific method because it embodied an ethical commitment
to open-ended inquiry wherein human values shaped the selection of
questions, the formulation of hypotheses, and the evaluation of results.
Dewey conceived of the ideal scientific community as a democratically
organized, truth-seeking group of independent thinkers who tested their
results against pragmatic standards, but those standards always reflected
moral, rather than narrowly technical, considerations. 1 10
It is clear from Kloppenberg s analysis that, for Dewey, scientific method and democracy
were nearly indistinguishable. They embraced the same values of “open-ended inquiry”
and constructive cooperation and employed the same means of formulating and testing
hypotheses with the available empirical evidence. Both communities promoted
108
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deliberation and discussion among
-free and ereat.ve individuals” whose
inquiry always met “ethical considerations.”
standards for
In drawing the connect,on between scientific method and democracy in Dewey's
.hough,, both Putnam and Kloppenberg htghligh, the fundamental component of his
epistemology the notion tha, intel.igence is a social, no, an individual, endowment.
Whtle Dewey conceded that some people may have superior nat.ve intelligence to others,
he maintained that a handful of brill,an, people, with the highest intelligence quotients
imaginable, cannot devise truths that would prove most benefidal in social matters. I,
may be recalled that Dewey did not consider intell.gence the ability to think logically or
solve mathematical puzzles bu, rather the capacity to make judgments based on our
expenences. But exercising judgment required one to look not only at his own
experiences but to the expenences of everyone else in the community, sharing ideas and
points-ot-view with others. For this reason, Dewey rejected the rule of experts, whose
raw intelligence would undoubtedly exceed most people's, but who would likely make
some unwise judgments because of their limited experience. “A class of experts is
inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests
and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge a, all.”" 1 The
implication here is that experts, their technical knowledge and pure intelligence
notwithstanding, do not have the knowledge necessary to address political and ethical
questions, because they are isolated from the experiences of everyone else in society. On
similar grounds, Dewey argued that paternalism ofany kind, no matter how well
intended, could not work.
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.n ways which leave passive those to be benefited Tert isTmoral
"
welfare can be advanced only by means which elicit the positive merest
~=:vhose ,o be benfed °r “,mproved” •poS^r^p a in carry,ng ,hem °m ,here is n°
For Dewey, the epistemologtcal lesson here is that a few wtse men, drawtng on their
super,or intellects, powers of reason and technical skills, cannot arrive at moral truths and
then confer their wtsdom about the good life on others. So that the “social welfare can be
advanced," all citizens must become engaged in the process of actively cooperatmg with
their fellow men to formulate and implement their goals, both political and ethical.
Dewey did not consider this such a far-fetched idea. He looked "forward to a
time when all individuals may share in the discoveries and thoughts of others ” Because
smaller and specialized scientific communities functioned this way, he saw no reason
why larger economic or political communities could not do so as well.
No scientific inquirer can keep what he finds to himself or turn it to
merely private account without losing his scientific standing. Everything
discovered belongs to the community of workers. Every new idea and
theory has to be submitted to this community for confirmation and test.
There is an expanding community of cooperative effort and of truth. It is
true enough that these traits are now limited to small groups having
somewhat technical activity. But the existence of such groups reveals a
possibility of the present—one of the many possibilities that are a
challenge to expansion, and not a ground for retreat and contraction. 113
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miS V,S'°n ,0 read' frUito
>
a democracy would emerge ,he form
of guild socialism, workers adopting
.he attitude and methods of sconce, and creating a
community that promotes communication and tolerates dissent. It would be the seientific
method writ large, tor
-freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of
communication, the distribution of wha, is found ou, to every mdividual as the ultimate
intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as in the scientific method.”" 4
As we have seen in this chapter and those on Peirce and James, pragmatism held
that men arrived at provisional truth in their attempts to answer questions and solve
problems in a radically contingent world; that the scientific method represented the best
means to attain such truths, not just about nature but also about man and his social and
political relations. But Dewey was the first to take these ideas a step further and suggest
that for the scientific method to yield truths in ethical and political matters, everyone in
the community had to adopt the attitude of the scientist, contributing their experiences to
the ongoing discussion and testing of hypotheses. As Putnam and Kloppenberg have
suggested, Dewey's decidedly democratic epistemology seemed to lead inexorably
toward participatory democracy. But Dewey could not make this leap without also
addressing the issue ofhuman nature, whether average men and women could in fact
improve themselves and leam the skills required of them in an enlarged scientific
community.
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V.
W.thou, question, Dewey embraced a democrat,
c psycho,ogy. Freedom and
Culture, he dec.ared ,ha, “democracy needs a new psychology,- one that is “allied with
humanism, with the faith in the potentialities of human nature.”' 15 That he believed
every man bnmmed with potent.al was evident throughout his career, and he oceas.onally
indulged in hypberole on that point. In an article he wrote fairly early in his career,
Dewey argued
.ha, “in every ind.vidual there lives an infinite and universa! possibility;
that of being a king and priest.”' 16 Putting his faith in the promise of human beings on
display, Dewey elicited attacks from critics who maintained that most people were no,
capable of mastering the skills necessary to think like scientists and participate effectively
m self-governance. In the 1 920s, a new crop of political scientists, including Charles
Merriam and his students Harold Lasswell and Harold Gosnell, believed that most people
were inherently irrational and, consequently, they argued that we should not encourage
the increase of citizen participation in our democracy. If anything, they thought it best to
limit citizen participation and reconceive democracy as rule by enlightened and
dependable experts. 1 17 Wrote Lasswell:
Familiarity with the ruling public has bred contempt. Modem reflections
upon democracy boil down to the propostion, more or less contritely
expressed, that the democrats were deceiving themselves. The public has
not reigned with benignity and restraint. The good life is not in the mighty
rushing wind ot public sentiment. It is no organic secretion of the horde,
but the tedious achievement of the few. 118
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The public have not ruled with “benignity,” according to Lasswell, because their political
actions “derive their vitality from the displacement of pnvate affects upon pubhc objects,
and political crises are complicated by the concurrent reactivation of specific primitive
motives, ’"’in other words, citizens panic,paling in our democracy cannot help but
express their most base and primal psychological instincts when they engage in civic
action. In Moral Man and Immoral Society, Reinhold Niebuhr assailed both religious
and secular liberals who believed, quite naively, “that the ego.sm of individuals is being
progressively checked by the development of rationality or the growth of a religiously
inspired goodw.ll and that nothing but the continuance of this progress is necessary to
establish social harmony between all the human societies and collectivities.” He accused
Dewey in particular of not acknowledging the “predatory self-interest” that dictates the
behavior of most people, and “the brutal character of the behavior of all human
collectives, and the power of self-interest and collective egoism in all intergroup
relations.” 120 A theologian by training, Niebuhr took the concept of original sin seriously
and believed that we denied the wretched nature of man at our peril. He maintained that
a naive faith in man's capacity for rational action and benevolence can lead to ill-advised
political enterprises with disastrous consequences. To avoid future manifestations of
Nazism or Stalinism, we should temper any attempts to achieve social perfection with a
heavy dose of reality about what can be expected of man.
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Lasswell and Niebuhr would have us believe that we are
.rral.onal or cruel
creatures by nature, that our instincts define who we are and limit our capacities. Bu,
Dewey had difficulty abiding thtnkers who could only expect the worst of human beings.
According to his former student, Sidney Hook, Dewey asked in a rare moment of
exasperatton why he had “to believe that every man is bom a sonofabitch even before he
acts like one, and regardless ofwhy and how he becomes one?-' While Dewey would
certainly have adnutted that humankind has a poor traek reeord, displaying throughout
h, story an uncanny aptitude for cruelty, injustice and destruction, he denied that our
natures are responsible for our shameful past. Indeed, he blamed not our instincts but our
hab'ts: We are not inherently irrational; we have been habituated to behave this way.
Though men have instincts (or what Dewey often called “impulses”) hard-wired into
them, these alone cannot account for our irrationality, selfishness, or cruelty, because a
whole host of conflicting instincts constitute a person. For example, he may have an
instinct for both sympathy and cruelty, but this does not explain why he acts one way or
the other. Said Dewey: “The instincts, whether named gregariousness, or sympathy, or
the sense of mutual dependence, or domination on one side and abasement and subjection
on the other, at best account for everything in general and nothing in particular.” 122 Like
James, Dewey believed that man harbors countless instincts, but a process of habituation
must activate those that become manifest.
Even when we refer to tendencies and impulses that actually are genuine
elements in human nature we find, unless we swallow whole some current
opinion, that of themselves they explain nothing about social phenomena.
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Mos, of our instincts He dormant, awaking a ca„ to action front the conditions of our
socal environment. Our instincts cannot on their own explain our behavior, for they
cannot take shape and “produce consequences’- un.i! our socta, environment instiUs
“dispositions" (or habits) within us. In add,,,on, Dewey agreed with James in suggesting
.ha, man had the ability to sublimate his instincts, channel,ng them in soetally productive
and psycholog,cally healthy ways. He even wen, so far as to take issue with Freud,
agreeing with the famous psycholog,s, that suppress,on leads to “all ktnds of intellectual
and moral pathology" but denying his assertion that ,t represented the natural state of
affairs. Instead, he believed that sublimation was the “normal or desirable fitnchoning
of impulse.” 125
The role of our social environment in cultivating our habits was crucial for
Dewey. We often thmk of habits as individual patterns of behavior, developed by
seemingly endless repehtion so as to perform relatively mundane tasks without couscous
thought. Though Dewey appreciated the importance of these kinds of habits, he was
more interested in those habits that onginated from, and had an impact on, our social
relationships. He beheved that, by and large, human beings were social construchons:
Habit is the mainspring of human action, and habits are formed for the
most part under the influence of the customs of a group. The organic
structure ofman entails the formation of habit, for, whether we wish or
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attitude and set a "“^cation of
Society shapes then habits, and, in turn, their habits define who they are, bnng.ng eerta.n
instincts and behaviors to life. Our habits can becotne so deeply engrained within us that
we sometimes confuse them with our natural instincts. We often use the terms “nature”
or “natural” to descnbe those depositions that we have become so “used to, inured to by
custom, that imagination can hardly conceive of anything different. Habit is second
nature and second nature under ordinary circumstances as potent and urgent as firs,
nature.”
127
Indeed, “[w]hen habits are so ingrained as to be second nature, they seem to
have all of the inevitability that belongs to the movement of stars”' 2* The power of habit
can hardly be overstated, according to Dewey, and he even went so far as to claim that
habits defined who we are. “When we are hones, with our ourselves,” he said, “we
acknowledge that a habit has this power because it is so intimately a part of ourselves. It
has a hold on us because we are the habit.” 12’ Nevertheless, we should never forget that
our habits are acquired characteristics that we can always change.
All of this implies that man acts selfishly or generously, cruelly or kindly, not
because his genes or his soul have impelled him to do so, but rather because his society
and culture have habituated him to this kind ofbehavior-so much so that it appears
completely "natural” to him, an intrinsic part of his identity. Though he may not be
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aware of the fact, he has equa, potential for wickedness and virtue, his fate depending on
the way society teaches him to relate with others. Dewey used the example of wha,
economic liberals call the eompet.tive instinct. They often praise capitalism on the
grounds that it accommodates our competitive instincts and channels them in such a way
as to foster social progress. But Dewey mamtamed that their argument rests on a false
prem,se-the not.on that men are competitive by nature and. except in rare instances,
cannot hope to transcend this inborn characteristic.
‘Neither competition nor cooperation
can be judged as traits of human nature,” sa.d Dewey. “They are names for certain
relations among the actions of indivtduals as the relat.ons actually obtain in a
community. Economic liberals have also invoked the inherent selfishness of man in
their defense of capitalism, but once again Dewey pointed to the social origins of this
supposedly immutable attribute.
A1 special privilege narrows the outlook of those who possess it, as well
as limits the development of those not having it. A very considerable
portion of what is regarded as the inherent selfishness of mankind is the
product of an inequitable distribution of power-inequitable because it
shuts out some from the conditions which direct and evoke their capacities
while it produces a one-sided growth in those who have privilege. 13 '
Human beings only behave selfishly, according to Dewey, because of inequitable social
conditions perpetuating the idea among both the haves and the have-nots that each
person, if he wants to get by in this world, must consider his own needs and desires first,
and only then, perhaps as an afterthought, should he extend a helping hand to his fellow
man. But Dewey insisted that this does not have to be the case. More cooperative social
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arrangements wou.d habituate us to regard the needs of others jus, as soon as our own
and to act accordingly.
Dewey maintained that serial re, a,tons could shape intellectual as well as
behavioral habtts. Ltberals and democratic realms, such as Merriam or Lippmann, often
spoke about the stupidity of the masses, their tnabth.y to think rahonally and base then
judgments on objective informal,on. To posit that they could develop the capacity for
scientific method and democratic participation was out of the question for these thmkers.
Bu, Dewey though, otherwise: “1, is satd that the average citizen is no, endowed with the
degree of intelligence that the use of i, as a method demands,” but such arguments rested
"wholly upon the old notion that intelligence is a ready-made possesston of individuals.”
In most cases, people have the intelligence necessary “to respond ,o and to use the
knowledge and the skill that are embodied in the social condittons in whtch he lives,
moves and has his being.” 132 Unfortunately, they have no, on the whole exhibited an
ability to apply the methods of science to solve social problems because they have not
been given the opportunity to learn these skills. Current social arrangements have denied
them “the rich store of the accumulated wealth of mankind in knowledge, ideas and
purposes. There does not now exist the kind of social organization that even permits the
average human beings to share the potentially available social intelligence.” 133 While our
society has failed to distribute social intelligence of the political and social kind, it
succeeds in many other, usually technical, areas. Dewey believed these successes were a
testament to his faith that average people can achieve much more than so-called elites
132
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Wi" 6Ver admit
' ^ 8aVe ",e eMmP'e of ‘he mechanic whose native tn.elhgenee is
average but who becomes quite skilled in his trade beeause he has the good fortune to
Lve in a soetal “environment in which the cumulative mtelligence of a multitude of
cooperating individuals is embodied.” Surrounded by experienced meehantcs who teach
him the trade, including its many methods and procedures, the novice will eventually
become a veteran and contnbute significantly to the social intelligence of fixing cars. If
.he average citizen enjoyed a similarly nurturing envtronment, we can only imagine wha,
he might achieve: “Given a social medium in whose institutions the avatlable
knowledge, ideas and art of human,ty were incarnate, and the average ind.vidual would
rise to undreamed heights of social and political mtelligence.” 1" But until that time
comes, it will remain “useless to talk about the fa,lure of democracy.” 135
It >s hardly surprising that Dewey devoted so much energy to education, for he
considered it the only means by wh.ch we could assist the average individual to reach
those “undreamed heights of social and political intelligence.” Dewey understood
educahon in the broadest terms poss.ble, not just as filling the vacant minds of children
with information or prov.ding them the basics in reading, writing, and arithmetic. A life-
long process, education cultivated habits ofmind in which people learn how to think
analytically and use ideas and information as tools for solving problems in a socially
cooperative environment. Its aim was to instill in its students a scientific attitude which
prepared them for democratic participation. Unfortunately, the American educational
system came nowhere close to achieving this goal. Schools employed pedagogical
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methods that encouraged individualism and competitiveness, no. sociability and
coopera,ton. Never expected to think critically to prove mastery of a subject, students
only had to re,am arcane informatton which teachers expected them to regurgttate from
time to time. The end result was that teachers and students alike saw educatton as largely
a solitary endeavor, a way of serving narrow self-interest, and they learned to regard the
information commuted to memory as unassailable truth. In other words, the prevailing
educational system in America perpetuated individualism and absolutism, both of which
were anathema to science and democracy.
Dewey thought the best way to forge scientific and democratic habits in our
schools was to require active participation in real-life enterprises-or what he often
called “learning by doing." In this approach, learning ceased to be the passive acquisition
of knowledge for its own sake and became a goal-oriented and social activity. Along the
way, students would acquire information and learn concepts that applied directly, or at
least bore some relevance, to the task at hand. At the Dewey School, for example,
students spent considerable time in the kitchen, preparing and cooking their own meals,
and in the process they would learn arithmetic, chemistry, physics, biology, and even
geography. He described learning at his school as follows: “Absolutely no separation
is made between the ‘social’ side of the work, its concern with people’s activities and
their mutual dependencies, and the ‘science,’ regard for physical facts and forces.” 137
Dewey believed this approach of “learning by doing” reconciled the traditional and
progressive theories ot education. The former group, led by advocates such as W. T.
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Hams, argued that students must expend effort memorizing information in order to learn,
Johann Herbari represented the latter in his suggests that learning must always sustain
students’ interest. Dewey believed that the chief advantage of his method was that it
accomplished both: always starting with a problem or a challenge, students engaged
actively in long-tenn projects that they considered meaningful and relevant to their
lives. All the while, students developed their capacity for intelligent thought and
problem-solving.
According to Max Eastman, a former teaching student for Dewey at Columbia
University, Dewey’s pedagogical method “saved our children from dying of boredom, as
we almost did in school.” 139 While this may have been true, Dewey had far greater
ambitions that have still not been realized. He meant for schools to function as
incubators tor democracy, where students would develop the skills and habits conducive
to civic engagement. Education, he said, was “the art of giving shape to human powers
and adapting them to social service.''' 40 Further, he believed that schools had to cultivate
an
interest in the community welfare, an interest which is intellectual and
practical, as well as emotional—an interest, that is to say, in perceiving
whatever makes for social order and progress, and for carrying these
principles into execution—is the ultimate ethical habit to which all the
special school habits must be related if they are to be animated by the
breath of moral life. 141
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Hav,ng promoted an interest in the commonweal, schools also had to condition students
tor cooperative undertakings with other members of then community, becoming
'‘an
institution in whtch the child is, for the time, to live-to be a member of a community life
m which he feels that he participates, and to which he contributes.” This school will
"have a community of spirit and end reaped through diversity of powers and acts,” said
Dewey. ‘‘Only in this way can the cooperative spirit involved in the division of labor be
substituted for the competitive spirit inevitably developed when a number of persons of
the same presumed attainments are working to secure exactly the same result.” 142 Dewey
placed so much emphasis on education throughout his career because he saw it as a
unique opportunity, a process of rehabituating self-absorbed individuals into enlarged-
thinking citizens who worked alongside their fellow men to serve the community.
But Dewey understood that education did not end in the school. While “we may
produce in schools a projection in type of the society we would like to realize,” which we
hope will “modify the larger and more recalcitrant features of adult society,” it will not be
able to contend with those oppositional forces "entrenched in command of the industrial
machinery” unless a democratic education is “made general,” permeating every social
institution that can conceivably shape our dispositions.' 43 Indeed, we can only hope to
bring about a “more equitable and enlightened social order” if a democratic education
reaches “ail agencies and influences that shape disposition,” including “every place in
which men habitually meet—shop, club, factory, saloon, church, political caucus—is
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perforce a school house, even though no, so labelled.”- The implication here was that
education was a life-long process, perhaps beginning in the school house bu, continuing
tnto adulthood, shaping our habits of mtnd and conduct. While the sehool may m,reduce
us to democratic practices, there was no substitute for actual ctvic part.cipation, getting
your fee, we, and engaging in i, directly. The concept of “learn,ng by doing” applied
here: participation represented the best way to develop and sustain democratic habits. In
other words, the best school ofdemocracy was democracy itself.
Dewey maintained a faith throughout his life that democracy could transform its
participants both intellectually and morally. Because Dewey did not subscribe to any
firs, principles or fixed ends, the only moral aim for which the educated person should
strive was growth or development itself, the process of learning new perspectives and
ideas throughout our lives and engaging in creative activities for our own self-realization.
We should never rest comfortably at a particular end, as if it were our ultimate goal in
life, the Holy Grail of our quest. The process of developing ourselves is the end.
The process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than the static
outcome and result, becomes the significant thing...The end is no longer a
terminus or limit to be reached. It is the active process of transforming the
existent situation. Not perfection as a final goal, but the ever-enduring
process of perfecting, maturing, refining is the aim in living... Growth
itself is the only moral “end.” 145
Critics have often suggested that growth of any kind, no matter how morally repugnant,
could meet this standard. A burglar, for instance, could continually improve his skills
and add new techniques to his repertoire. But Dewey argued that individual growth
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demanded creative and ennehing activity that releases the partictpan, from pas, problems,
and his success depended on the degree to winch he connected with nature and other
people. Burglary could never promote indtvidual growth because i, severed connections
between the perpetrator and the society in which he operates, making i, impossible for
him to address fundamental problems in his life.'* People could only enjoy true growth
tf they lived in a community in which people shared a variety of interests with others in
then social group and also communicated openly with people who belonged to other
groups. Dewey described the growth standard thusly: “How numerous and varied are
the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other
forms of associaton?" A criminal band, he argued, did not meet the standard very well,
for i, has few common interests that tie its members together, and the nature of their work
isolates them from other groups. “Hence, the education such a society gives is partial and
distorted.” Its members will never grow in the true sense of the word. 147
In comparison to the criminal band, Dewey gave the example of a family that
does meet the standard and thus promotes growth among its members. This family
shares material, intellectual, aesthetic interests” to such an extent that “the progress of
one member has worth for the experience of other members,” and, furthermore, it
is not an isolated whole, but enters intimately into relationships with
business groups, with schools, with all the agencies of culture, as well as
other similar groups, and... it plays a due part in the political organization
and in return receives support from it. In short, there are many interests
consciously communicated and shared; and there are varied and free
points of contact with other modes of association. 148
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As Dewey saw it, this example showed that the “two elements in our eriterion both point
to democracy." 149 A despottc state fails to foster growth because the official use of terror
alienates citizens from each other and their leaders, whtch means that “there is no
extensive number of common mterests; there is no free play baek and forth among the
members of the social group. Stimulation and response are exceedingly one-s,ded.“ The
members of a group can only share a large number of interests if they all enjoy “an
equable opportunity to recetve and to take from others. There must be a large variety of
shared undertakings and experiences. Otherwise, the influences which educate some into
masters, educate others into slaves.” 150 A despotic state also isolates itself from other
nations, which leads to hardened dispositions—or to the “rigidity and formal
institutionalization of life." 151 Democracy, on the other hand, ensures participation in
collective action for all its members and promotes inter-group communication to
introduce fresh perspectives in the community. Thus, democracy was the ideal social and
political order in which its members could experience growth. “A democracy,” said
Dewey, “is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of associated living.
of conjoint communicated experience.” This results in a “liberation of powers which
remain suppressed as long as the incitations to action are partial.” 152
149
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In the end, Dewey's psychology speaks to the transformative power of democratic
parttcipation. A soctety
.ha, makes provisos for widespread civtc part.cipatton and
period,cally readjusts its eustoms and institutions releases energies within its members
and develops their moral and intellectual capacities to untold heights. “Democracy has
many meanings ” Dewey said, “bu, if i, has moral meantng, i, ls found in resolvtng that
the supreme test of all pohtical mstitutions and industnal arrangements shall be the
contribution they make to the all-around growth of every member of society."
Necessarily a product of social relationships, the individual can never reach his foil
potential and fashion a complete tdentity in solitude. Because each of us can only
achieve selfhood in this soctal context, we search for a “mode of associated living" that
does not leave us at the mercy of remote economic or political forces but instead
empowers us partake in the making of this world of which we are an inextricable part.
That is the very meaning of democracy. In one of his more memorable passages, Dewey
compared associated life to cultivating a garden:
To gain an integrated individuality, each of us needs to cultivate his own
garden. But there is no fence about this garden: it is no sharply marked-
off enclosure. Our garden is the world, in the angle at which it touches
our own manner of being. By accepting the corporate and industrial world
in which we live, and by thus fulfilling the pre-condition for interaction
with it, we, who are also parts of the moving present, create ourselves as
we create an unknown future. 153
The garden metaphor captured perfectly the condition of the associated human being. To
achieve individuality and freedom, a person must “cultivate his own garden,” even
though it cannot be enclosed and completely protected from outside intrusion. He must
learn to accept the entire corporate and industrial world as his garden, even if shared, and
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make his coninbuiions to its cultivation, however
.nodes, they nray be. the proeess of
working collectively to “create an unknown future," he will create himself.
VI.
That man will pick up his shovel or hoe and begtn worktng in his garden Dewey
almost took for granted. Indeed, his democratic theology was robust. If he devoted little
attention to the question of free will or choice, i, was because the answer seemed all too
obvious to him. He understood intuitively that his faith in democracy would be
unthinkable without the belief that human beings could make free choices, drawing on
their intelligence to shape their own destiny. Ltke James, Dewey found middle ground
between the atomism of empiricist philosophy and the monism of various mechanistic
and idealist thinkers. Particularistic empiricism rested on the notion that entities in this
universe have the capacity to act solely from their own powers and initiative. From this
view, the universe appears completely indeterminate and chaotic, teeming with
spontaneity but lacking any coherence or meaning. Monism, on the other hand, posited
that entities are part of a large interactive system, acting not with self-initiative but in a
predetermined way. Whether the system was mechanistic or idealist, this implied a
block universe in which human freedom was sheer illusion. Dewey found neither
outlook very appealing as a way to describe the human condition. “For no living creature
could survive, save by sheer accident, if its experiences had no more reach, scope or
content, than the traditional particularistic empiricism provided for. On the other hand, it
225
‘S ,mp°ssible 10 ima8ine a “ving creature coping with the universe all at once." 154 As an
alternative, he offered "a via media between extreme atomistic pluralism and block
un,verse monisms.” 155 He saw experience as a transaction, a back-and-forth exchange
between human betngs who take on certain functions within a larger social organ,sm.
Human beings enjoyed freedom to make choices and
social context.
exercise influence, but always in a
The social aspect of free choice notwithstanding, Dewey argued that “all
deliberate choices and plans are finally the work of single human beings.” 156 Every
individual human being has the capacity to transcend biological and social influences, act
with a certain degree of spontaneity, modify his habits, and perhaps even have an effect
on his social environment. On the subject of free will Peirce and James often invoked
Darwinism, suggesting that the doctrine of chance variation could explain spontaneous
choice. Though Dewey agreed with this idea in principle, he contributed some original
insights to the discussion. Most thinkers regarded instincts as a set of biological
conditions that placed severe constraints on human freedom, but Dewey thought that they
actually liberted us: “Impulses are the pivots upon which the re-organization of activities
turn, they are agencies of deviation, for giving new directions to old habits and changing
their quality.
7
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become mired. Without the liberal,ng energy of instinct. we would remain slaves to our
habhs. But our “impulses are too ehaot.c, tumultuous and confused” if left on them own.
for they rush “blindly into any opening” they find and show no discrimination in seeking
an “outlet.” 158 In order to make our instincts work for us, we must harness them with our
intelligence, giving them direction and structure. As Dewey said: “Breach in the crust of
the cake of custom releases impulses, but it is the work of intelligence to find the ways of
using them.” 159
The first step in this process is deliberat.on, rehearsing in our imagination various
ways of acting, either in accordance with “prior habit” or “newly released impulse.” We
finally make a “choice” when “some habit, or some combination of elements of habits
and impulse, finds a way folly open.” 160 Reject,ng James’s belief that we could simply
break old habits through the sheer exercise of will, Dewey argued that free choice was a
matter of careful reflection, employing intelligence (scientific method) to mediate
between our habits and impulses. A person who wanted to exercise free choice had to
discover why he has acted in certain undesirable ways in the past and then devise means
of releasing those latent impulses. This involved creating the right social conditions
under which he could break his bad habits and forge new and better ones. He relied on
his impulses to fuel novelty, but he used his intelligence to turn them into viable action.
What intelligence has to do in the service of impulse is to act not as its
obedient servant but as its clarifier and liberator. And this can be
accomplished only by a study of the conditions and causes, the workings
158
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and consequences of the greatest possibile variety of desires and
Dewey s argument was s.mple: we are free to the extent that we act in the spirit of the
scent, tic method in our daily lives. A person who does not challenge his extant habits
and harness his unpulses to modify them lives at the mercy of his social environment.
Faihng to engage in a transaction with the social organisms, he fulfills the detenninist
prophecy and follows the orders issued from his society. The implicate, of course, is
that man I,berates himself further in a democracy, whtch gives him the power to exercise
his intelligence and solve problems alongside his fellow citizens. Dewey made the
connection between free choice and power quite explicitly: “There is an intrinsic
connection between choice as freedom and the power of action as freedom. A choice
which intelligently manifests individuality enlarges the range of action, and this
enlargement in turn confers upon our desires greater insight and foresight, and makes
choice more intelligent. There is a circle, but an enlarging circle, or, if you please, a
widening spiral.” 162
For Dewey, sublimation represented prima facie evidence that man used his
intelligence to harness instincts. In dealing with his instincts, man had three options
explosive action, sublimation, and suppression—and more often than not, according to
Dewey, he chose sublimation.
In the career of any impulse activity there are speaking generally three
possibilities. It may find a surging, explosive discharge—blind.
lt
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unintelligent. It may be sublimated—that is become a
intelligently with others in a continuing cour’se of^acLn“ g^ofnger may, because of its dynamic incorporation into disposition beconverted into an abiding conviction of social injustice to be remediedand furnish the dynamic to carry the conviction into execution Such anoutcome represents the normal or desirable functioning of impulse- inich, to use our previous language, the impulse operates as a pivot orreorganization of habit. Or again, a released impulsive action may beneither immediately expressed in spasmodic action, nor indirect
employed in an enduring interest. It may be “suppressed ” 163
Dewey’s analysis of sublimation suggests that free choice rests somewhere at the nexus
betewen impulse and intelligence. The fonder breaks through the thick layer of habits in
which we become trapped, and the latter tames that “explosive discharge” of energy and
cleverly puts it to good use, toward the creation of new habits with “enduring interest” to
our society. A man overflowing with anger may become a tyrannical husband, father, or
boss. But a growing awareness of his predisposition and of potential sublimation
strategies can help him redirect his anger in more positive ways, such as fighting “social
injustice, for which both his immediate family and colleagues would be thankful and
from which society as a whole would benefit.
1 63 Human Nature and Conduct
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VII.
In this chapter, 1 have presented Dewey as the essential link between classical
pragmatism and participatory democracy. Dewey said himself that “any theory of
activity in social and moral matters, liberal or otherwise, whtch is no. grounded in a
comprehensive philosophy, seems to me to be only a projection of arbitrary personal
preferences.'- 164 I have simply taken him at his word and sought to uncover the
philosophical foundation of his political theory. My analys.s shows that the three
democratic tenets found in the thought of Peirce and James were crucial to the formation
Of his political theory. A striking irony emerges: pragmatists swell with pnde over their
anti-foundational ism, their belief that human beings can lead more productive and
meaningful lives, devoid of intolerance and social injustice, if they reject first pnnciples
and fixed truths and focus more on the means to achieving a better life; but the
democratic way of life for which Dewey showed so much preference actually rested on
three first principles—what I have called the democratic tenets. This irony suggests—at
the risk of abusing Mark Twain's phraseology—that rumors about the anti foundational-
lsm of pragmatic thought has been greatly exaggerated. It may also point to a tension
within participatory democratic thought whose advocates criticize liberalism for making
specious assumptions about the human condition but cannot avoid doing the same. In
their attempt to construct a politics without foundations, they have merely subsituted new
absolutes for old ones. As we will see, this raises serious questions about the viability
and theoretical coherence of participatory democracy.
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Deweys faith in method sounds almost quaint after an emerging philosophy of
sctence began to challenge the idea that setenttfie communities are sure to arrtve a, even
provisional truths through a process of validation and experimentation'” His belief that
human betngs are emmently educable also seems dubious, especially gtven the ample
supply of contradictory ev.dence to which democratic realists have often pointed and of
which even the most casual observers of the American electorate have been aware
Fmally, Dewey’s unwavering democratic theology, his complete confidence in human
agency, may in fact date him as a thinker. He had no doubt that, if given the resources,
men would not hesitate to use their intelligence to solve problems collectively. Man is
tree and thus poised for civic action. But enthusiasts for partictpatory democracy in the
second halfof the twentieth century and the early twenty-first century have betrayed a
weaken,ng democratic theology. In their view, emerging bureaucratic and technologtcal
forces pose grave threats to human freedom, and they see no immediate remedy to this
problem. In chapters five and six, we turn to the legacy of participatory democracy, as it
has retreated to the margins of academia in the forty or so years after the initial wave of
enthusiasm from the New Left began to recede. We turn next to two inheritors of this
legacy, Sheldon Wolin and Benjamin Barber, whose admiration for participatory
democracy far exceeds their hope for its realization.
16
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CHAPTER V
SHELDON WOL1N AND MELANCHOLIC DEMOCRACY
Sheldon Wolin, an ementus professor at Princeton University and one of the most
influential political theorists in the American academy, has devoted his life to gaining a
fuller understanding of
-the pohttcaP-an ideal and perhaps illusive condition of
poht.cal engagement in which the participants act toward common ends. For him, the
political stands in opposition to politics, or what most would call politics as usual, in
which participants grapple for power to serve private goals.
I shall take the political to be an expression of the idea that a free society
composed of diversities can nonetheless enjoy moments ofcommonality
when, through public deliberations, collective power is used to promote or
protect the well-being of the collectivity. Politics refers to the legitimized
and public contestation, primarily by organized and unequal social
powers, over access to the resources available to the public authorities of
the collectivity.
Perhaps most importantly for Wolin, the political requires deliberative participation on
the part of not only elected politicians or other elites but of the “public” as well. Politics,
on the other hand, is something with which we are all quite familiar, involving
competition among “organized and unequal social powers” for positions of authority. Of
course, only an elite tew, those selected to represent a particular social power, are able to
become “public authorities of the collectivity” and thus make decisions that affect its
well-being. Attaining power is often an end in itself for the contestants, and although
their decisions aftect the well-being of the collectivity, they do not promote the common
good so much as they carry out the agenda of the social power(s) they represent. Because
1
Wolin, “Fugitive Democracy,” 3 1
.
232
these social powers are “unequal,” some contestants have more resources a, their disposal
than others do to realize their objectives. By its very nature, polities excludes certam
groups from political decision-making and distributes power unequally.
Because politics is inherently exclusive, it fails to work toward common ends,
according to Wolin. Only an inclusive political process, which allows all citizens to
participate, can successfully promote the common good. It is no surprise, then, that later
in his career Wolin made it clear that the political can really only manifest itself
democratically. He does suggest that democracy “is one among many versions of the
political,’'
2
probably because he hesitates to deny the possibility of other manifestations
he has not envisioned. Still, democracy represents the political par excellence for Wolin:
“Democracy is a political moment, perhaps the political moment, when the political is
remembered and re-created.” 3 Pure democracy for Wolin is far different from any of the
vanants that have emerged in the last two thousand years. To deserve the name, a
democracy must be inclusive, participatory, and deliberative. In his conception of what
he sometimes calls radical democracy, all citizens share in political decision-making and
work collectively and painstakingly to find solutions to social problems. Power is
decentralized and diffuse, resting in the hands of the many, who, though diverse and
heterogeneous, seek to understand other points of view and to reach mutual agreements
on disputed matters. Anything short of this vision compromises the power of the people
and threatens to consolidate power in the hands of a few who ultimately work toward
private, not common, ends. Our politics—with its periodic elections, endless campaigns,
2
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and political parties-amounts to nothing more than a sham or a mockery ofdemocracy
because 1, fails to accommodate deeply panic,pa.ory modes ofpolitical expenence. (In
the Wolinian spirit, I shall coin the term “shamocracy”)
Wohn s vision ot democracy is so uncompromising that he believes any
formalization or institutionalization brings about its death. Once institutionalized.
democracy becomes co-opted, a domesticated servant of the state, and it quickly loses its
participatory characteristics. This helps explain why Wolin hesitates to provide a clear
picture of what democracy might look like in practice. Blue prints and plans are
anathema to democracy because they immediately place limits on the possible and
necessarily guide politics in particular directions.
Institutionalization brings about not only settled practices regarding such
matters as authority, jurisdiction, accountability, procedures, and
processes but routinization, professionalization, and the loss of
spontaneity... Institutionalization depends on the ritualization of the
behavior of both rulers and ruled to enable the formal functions of state-
coercion, revenue collection, policy, mobilization of the population for
war, law making, punishment, and enforcement of the laws—to be
conducted on a continuing basis. It tends to produce internal hierarchies,
to restrict experience, to associate political experience with institutional
experience, and to inject an esoteric element into politics.4
Contrary to the democratic spirit, institutionalization introduces structure and routine to
politics, which in turn creates hierarchies and restricts access to power. Formless,
spontaneous and even anarchic, Wolinian democracy has no “settled practices” and thus
can manifest itself in a variety of ways. Though democracy may temporarily occupy
4
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institutions, those institutions should never take hold of it and
structure
.
5
impose a particular form or
Undoubtedly frustrating for some readers, Wolinian democracy remains a
somewhat nebulous concept, but perhaps we can best understand it as a rationally
disorganized reaction against formal institutions and power structures. Says Wolin
Instead of a conception of democracy as indistinguishable from its
const, tu ton, I propose accepting the familiar charges that democracy is
nherently unstable, inclined toward anarchy, and identified withZ^Z^SlnS theSe traitS as the basis for a different - constitutionalconception of democracy.
. . we might think of democracy as resistant tothe rationalizing conceptions ofpower and its organization which for
centuries have dominated western thinking and have developed
constitutionalism and their legitimating rationale. This democracy mightbe summed up as the idea and practice of rational disorganization
.
6
Accepting the accusation that democracy has anarchic and revolut.onary tendencies,
Wolin is free to examine and illuminate it without the familiar qualifiers—constitutional,
liberal, etc.—clouding our vision. He seeks to understand democracy unadulterated, and
unlike most political theorists, old and new, he argues that its domestication (or
constitutionalization) is unnecessary, based on unwarranted fears.
According to Wolin, though democracy may be disorganized and anarchic, it
finds coherence and commonality in a shared place, history, and culture. Every person is
located in a certain place. Place is geography and vocations. (Vocations:
what we do in and to the world.) This means that subjectivity and
historicity are connected. Our place in the double sense of geography and
vocations is known only by its history, so, therefore, is our identity
.
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Every person is located in a p.ace in ,1ns world where his expenences with nature and
Cher people shape his identity. We must situate a person in his cultural and historical
context to understand hint. Like nrany cnttcs of liberalism, includ.ng communitarians.
Wolin has li„le use for a politics tha, reduces the citizen to an unencumbered self-.o an
individual whose identity is completely independent of the culture and history tha,
produced him. “A political being” is not "an abstract, disconnected bearer of rights,
privileges, and immunities,” but rather a “person whose existence is located in a
particular place and draws its sustenance from circumscribed relationships: family,
friends, church, neighborhood, workplace, community, town, city.”8 The identity of a
political being is contextual, inseparable from the expenences he shares with others in his
community.
Shared experience—past, present, and future—is an important element of
Wolinian democracy, but one must not assume he endorses homogeneity or uniformity.
In eschewing institutionalization and formalization, Wolinian democracy remains—to
use his terms “localized" and “feudal," comprising a complex web of relationships and
a diversity ot interests and traditions which resist forces of centralization and uniformity
(i.e., the modem state or corporation). When people of various interests and experiences
come together tor a common purpose, when they engage collectively in political action to
resist the current organization of power, and when each individual participates fully, they
become a demos. Wolinian democracy, then, is spontaneous, loosely organized, complex
and diverse, but geography and history create a common identity around which the demos
can organize and become animated.
“What Revolutionary Action Means Today," 27.
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L,ke individuals, the demos is capable of hero,c political action and strives to
enhance its power. In fact, the demos has a cons,durable advantage over political
ind,v,duals: i, is far more powerful and fearsome. The demos has an .mmense capacity to
challenge ex,sting laws and political insftutions, even to transgress or subvert them. In a
clever inversion of Nietzsche’s master and slave moralities, Wolin argues that the
transgress,ve tendencies of the demos resemble those of the supennan, whose will to
power is insatiable yet never grounded in resentment or mahce. 9 Wolin concedes,
however, that unchecked demotic power can exceed mere transgression and become
horrifyingly destructive, annihilating not only political, social and economic institutions
but also, in the end, itself.
For this reason, political theorists have long disparaged the demos as a grave
threat to the political order and the rule of law and have defended other political forms—
aristocracy, monarchy, republicanism, liberal democracy—on the grounds that they can
contain demotic power. Liberals have been especially concerned about individual rights.
Time and time again, liberals have invoked the familiar Tocquevillian phrase, “tyranny of
the majority,” to justify institutional obstacles to citizen participation. Of course, what
Wolin would call obstacles, liberals would regard as safeguards—the idea being that
institutional checks and balances serve to fragment power and thus prevent a majority
faction from trampling on the rights of an unfortunate minority. But liberalism, Wolin
argues, represents more than just an attempt to attenuate the excesses of majority factions
through institutional safeguards. It constitutes a concerted effort to derail any kind of
meaningful political action and to redirect human energies toward economic pursuits.
9
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The task, as Madison and later liberals saw it was to encouraoe
institutional devices that would control the effects of politics not toreconstitute politics. Citizens would be engrossed in private achoIs for
given fre
;
dom ,hey use h ,o «if-
namTof
be U"JUSt and °PPressive to limit that pursuit in thee o encouraging common action for common ends
.
10
Because they consider any kind of “common action for common ends” to be
“oppressive,” a threat to individual nghts, liberals seek to disassemble the demos. They
encourage citizens to withdraw into their own private lives and pursue solely what is in
their self-interest.
In Wolin's estimation, liberalism has been especially complicit in encouraging the
growth of the administrative state, whose chief purpose is to assuage our anxieties about
the many sources of pain and suffering in the world. The unencumbered self is an
ahistorical fiction that uproots each individual from the histories, traditions, mores, and
customs that constitute him and connect him to his fellow men. Primarily concerned with
threats to its right to life, the unencumbered self voluntarily contracts with equally
worried people. This imaginary contract, according to Wolin, provides justification for
the hyper-rationalized, bureaucratized, and centralized liberal state whose ostensible
function is to protect individual rights but whose actual objective is to centralize and
augment its own power and to nurture and support capitalism at home and abroad. This
leaves little room for political action and puts individuals at the mercy of a labyrinthine
bureaucratic state, enormous faceless corporations, and the ebb and flow of the economy.
The result is the withering of freedom and power for individuals and their communities.
10
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Preoccupied with profit margins and the acqu.sition of worldly goods, liberal man
iS aCU‘ely SenS"iVe 10 'he pa,n caused bV the 'oss of wealth, and feeling vulnerable to
whimsical shifts in the market economy, he weakly turns to the state for protection.
Plagued by anxiety, liberal man does not care about shanng the exercise of political
power; he measures the legit,macy of a regime by the extent to which the state can
successfully apply wha, J. S. Mill called the pleasure prine,pie-max,mtze pleasure and
minimize pain. The political, then, gives way to increasing reliance on the state to
improve our lives, to guarantee our safety and provide services, and liberal man loses a
portion of his humanity as a result. The modem state has made almost any kind of
democratic action nearly impossible by turning citizens into consumers, active political
participants into passive political spectators, socially-connected beings into atomized
individuals. It is not surprising that Wolin shows little concern for demotic
destructiveness: it is highly unlikely to occur in modernity. The dangers of unfettered
democracy pale in comparison to the palpable evils of political passivity and disaffection.
Assisted by bureaucracy and centralized administration, and nurtured by social
and economic elites, the modem state effectively depoliticizes what were once considered
political matters and transforms them into administrative or technical issues. The
assumption becomes that the large political questions have all been answered, that a bit of
fine-tuning or a few slight adjustments to our current economic policies can make
everything right again. This means, of course, that most of us can abandon politics and
leave it to the experts to fix any glitches in the system. Our political engagement need
See Chapter 9 of Politics and Vision
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no, extend beyond period.c evaluates of these experts, re-electing then, if we like the
material results of their actions or replactng them if we do no,. So long as the economy
grows apace, providtng a plethora of goods and services to which we have become
accustomed and feel increasingly entitled, we accept the status quo. Should the economy
slump or should the state fad to provide servtces «o our satisfaction, we elec, new people
who espouse a few alternative policies but never entertain more rad, cal solutions-such
as fundamental changes to the system. In today’s political economy, says Wolin, we
cease to be eitizens-to be fully human-and become docile rectpients of the
technocrat’s expertise.
In recent years, Wolin has ascribed far more sinister designs to the state. The
postmodern capitalist state that lays claim to “superpower” status—i.e, the United
States-bears resemblance to the Nazi regime in that it too “aspires to totality.” Wolin
suggests that the totalitarianism against which we always thought the “free world” had
enjoyed a series of stunning and decisive victones has merely assumed a new and
inverted form—a form that appears far more benign than earlier incarnations, such as
Stalinism or Nazism, but has similarly terrifying features. This latest threat to human
freedom is what Wolin calls “inverted totalitarianism.” 12 Wolin is quite aware of the
obvious differences between the Nazis and the postmodern capitalist regime: while racial
hatred inspired the Nazis, the "ideology of the cost-effective” and economic efficiency
motivates the postmodern state. While the Nazis sought to mobilize the citizenry to
support their initiatives, the postmodern state “works to depoliticize its citizenry” and
"promote a sense of weakness, collective futility that culminates in the erosion of the
12
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democratic faith.” Whtle “big bus,ness” in Naz, Germany ultimately served the tnteres.s
of the state, “corporate power has become predominant” in the postmodern state. 13 But
these differences only go to show that ,averted totalitarianism can achieve the same
nefarious aims as its earlier incarnations. Though their means may differ, totalitarian
regimes of all stripes are fiercely ideological and aggressive on the world stage, and
perhaps most disturbingly, they create a “general climate of fear and suspicion” which
reduces “the cttizen” to a “nervous subject.” 14 The recent war on terror in the wake of
September 1
1
lh
lends credence to Wolin’s alarmism. One only has to constder the Patriot
Acts which sanction intensified domestic surveillance, as well as the torture and
indefinite detention of "enemy combatants” which exemplify the Bush administration’s
brazen defiance of the Geneva Convention and the invocation of a new doctnne of pre-
emption to justify the invasion of Iraq. Things could not be much gloomier for Wolin.
On the surface, Wolin is an unlikely candidate to advocate radical democracy. A
World War II veteran bom into what has been popularly referred to as the “greatest
generation,” he was nevertheless radicalized later in life by his involvement with the Free
Speech Movement at Berkeley. He then adopted a decidedly anti-institutional, almost
anarchic, understanding of democracy. But in the years following this experience,
especially after the Reagan Revolution reached its high point, he has increasingly struck a
melancholy note in his writing. He seems to be almost eulogizing those deeply
participatory moments which he believes modernity has taken away from us for good.
This melancholy may not seem consistent with the optimism of his pragmatist forebears,
13
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bu, if anything Wolin has rematned too faithful to the first two pragma!, s, tenets-the
democrats epistemology and psycho,ogy-and taken them to their logical extreme. The
result is an uncompromising view ofdemocracy that ultimately undermines his theology,
the faith that people will engage in c.vic act,on. While Wolin believes that democracy is
a transformative activity, promoting the general welfare and the moral development of
each individual, he cla.ms these expenences are fleet,ng, for modem forms of power
foreclose opportunities for meaningful political participation.
I.
Like the classical pragmatists, Wolin adopts a democratic epistemology. He
believes that people learn socially and experientially, that the truth is an agreement
reached after painstaking discussion and deliberation among those people whose
experiences are relevant to the question at hand. In support of this idea, Wolin accepts
and employs the postmodern notion that power generates knowledge (or truth). He does
not believe that truth corresponds to some fixed, a priori reality, but instead embraces the
idea that truth is a social construct and grounded in our experience with power
relationships. Deference to an elite group of experts, for instance, only serves to give
them a monopoly on the truth and thereby disempowers the majority of people whose
experiences could contribute considerably to the discussion and to the creation of
knowledge and truth. But an inclusive and participatory politics will reconstitute power
so as to promote the common good—and a radically different conception of truth.
Empowering the entire citizenry, not just a fraction of it, will yield political knowledge
and practices truths, if you must—from which the collectivity as a whole benefits.
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Democracy organizes power in this way, and Wolin believes it is “c
dignity and realization.”
rucial to human
Democracy involves more than participation in political processes' it is „
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erience , an access to, power is essential to the development ofthe capacities of ordinary persons because power is crucial to
“
gmty and realization. Power is not merely something to be shared but
something to be used collaborative, y in order to initial, to i„o’ bring
That people exercise power in this world is unavoidable, according to Wolin, but there
are right and wrong ways of organizing it. When power is “shared” and “used
collaboratively,” it can “initiate” or “bring about” a better and more just society.
This last point becomes clear in Wolin’s criticism of French philosopher Michel
Foucault, whose career was devoted to illuminating the configuration and deployment of
power in modernity. Wolin accepts the Foucauldian notion that power is ubiquitous but
rejects the pessimistic view that power is always deployed to oppress and dominate.
While this may be true much of the time, Wolin suggests that power directed toward
common ends can actually be liberating. In Foucault's writings, “the emphasis is upon
the repressive, dominating quality of power.” 16 He “gives us a vision of the world in
which humans are caught within imprisoning structures of knowledge and practice, but
he otters no hope of escape. Every discourse embodies a power drive and every
arrangement is repressive. There is no exit...” 17 Any attempts to transcend the structures
of power are ultimately futile in the Foucauldian universe, and this futility is the
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“consequence of having accepted an unqualified Nietzschean conception of knowledge a
generated by power dnves that leaves no rootn for conceptions of theoretic vocafion and
civic commitment. Foucault came to the conclusion that neither political theory nor
civ,c action offers an escape from the structures of power, says Wolin, because he
“confused politics with the political.”
The problem of the political is not to deny the ubiquity of power but todeny power uses that destroy common ends. The political signifies theattempt to constitute the terms of politics so that struggles fofpower canbe contained and so that it is possible to direct it for common ends such as
atou?
,eqUa ity
’
and CU"Ural Va ' UeS ' Commonali,y is what the political is
Wolin even suggest that people who engage in the political, harnessing power “for
common ends," develop a “critical vantage point” 19
-a perspective that transcends both
narrow self-interest and dominating systems of power.
Because Foucault believed all truth claims are really just attempts to dominate, he
rejected the possibility of a critical vantage point. Truth, he claimed, can never be
validated by procedures and conventions recognized by some appropriate community of
inquirers .”20 Thus there is no truth in this world, only “truth” with scare quotes—
assertions of which we must forever remain wary because they are necessarily
contaminated by some discourse of power. But, of course, this assertion, that all truth
claims are attempts to dominate or repress, is a truth claim itself, suggesting that Foucault
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"repeated the same error of totalise thinking with which he taxed class,c theory.’*2 '
Wolin, on the other hand, avotds this pitfall by mamtaining that a “community of
inquirers” can often validate truths. People are no, impnsoned within Foueauldtan
"discursive formations” whtch prevent them from ever sharing experiences with other
people in their community to arrive at truths. To the contrary, our shared expenences
with power shape our identities more than anything else and thus serve as a basis for
socially cons,me,ed truths.22 Change (he organ,zatton of power, which affects our lives
m a direct and tangible way, and you will reshape the prevatling discourse and create new
truths. Real truths without scare quotes are not objective or independent of power
relationships, according to Wolin, bu, they do stem from a critical vantage point whtch
only political theorizing or demotic action can provide. People have the capacity to
imagine a better world for their communities (political theory) and to act collectively to
realize their dreams (civic action). Never privileging the desires of a particular individual
or group, theorizing and civic action can together promote a “participatory, community-
oriented politics”23 that ultimately red,reels power-and hence truth-,oward common
ends. For Wolin, truth emerges when, drawing upon their experiences, all citizens in a
political community deliberate and then decide what is best for the whole. Truth is the
judgment—and the sole jurisdiction—of the demos.
That Wolin has an unfailing faith in the demos becomes even more apparent when
he scoffs at the liberal fear of majority tyranny. Even Aristotle, an antidemocrat to the
21
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core, conceded that
-.Ire demos was better a. deliberating public polices than were the
few.”24 Despite the famtliar warnings from the liberal camp that the demos poses a grave
threat to individual property nghts, there is really nothing to fear. Wolin points to
Athenian democracy, which “was gutlty of few, if any, excesses against the wealthy. The
importance of this point is that the demos was no, so much concerned with gaining forms
of social recognition as creating a distinct political place where power was equally
shared. In short, the ideal was political, not social.”25 The Wolinian demos does not
wtsh to engage in class warfare and butcher the bourgeotsie; i, merely wants to broaden
political participation and diffose power. Moreover, the democratic impulse tends to be
restorative, not destructive or tyrannical, according to Wolin. It restores the political and
can heal a society ravaged by human or ecological degradation:
The possibility of renewal draws on a simple fact: that ordinary
individuals are capable of creating new cultural patterns of commonality at
any moment. Individuals who concert their powers for low income
housing, worker ownership of factories, better schools, better health care,
safer water, controls over toxic waste disposals, and a thousand other
common concerns of ordinary lives are experiencing a democratic moment
and contributing to the discovery, care, and tending of a commonality of
shared concerns.
Wolin is far more sanguine about what collectivities can accomplish than liberals or other
detractors of democracy. He suggests here that their capacity to address “shared
concerns”—of which there are thousands of examples, however modest—belies liberal
warnings about majority tyranny.
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Rumors of democracy’s tyrannical
,endenc.es may be greatly exaggerated, but i„
his recently-published tome, Tocqueville Between Two Worlck, Wolin concedes that
democracy may have two opposing propensities, one toward diversity, particular.,y and
decentra,
,zed power, the other toward uniformity, homogene,ty and totaling statism.
Accord,ng to Wolin, Tocquevrlle believed that only partrcipatory democracy, someth,ng
akm to the fifth-century Athenian pofitical experience, could offset this latter propensity.
The only cure to the ills of“democracy” is real (or deepened, democracy. Bu, “if
democracy failed to cultivate participatory forms that engaged pofitically the energies of
the ordmary citizen, political populism would be displaced by a cultural populism of
sameness, resentment, and mindless patnotism, and by an anti-political fonn
[Tocqueville] labeled ‘democratic despotism.’”27 Despite paying considerable lip service
to the idea, Tocqueville did not fear majority tyranny so much as an “anti-political form”
ot democracy wherein citizens did not play a decisive role in decision-making and
instead a culture ot apathy, passivity, and social alienation prevailed. This “democratic
despotism leaves individuals isolated and powerless, resentfully withdrawing into
private life, and mindlessly conforming to the dictates of state and economy.
This was why Tocqueville praised the New England town meeting: “The
township was not so much the faithful reproduction of democracy as its crucial
qualification, ’ serving to redirect its conformist and socially leveling tendencies. 28
Participatory democracy brings people closer to the implications of political decision-
making, instilling in them a respect for the exercise of power, and cultivating a wariness
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Of s,mple, impetuous solut.on. As Tocqueville saw it, the township represented an arena
for petty politics politics on a small scale-and accordingly was able to connect citizens
directly to social concents, eliciting their moral sympathies and showing them that their
"political involvements made a difference.-
-The immediacy of its politics has not the
inconsiderable virtue of restrain,ng the democratic appet.te for generalization. A politics
geared to immediate concerns has a natural respect for limits because the implications of
a law are more readtly grasped”30 In them consideration of "immediate concerns,” the
demos understands readily that its decisions affect the lives of other people and, as a
result, exercises power far more judiciously than liberal alarmists would ever give them
credit for.
Judicious and deliberate, the Wolinian demos demonstrates a self-consciousness
usually characteristic of individuals. He sees the demos as a political actor which, like an
individual, can form a coherent and critical perspective. Hardly an unthinking mob that
merely reacts against oppression, the demos has the capacity to wield power responsibly
and make astute decisions on important political questions. There have been few true
democracies in history, according to Wolin, so his portrait of the demos relies heavily on
one shining example—fifth-century Athens. If we are to believe Wolin’ s historical
account of Athenian democracy, the demos certainly sounds impressive:
Athenian democracy of the fifth century was shaped by class conflicts,
rivalries between the rich and the well-bom, the ambitions of politicians,
and the struggle for empire. It developed as the demos became a self-
conscious actor. Democracy began as a demand for a “share” of power in
the institutions for making and interpreting the laws and deciding
29
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Portraying the demos as a “self-conscious actor” with a capacity for “interpretmg the
laws and deeding questions of dtplomacy and warfare” is essenttal to Wolin’s political
understanding, for we saw earlier that truth emerges from the judgment of the demos. If
we are to take this epistemology seriously, we must accept a radically dtfferent
conception of the demos. Drawn from a diversity of individuals with “scattered
experiences,” the demos develops into a coherent whole wtth a “self-consciousness about
common powerlessness and its causes. The demos is created from a shared realization
that powerlessness comes from being shut out of the councils where power’s authority is
located.”32 Now aware of its exclusion from the corridors of power, the demos finds
unity from common experience and demands. From this struggle, the demos “becomes
political, not simply when it seeks to make a system of governance more responsive to its
needs, but when it attempts to shape the political system in order to enable itself to
emerge, to make possible a new actor, collective in nature.”33 The rag-tag collectivity,
whose political struggles contribute to its maturation and development, turns into a self-
conscious political actor with an unprecedented capacity for governance.
The Wolinian demos displays not only self-consciousness but also the heroic or
agonistic qualities usually attributed to individuals.
Because the heroic has been claimed as an individualistic category, the
idea ot an agonistic demos seems not only unfamiliar but oxymoronic.
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Why should it seem intuitively absurd that an agonistic demos like „„
agonistic Alctbtades, might be driven by the needs of its nature m o' -
constnuriona, restraints? Or that the relationship AicibTadJs ,o
’
Atheman democracy was vexing because two overreachers were
nfr™ "18 ®ad* other? Tl« problem that democratic action poses for
anon^it'^4
'° n°ti<>nS °f 'heroic 0r "dividual actors is its
' '
Ltke Alcibiades or other political heroes throughout history, the demos strives for power.
sometimes transgressing established rules or “constitut.onal restraints” in the process.
The heroic action of the demos often manifests itself in the form of “revolution or
popular uprising, collective disobedience, and mass protest” and, as a result, is “typically
regarded as destructive or disruptive of established order and as anticonstitutional or
threatening to become as such .”35 Wolin suggests that it is unfatr to interpret the
agonistic behavior of an Alcibiades as heroic and to view similar behavior from the
demos as destructive and threatening, for both individual and demotic agonism stem from
the same primal urge to acquire power. If anything, demotic agonism is far more heroic,
suggests Wolin, for the former serves private ends while the latter attempts to redress
power inequalities, which Wolin believes are the primary source of injustice in the world:
Unequal treatment is less a consequence of unequal rights than of unequal power.
Unequal power is often, although not always, related to an inability to act effectively or at
all. Thirsting for power, the demos can certainly be destructive in the short term, but it
seeks to redistribute power more equitably—a far more heroic aim than individual glory.
Wolin also prefers demotic power because he sees it as an expression of Nietzsche's
Ibid., 64.
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master morality. The demos exerts its will to power not ou, of resentment bu, ou, of a
relentless, even joyful, drive to expand, to create new opportunities for partie,patron, to
transgress boundaries. Elite power, on the other hand, manifests a slave morality, its
exert,ons stemming from fear and resentment of the demos.” As a result, elites have
long conspired to persuade us that democracy threatens the common good.
Wolm concedes, however, that there is a darker, self-destructive side to demottc
agomsm. After the demos has consolidated its power domestically, it may channel its
surplus energy outwardly, beyond the borders of its homeland. “The demos exists as
striving, but that drive may be directed not at assuring duration to its existence but at
challenging its own finitude. The tangible expression of that problematic would be the
leap from polis to empire .”38 Wolin does no. believe that a few demagogues convinced
the Athenian assembly to carry out their imperial designs. To the contrary, the "empire
was a testimony to both the transgressive and aggressive impulses of the Many and to an
epical hero whose agon goes mostly uncelebrated by poets and philosophers and only
ambivalently by ancient historians.” As with an Alcibiades or an Alexander, this desire
can become all-consuming, leading to imperial designs that literally uproot the demos
from its polis. Alcibiades left his beloved Athens to fight for its archenemies, the
Spartans, but he considered his act not a betrayal of his city but rather an attempt to
recover what had been lost. Though he no longer inhabited the city, he was still an
Athenian in spirit. Similarly, after having suttered its second invasion, the Athenian
demos uprooted itselt horn the city and took to the high seas. The polis might have been
37
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lost, said Fences, bu, the Athenian detnos eould sus.atn ttself a, sea, as a nava, power.
The demos, like Alcibtades, abandoned its polis to further its imperial designs, but it
os.ens.bly retained its Athenian identity.» What becomes apparent here is that while the
demos will undoubtedly redistnbute power more equitably at home, it may display the
charactenstics of a tyrant in its contact with the outside world. And in its attempt to
repress strangers abroad, the demos might overextend itself, leaving itself vulnerable to
military defeat, social disarray, and ultimately the loss of identity.
The dangers of democratic excess and surplus energy are even more senous in
modernity. Should the demos ever harness the power of the state, says Wolin, there is no
telling what the damage might be. Wolin says that democracy is “incompatible with the
modem choice of the state as the fixed center of political life,” which means that it would
be both an unlikely and undesirable occurrence. “Democracy in the late modem world
cannot be a complete political system, and given the awesome potentialities ofmodem
tonus of power and what they exact of the social and natural world, it ought not to be
hoped or stnven tor.”40 Wolin does not pursue the matter further, but once one
incorporates his discussion about democratic imperialism, it seems obvious that Wolin
fears that the demos could perhaps misuse modem forms of technologically enhanced
military power currently at the state’s disposal. Put bluntly, the demos may not restrain
itself from using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons to destroy its adversaries
abroad. Wolin suggests that there are limits to the epistemological authority of the
demos, whose knowledge of the truth cannot extend beyond the polis, the center of
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common h.slory and experience. This imphes that even Wolin thinks democracy requtres
some constraints, though hardly the constitutional Hmits currently imposed on it. ,f the
Wohman demos can somehow remain localized and contain its energy to domestic
concerns, its epistemological authority will remain unassailable.
The issue of democratic imperialism aside, Wolin’s epistemology must be
squared with that of his professional nemesis-the behavioral social scientist, whom he
calls “the methodist." There are some obvious similarities between Wolin and the
methodist, for they both accept implicitly the idea that truth is probabilistic and socially
and inductively constructed. It would hardly be a stretch to desenbe Wohman truth as a
generalization drawn from a large sample of democratic participants. After all, the truth
emerges, according to Wolin, when all citizens share power and deliberate collectively—
the more inclusive the process, the better. But it should be understood that Wolin bitterly
rejects methodism, which he argues is a “proposal for shaping the mind” in such a way
that reinforces an uncritical view of existing political structures.”41 Having little use for
creativity, imagination and spontaneity, methodism applies fixed techniques and
procedures to test hypotheses. Since Descartes, those with a methodological disposition
have eschewed anything that smacks of disorder, doubt, or diversity and have embraced
whatever bears the mark of regularity, uniformity, and homogeneity. They gravitate
toward the familiar and summarily dismiss any alternative approaches or creative
solutions to problems.
Furthermore, Descartes argued that the methodical person had to erase all
“acquired habits, beliefs, and values” until he “stood divested of [his] cultural heritage in
41
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an ahistoncal silence. In theory, th.s ahistorical being, uncorrupted by received beliefs
and values, is an impart, al observer of politics and approaches the subject with a
scientific detachment, bu, Wolin argues that this is no, so. In rejecting tradition and the
past and always searching for regularities in political behavior, the methodist can only
draw on current practices as his reference point for what is normal.43 Accordingly, he
betrays a conservative bias against fundamental change and an unrefleet,ve penchant for
the current system of power. Wolin believes that an insightful political theory-any
science, for that matter—relies on careful consideration of the past and our traditions.
Erasing the past putatively serves the requirements of objectivity but actually destroys
any possibility of gaining a critical perspective. Theorists and political actors alike must
reflect on-and come to terms with-the myriad of experiences and ideas that have
shaped who we are, no matter how shameful, contradictory, or muddled they may be. In
so doing, we draw on what Wolin calls our “tacit political knowledge,” which is far more
suggestive and illuminative than “explicit or determinate.” 44
Not surprisingly, Wolin is not optimistic about the application of science to the
political. In the expanded edition of Politics and Vision
,
Wolin comments specifically on
the link between the scientific method and democracy in a chapter partially devoted to
John Dewey. Wolin s treatment of Dewey reveals a qualified sympathy for his overall
project. Unlike theorists of the Baconian tradition, who believed it was incumbent on the
state to harness the power of science and technology to serve the interests of progress.
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Dewey was susp.c.ous of this marriage. L.ke Wolin, he understood that the state and the
agents of advanced capitalism could deploy science and technology to augment their own
power. So, instead, Dewey proposed a marriage between science and democracy: “[He]
proposed a conception of science that not only placed it at the d.sposal of democracy but
emphasized the intellectual affinities, even the contimuties, between scientific method
and everyday practices.”' 5 Dewey understood democracy as nothing other than the
scent, tic method writ large. Science represented the paragon after which true democracy
must pattern itself:
Science Dewey insisted, was a moral undertaking. Scientists not only
practiced cooperation but presumed a community to which they could
present their findings and count on unfettered discussion...Dewey’s
ultimate ideal was a society in which scientific values permeated the
culture and shaped human desires towards more cooperative and
egalitarian ends.
Dewey believed that every human being is capable of learning from the laboratory of life,
formulating hypotheses, testing them with empirical data, and sharing the results with
others in the “scientific" community. This democratic laboratory is the classroom in
which participants (or students) receive an education, learning collectively how to redress
problems through experimentation. Dewey also stressed that only face-to-face
participatory democracy, local in character, could adequately replicate the scientific
method so as to promote what he called “the general social welfare.”
Though Wolin seems to agree with the tenor of Deweyan democratic theory, he
finds fault with Dewey for “evading questions about power.” Dewey was so “fixated on
45
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.he findings of method, the conduct of experiments, and the communication of result”
.ha, he largely ignored
“[q]ues,ions of how problems become identified, who controls the
communications of results, and who evaluates the consequences.'-7 Dewey assumed that
every democratic parttctpan, would be the equivalent of a sc,ends, who is familiar w„h
the methods of expenmen,a,ion, and he never explored the possible asymmetnes of
power and knowledge intrinsic to the scientific culture. Accord,ngly, Wolin challenges
the democracy-as-method metaphor, suggesting that science employs fairly esoteric
“concepts and language " that perhaps “exceeded the common understanding as to be
incomprehensible to the vast majority of citizens.” Wolin does not haughtily suggest
here that some people are too stupid to understand science. Rather, he maintains that the
cult(ure) ot science is inherently elitist and fails to promote the equal exchange of
information in the ideal way described by Dewey. Grafting this scientific way of life
onto the greater populace would not bring about democracy and instead would only
maintain the inequalities already in place. Dewey held naive, romantic notions about
science and, as a result, failed to recognize that it was susceptible to interest politics and
even perpetuated hierarchies of knowledge and power. Now heavily financed by the
modem state and big business, science has been properly exposed as impure and
corruptible, vulnerable to co-optation. For Wolin, this only reinforces what was true all
along: science and democracy do not mix. 48
While Wolin may subscribe to a democratic epistemology, he does not believe
that the demos simulates the scientific community in any way. Democracy is far too fluid
Ibid., 517.
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and anarchic, resisting any form or procedure one might impose on it. This formlessness
“ wha, allows democracy to remain egalitarian, tnelusrve, and deeply partierpatory. „ is
also important to remember that the Wolinian demos is a peculiar community, taking on
the characteristics of an individual, including self-consciousness and willfulness, in its
struggle. The demos coheres around this nascent political identity, and marshaling
immense power to achieve
.ts aims, will not hesitate to transgress boundaries, sometrmes
leaving a path of destruction in its wake. The scientific commun.ty, on the other hand,
has embraced institutionalization and all the hierarch.es, routines, and procedures that
come with it. As a result, it has a far more conservative disposition and will rarely defy
protocol, let alone follow a revolutionary course of action.
H,s sharp cnticisms notwithstanding, Wolin does not disparage scientific methods
unequivocally. He acknowledges that “the invention of methods, like the invention of
theories, demands a higher order of creativity and is entitled to the highest praise,” but
when that discovery is institutionalized in a training program,” it impoverishes
education and
poses a threat not only to so-called normative or traditional political
theory, but to the scientific imagination as well. It threatens the meditative
culture which nourishes all creativity. That culture is the source of the
qualities crucial to theorizing: playfulness, concern, the juxtaposition of
contraries, and astonishment at the variety and subtle interconnection of
things. These same qualities are not confined to the creation of theories,
but are at work when the mind is playing over the factual world as well.
An impoverished mind, no matter how resolutely empirical in spirit, sees
an impoverished world. 49
Wolin suggests here that behavioral social science—i.e., methodism—is not even good
science, tor it institutionalizes and routinizes the search for knowledge, spuming all
49
Ibid., 50-51.
257
creativity and imagination in the process. Good scientists employ method when
appropriate, but they do not limit themselves to tins approach. They always remain
mindful of histoncal context and the messy confluence of traditions, and they must
playfully acknowledge contradict,ons and nuances in then analyses of the empincal
world. Like the pragmatists before him, Wolin believes in the intersubjectivity of truth-
that any community, even a scientific community, constructs a truth after painstaking
discussion and meditation, sharing all relevant knowledge and experiences with one
another. This is not always a neat process, often requiring participants to break the rules,
to improvise unique solutions to social problems, and to abide patiently the not always
fruitful contributions of others (or themselves, for that matter). As William James
admonished, the search for truth must remain an open universe and never foreclose
imaginative approaches or intrepid forays into the unknown. Celebrating the regimens of
training and technique, the professional methodist shuns both the past and the
imagination and has no patience for what he considers fruitless digression. Perhaps we
can understand him better as a technician, not a scientist, for he practices method stolidly
and predictably.
What most separates Wolin from his pragmatist forebears epistemologically is his
treatment and understanding of power. The demos has the inside track on political truth
because it re-organizes power so as to serve common ends, not because it adopts superior
methods of inquiry. Though Wolin’s formulation draws on postmodern notions of power
to which the classical pragmatists were not privy, the metaphor of statistics still resonates
in his epistemology. After all, statisticians praise larger sample sizes for enhancing
statistical power. One might rephrase his democratic epistemology as follows:
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Increasing the sample size of participants changes the dynam.cs ofpower which in turn
generates truths that serve the common good. In the end, Wolin's epistemology
resembles closely that of the pragmatists: both argue that truth is consensual, the product
of painstaking discussion and deliberation among people who draw on their relevant
experiences. And as we shall see in the next section, man himself is a social
construction, the product of power relationships, and democracy becomes the ideal
school in which to receive a proper education, to develop the capacity for empathy and
understanding.
II.
Like the pragmatists, Wolin also subscribes to a democratic psychology, the
notion that man is an educable and mutable creature, capable of moral development. The
idea of an unwaveringly flawed “human nature” is really just a defeatist myth, justifying
political apathy and compliance with the status quo. Man will remain stagnant if he
continues to embrace political passivity and the predominance of the modem state, but
should he become a political animal, share power equitably, and engage with his fellow
men to make a better world, he will improve not only society, as we saw in the previous
section, but also himself. Because democracy is the fountainhead of truth, the democratic
experience is the school in which one receives a proper education. For Wolin, democracy
affords its participants a transformative experience, teaching them to think beyond
narrow self-interest, to have empathy for people unlike themselves, and to work with
others toward common ends. Wolin says: “In my understanding, democracy is a project
concerned with the political potentialities of ordinary citizens, that is, with their
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possibilities ofbecoming political beings through (he self-discovery ofcommon concerns
and modes of act,on for realizing them.”50 Democracy is a way of life, “a process of
becoming," 51 that turns an alienated creature into a fully-realized, authentic human betng.
To make sense of Wolin's democratic psychology, we must first turn to his view
of human nature. Briefly stated, man is not bound by his nature; he is a collection of
ingrained habits. The political constitution, or the way in which society organizes power,
disposes people toward certain patterns of behavior and demands of them an obedience to
the status quo. Over time this organization ofpower circumscribes what man thinks he is
capable of doing and accomplishing in this world; it “determines” his “political
identity.”
52
The particular ways in which a society is constituted to generate power is
its political constitution. The historical project of most societies, including
our own, is to shape its members so that they do more than obey or
submit: they become disposed
,
inclined in such a way that political
authorities can count on their active support most of the time. These
dispositions have to be cultivated if power is to be generated and
continuously available. Power depends importantly on an historical
accumulation of dispositions. But dispositions are not something so trite
as learned behavior. They are inscribed demands of the kind that the
village laborer has to ‘learn’ in the factories and slums. Power is not,
therefore, an exchange or a transaction but an exaction. It is had on terms
that exact over time and become cumulative... 53
Wolm describes these dispositions which constitute every person as “inscribed demands”
or “exactions” whose effect strengthens “over time and become[s] cumulative.” What we
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believe are unassailable truths about politics
have internalized unwittingly and embraced
and humanity are really just demands we
as our own. Our acquiescence to these
demands reinforces our own dispositions and secures the power of political authorities.
In turn, these authonties can count on our support because over the years we have
become so accustomed to the way power is organized in soctety that we blindly accept its
inequities. We assume the organization of power reflects inexorable realities about
human nature and life itself, but Wolin reminds us that "power and identity are never
fixed once and for all: they are histoncal projects being worked out over time and in a
claimed space.” 54 Man is a mutable creature whose character is not circumscribed by the
laws of nature but rather habituated over time by power relationships. Power, not nature,
places limits on the possible; power, not nature, determines who we are. Changing our
political constitution, then, will transform who we are.
The current political constitution, says Wolin, gives us “an essentially anticivic
education, tor it teaches that “the first duty is to support the self-interest of the group
because politics is nothing but a struggle for advantage.”55 This kind of interest group
politics works on the assumption that life is necessarily a zero-sum game with winners
and losers. It “dissolves the idea of the citizen as one for whom it is natural to join
together with other citizens to act for purposes related to a general community” and
replaces it with the idea ot individuals who are grouped according to conflicting
interests.”
56 One gets the impression from reading Wolin that the system adopts a divide-
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and-conquer strategy. I, condtfions us to believe that we are no. “civic erea.ure[s] bound
by preexisting ties to those who share the same history, the same general association, and
the same fate.” Instead, each of us defines himself by a group or vocational identity-“a
business executive, a teamster, a feminist, office worker, farmer or homosexual”-that
“naturally divides [us] from others.”” As a result, each group competes for a finite share
of resources, serving only its own interests and never entertaining the possibility of a
broader perspective.
In addition to dividing us, the system also teaches us to identify our own well-
being with the growth of state power, both domestically and internationally. We may
surrender our own political power in the process, but many (not all) of us find it
worthwhile after receiving unprecedented economic and material benefits in return. 58
The American experience is especially instructive, as most of us have profited from both
the rise of the welfare state and aggressive imperialism. The former has provided social
security benefits and corporate subsidies, for instance, while the latter has afforded us
cheaper consumer goods and low oil prices. As far as we are concerned, things are fine
so long as the state and the political economy can deliver the goods and improve our lives
in these very materialistic ways. But despite what we are led to believe, human nature
does not require us to be this way, suggests Wolin. The modem state has habituated
people to this way of thinking, which means there is always the possibility that a new
organization of power can re-educate them and broaden their perspective. Wolin calls for
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revolution to challenge extsting power structures and thus change our dispositions, our
habits of mind and action: “No,lung short of a long revolution” will subvert “the current
structure of power" and change the way people think; it “is illusory to believe...tha, the
same human depositions toward power-passivity by the many, control by the few-wil]
serve as well for a new soc.al order as for the current one.”w Under the right conditions
we can all become “new beings'
—citizens in the true sense of the word.
Unlike the “groupie,” says Wolin, the citizen transcends this “stage of
unreflective self-interest” and, learning to “think integrally and comprehensively rather
than exclusively,” develops a “perspective of commonality.”60 Participatory democracy
is the school in which groupies acquire this education and transfonn themselves into
citizens who think beyond narrow self-interest and consider common concerns. Wolin’s
recent work on Tocqueville sheds considerable light on the importance of political
education in modernity. In addressing this issue, Tocqueville identified the paradoxical
nature of democracy: its participatory character “promoted solidarity” but its “idea of
popular sovereignty... taught that each is the best judge of his own interests and needs.”61
According to Wolin, the chief problem of modernity was that the pendulum had swung
too far to the individualistic side of the spectrum, where people are isolated from others,
and away from the collective side, where people feel connected to their community.
Tocqueville said that modernity has increasingly conditioned man to withdraw inwardly
into the private sphere and to lead a life of crass self-interest and materialism, and argued
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that participatory democracy was the best antidote to reverse this trend, to defeat rampant
individualism and soctal alienahon. The New England townships show by example that
participation can re-habituate or re-educate people, teach them that their own interests
actually coincide with the common interest, that they enrich their own lives by
cooperating with others. 62
Wolin readily concedes that the citizen of the New England township never
undergoes a complete moral transformation in which private interests unequivocally give
way to the common good. After all, the township is the stage for petty or
circumscribed” politics. But he thinks this form of participation, undoubtedly an
imperfect model of democracy, is a step in the right direction. Pure democracy may exist
only in the realm of theory, but this does not detract from its value as a model. Besides,
fifth-century Athens provides us an example of participatory politics on a grand scale. In
this case, the demos did not limit itself to questions of local governance or emerge on the
margins of society to rebel against the existing system. While it still resisted boundaries
and transgressed convention, it engaged in mainstream and large-scale politics, taking
control of the city's most important political institutions and addressing the most pressing
issues of the time, including even foreign policy. In the process it educated its denizens
and turned them into “deliberating citizen[s].”
The Athenian demos seems to have evolved into a different being whose
essence is civic: a full-fledged citizenry whose being is validated through
the numerous institutions in which it takes an active part. The beast has
somehow become a deliberating citizen. 63
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Wolin argues that “the self-transformation of the demos
subject into citizen" was confirmed by observers who w
3S into the citizen body, of the
ere decidedly antidemocratic.
Despite their hostility to democracy, they revealed in their writing, sometimes
unwittingly, the transformation of the demos into a “politically committed class.”64
education for the general health of the polis, they have usually argued that a group of
elites or even God should be responsible for this task. Even Rousseau, who Wolin
considers a pseudo-democrat, could not “conceive of a self-fashioning people,” so he
devised “a deus ex machina, a Great Legislator who is to transform human nature.”65
Wolin maintains that people can transform themselves by participating in the democratic
process. Democracy is the school in which its participants learn how to deliberate and
wield power collectively. As the Athenian experience testifies, citizens undergo a
profound transformation when they engage in democratic politics.
[Deliberative politics was the crucial element in the experience by which
a demos constructed itself as a political actor. Deliberative politics was
for the demos a mode of political development, and by the same token
certain other types of politics—bureaucratic, charismatic, or even
representative government arrest that development. A participatory and
egalitarian politics that is deliberative serves the political education of the
demos.66
Now self-conscious political actors, the demos have learned to transcend narrow self-
interest, empathize with their fellow men, and focus on the long-term implications of
their actions. Citizens develop “a mode of thinking that deals in considerations and
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Though political theorists have often waxed lyrical about the importance of civic
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categones different from those used one’s own affairs.” They del,berate “for the
fttture more than for the present,” which a, the very leas, “requtres repressing immediate
gratifications."'’7 Interacting with others in his community, the democrats citizen
becomes a different kind of human being, future-minded and self-less.
But why does democracy transform its participants in this way? Wolin maintains
that “transgression was crucial to the making of a democratic actor.”68 As they resist
conventional norms and boundanes in their struggle for power, participants open new
vistas, new possibilities not only for the distribution of power but also for self-
understanding. Democratic citizens come to realize that it is within their power to alter
themselves and society as a whole, that their own development feeds back into the
society they seek to remake. Wielding power to resist what we often consider to be
natural or normal—about both ourselves and society—this is the key to demotic
transformation. “Democracy,” says Wolin, “is committed to the claim that experience
with, and access to, power is essential to the development of the capacities of ordinary
persons.” To make his case, Wolin once again points to fifth-century Athens. Defying
“the norms of nature to set up their own standards,” the Athenian demos became a “new
political presence that had succeeded in developing its own political culture.”70 The
effect ot democracy on its participants can be so powerful that there is little wonder why
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Plato, an Athenian citizen, believed it to be “an invasion of the psyche, contest,ng for
nothing less than the ‘soul’ of all citizens.”71
Wohn’s democratic psychology does not rest on his readings of the New England
township and fifth-century Athens alone. Wolin also draws from personal experience.
As a professor at Berkeley in the 1 960s, Wolin became involved in the Free Speech
Movement, a radicalizing experience that changed him and many of his colleagues
forever. “The intensity of the experience... changed everyone involved. For many of us
“ WaS ,he exPenence of moving from an apolitical to a deeply political existence, from a
protected status with known boundaries to a condition that was risky and unfamiliar.'’72
In resisting the university’s draconian speech laws, Wolin was introduced to a new kind
of existence, fraught with risk and variability but enriched by deep political engagement.
His experience taught him that to be folly and authentically human one must act
collaboratively in defiance of political norms and forms.
III.
Wolin’ s theory seems to lack a robust democratic theology, a faith that people, if
given the opportunity, will awake from their slumber of passivity and act to make the
world a better place. Though Wolin claims that real change demands meaningful
political action, he is hardly sanguine about the prospects of this ever happening.
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Occurrences of the political or democracy, according to Wolin,
politics as usual "is continuous, ceaseless, and endless.”73 He says:
are “episodic, rare,” while
The modem state has so effectively foreclosed opportunities for political action that only
in momentary democratic uprisings does Wolin find any kind of hope. Democracy has
the state makes the necessary adjustments to domesticate political action and suppress
any serious critical opposition. The hope for a marriage between the modem state and
democracy rests on a profound misunderstanding: that people can engage in meaningful
political action within the modem state apparatus. This is impossible because the state by
its very definition seeks to bureaucratize and mechanize, to establish a set of procedures
and protocols. In the process, it serves to contain spontaneity and promote passivity. As
the state and our reliance on it grow, the opportunities for democratic moments diminish.
No wonder Wolin believes “the idea of a democratic state is a contradiction in terms.”75
Though the emergence of the modem state has foreclosed opportunities for
democratic action, Wolin argues that democracy has always been a fragile enterprise.
Wolin offers a possible explanation for this: democracy is an inherently unsettling
become fugitive, surfacing episodically in reaction to crises, rocking the boat a bit until
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expenence for its part, c,pants, who will eventually betray a “conservative temper” and
make attempts to impose a form on it. He potnts to the demise of true democracy toward
the end of the fifth-century in Athens:
The crucial moment occurred in 403 or 402 B.C. when the restoreddemocracy rejected a proposal to limit the franchise to property ownersthereby preserving its egalitarian conception of citizenship. At the sameime however, it refused to extend citizenship to those slaves who had
assisted in the revolution against the Thirty. Each of the proposals, from
opposite directions, struck at the Athenian conception of democracy one
would contract it, the other enlarge it. The double rejection was
symptomatic not simply of a determination to defend democracy against
o igarchy—which it was—but of a conservative temper indicating thatdemocracy had “settled down” and found its constitutional form its ne
plus ultra.
Wolin argues that before this settling moment, Athenian democracy could be described as
a succession of popular uprisings that succeeded in transforming the so-called ancestral
constitutional and its various boundaries.” 77 It was a “culture not only of participation
but of frequent rebellion,” in which boundaries were challenged and never clearly
delineated. 78 But this rebellious spirit came to an end when the Athenian assembly
clearly drew these lines, distinguishing between those who could and those who could not
participate. Athenian democracy adopted a “constitutional form,” which marked the
beginning of its domestication and institutionalization—its death.
At times, however, Wolin waxes lyrical about the prospect for revolutionary
action wherein citizens withdraw and direct their energies and civic commitment to
finding new life forms” and their “whole mode of thinking [is] turned upside-down” such
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that they "renounce the state paradigm.”™ These glimmers of optimism may seem
inappropriate given what Wolin has said about the “fugitive" character of democracy.
But it is important to understand that Wolin's democratic theology rests ultimately on his
democrat,c psychology. Most of us may be d.sposed toward political passiv.ty, making
the prospects for democratic act.on quite dim, but a series of democratic moments could
always change our d,spos,tions. In other words, these democratic moments-if enough
of them erupted could have a cumulative effect and eventually reverse the way we think
and act. One gets the sense that Wolin is not holding his breath here, but he does
maintain hope that citizens can subvert the “state paradigm" and in a profound way
reclaim their humanity.
His cautious optimism notwithstanding, Wolin never fully convinces his readers
that there is much hope for democracy, for he is never able to resolve inherent tensions
within it. Wolin insists that democracy must remain localized, grounded in a place and a
people’s history, but at the same time he argues that democracy today has to transcend
parochial concerns and address the larger issues at stake in the modem world for it to take
hold. More specifically, democracy will never manage to subvert the state, which not
only perpetuates an antidemocratic organization of power but also influences all of our
dispositions, if it refuses to look beyond local concerns. Says Wolin:
While it is of the utmost importance that democrats support and encourage
political activity at the grassroots level, it is equally necessary that the
political limitations of such activity be recognized. It is politically
incomplete. This is because the localism that is the strength of grassroots
organizations is also their limitation. There are major problems in our
society that are general in nature and necessitate modes of vision and
action that are comprehensive rather than parochial. And there are
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historical legacies of wrong and unfairness
and may even be exacerbated by exclusive
politics.
0
that will never be confronted
concern with backyard
But the problem is, how can democracy be both local and national in character? Wolin
perceives the conundrum here, but he also understands that local democrat,c movements
can be ‘'bigoted, provincial, myopic, and anti-intellectual”8'—that their “exclusive
concern with backyard politics” may only exacerbate “historical legacies of wrong and
unfairness” for which the modem state is largely responsible. The current problems
besetting society today are "general in nature” and thus demand a “comprehensive”
response, a large scale democratic movement that uproots the source of all that is wrong.
Unfortunately, Wolin never explains how this would actually happen and leaves this
problem for future thinkers who may develop “modes of vision and action” currently
beyond our scope.
While Wolin admits that a tension between the local and national exists, he seems
to underestimate the seventy of the issue. Many political thinkers have suggested that the
size and scope ot modem society make participatory democracy impracticable, but Wolin
dismisses this claim outright, arguing that democracy is only incompatible with the
modem state, not the size and scope ofmodem society. 82 But does not the vastness and
complexity ofmodem society invite state intervention and regulation of society and
economy not only tor sinister reasons, like imposing order and perpetuating social
hierarchies, but also for more legitimate reasons, such as to improve the quality of life for
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rmihons of people living in close proximity to each other? As Stephen Holmes argues in
his review of Tocqueville Between Two Worlds, democratic majorities often call on the
state to offer its expertise in accomplishing honorable social goals. “As women join the
workforce, for example, voters address a difficult-to-ignore social demand to political
authorities for elder care to be transferred from working-age daughters to taxpayer-
funded social services. Holmes cites this example to suggest that democracy and the
modem state are not “inherently at odds,”84 which may be true, but even if we accept
Wolin’s argument that our growing reliance on the state erodes true democracy, he is
unable to explain why we would ever turn to participatory democratic movements to
improve our lives. Indeed, even professional legislatures, which enjoy far more time to
devote to politics than do ordinary citizens, have increasingly delegated authority to the
executive branch and the bureaucracy to address complex issues that extend beyond their
expertise. Participatory democracy may even turn back the clock—maybe even work
against social progress for women, for example—and re-introduce social and economic
conditions that most people would consider far too primitive and uncomfortable to
embrace. Wolin would respond that we have been conditioned to think this way, to
believe that only the state can marshal the expertise to solve complex social problems.
But it is difficult to imagine the demos addressing problems that affect hundreds of
millions of people inhabiting a land that stretches from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Given
this unresolved tension between the particular and the general, the local and the national,
Wolin’s democratic theology appears weak.
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If pressed on this issue, Wolin would probably agree. He has written about the
founding period in American history and has lamented the failure of the anti-Fedcralists
and other proponents of local partttipatory democracy to defeat the ratification of the
Constitution. For Wolin, the Constitution represents a radical departure from the
democratic heritage of the colonial experience in America, expressed most succinctly in
the Declaration of Independence. 85 The Constitution marks the beginning of a new
America, primarily economic and intentionally antidemocratic.”86 Though vestiges of
the democratic tradition in America remained after the ratification, the Civil War drove
the final nail in democracy’s coffin. It may have put an end to slavery, but in so doing it
resolved the tension between local democracy and the centralized state. The latter won
decisively, "reducing the power of the states, and working a revolution in the moeurs of
the American citizen: instead of a participating member of the polis, he would be a
voter.”
87
Wolin’s narrative of early American history suggests that certain key events
undermined our democratic heritage and set us on a perilous course toward increasing
centralization, bureaucratization, and imperialism. In this light, recapturing what we lost
so long ago seems a nearly impossible task.
One wonders why Wolin has devoted his career to a way of life he believes is
nearly unattainable and when it is, only momentarily. Indeed, his Weberian pessimism
precedes him, and he has just stopped short of declaring outright that democracy is dead.
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He even suggests ,ha, the voeatton of (he political theorist resembles that of the eulogist,
devoted to preserving the memory of democracy and articulating the signtfrcance of its
loss for humanity. 88 But, for Wolin, democracy is no, exactly dead; i, lies dormant,
waiting to reawaken in moments of erists and to emit occasional shocks to the state. This
suggests that Wolin does not lack a democratic theology so much as he has embraced a
soberer version of it. Quite realistically, Wolin accepts that the modem state will never
disappear it is here to stay-bu, he does hope for more democratic moments which can.
tirst ot all, keep the state in check and, perhaps more importantly, give people an
opportunity to experience, however briefly, their humanity to the fullest. In the end. his
democrat,c theology strikes a melancholic, even tragic, chord. He describes democracy
as a mode of being that is conditioned by bitter experience, doomed to succeed only
temporarily, but.
..a recurrent possibility as long as the memory of the political
survives. And those participants fortunate enough to taste the bitterness of democracy
enjoy a strange kind of power, which Wolin describes as “experience, sensibility,
wisdom, even melancholy distilled from the diverse relations and circles we move
within. He seems to suggest that in modernity democratic power endows its
participants with a critical perspective, one that drives them to act but continually
reminds them of the futility of it all, evoking what they once had and can never really
have again. Accordingly, Wolin’s radical democracy assumes the tenor of a
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“melancholic democracy-more a sad remembrance of what has been lost than an
upbeat theory of what can be.
IV.
Wading through the oeuvre of Sheldon Wolin is a formidable enterprise, to say
the least, and one can become quickly entangled in a jungle of apparent tensions and
contradictions. But examining his work through the lens of the three pragmatist tenets
reveals an overall coherence to his democratic theory. He believes that deliberative
collectivities, unrestrained and unbounded, have a grapple hold on the truth (democratic
epistemology); that man is mutable and thus has the capacity to direct his habits of mind
and action toward common concerns (democratic psychology); and that men will on
occasion, and in defiance of the state, seize the opportunity to act collectively
(democratic theology). In some ways, Wolin has taken the pragmatist tenets to their
logical extreme in his democratic theory. His rabid anti-institutionalism invokes the
Jamesian admonition that the search for truth must always remain open and forever
eschew attempts to foreclose new approaches. It is no wonder that his democratic theory,
in the context of modernity, ends on a melancholy note. The open universe seems but a
dream in a world increasingly dominated by technology, in a world wherein everything
would come to an abrupt halt without our established routines, procedures, and processes.
Ephemeral and elusive, democracy is a precious experience that can never be sustained
long enough to yield epistemological or psychological benefits.
To give these rather abstract concepts some life, it may be helpful to consider the
game of baseball as a metaphor for democracy. Wolinian democracy evokes images of
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the sandlot, a place where neighborhood k.ds gather to play the game they love. Imagine
a nekety wooden fence in the outfield, sweatshirts used as bases, unmowed grass with
brown and yellow patches, and countless bumps and divots in the ground which make for
tncky bounces in the infield. But the children do not eare. They play for neither money
nor fame; they play for the sheer thrill of the game. There is no need for umpires, for the
players regulate the game and settle disputes themselves. While there is general
agreement on the rules of the game, they are hardly fixed. For instance, if more or fewer
than 1
8
players arrive on a particular day, the rules will be altered to ensure fair play and
equal playing time. One team may be short a player, for which they will receive just
compensation by giving the other team only two outs per inning instead of three. Both
teams may have more than nine players which will require either rotating substitutions or
allowing more than nine players on the field. Or perhaps an older and much more
powerful player may agree to bat left-handed so as not to give his team an unfair
advantage. A late arrival may change the entire dynamic of a game, requiring some ad
hoc adjustments, maybe even switching a player from one team to another. It hardly
matters in the end, for they may choose not to keep score today. Winning is hardly as
important as an evenly matched, well-played game. Finally, there are no spectators or
fans. Whoever arrives at the sandlot, no matter how late, receives a warm invitation to
play or, if he prefers, to be directly involved in another way
—
perhaps as a scorekeeper or
a base coach. Everyone is a participant, contributing to the game in his own way,
sharpening his skills, and enjoying an authentic baseball experience. Collectively these
participants represent the demos.
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Shamocracy evokes images of professional baseball and all the assoeiated
glamour. Adorned in their freshly-washed and
-pressed uniforms, the muscle-bound
athletes play on an impeccably manicured field in a 45,000-seat stadium. They observe
set rules which are strictly enforced by umptres. Without these tmpartial judges there
would be chaos on the held, for the owners and fans tssue a clear mandate that winning is
everything. With billions of dollars on the line for owners, players, and merchandisers,
what was a gentleman's game in the nineteenth century becomes a mass spectacle,
drawing millions of fans to the ballpark or their televisions. Of course, the most
important feature of the professionalized game is its exclusiveness, drawing a clear line
between players and spectators. Passively watching the trials and triumphs of their
heroes on the field, spectators can only find meaning in their own lives from the
comfortable confines of their luxury box seats or living room. They can only experience
baseball vicariously. Representing the fans of their fair city, players constitute a
meritocratic elite who enjoy not only the rare opportunity to play but also the bargaining
position to negotiate multi-million-dollar contracts. In the end, all the money and fanfare
corrupt the players, whose celebrity turns them into commodities for product
endorsement and makes them forget why they loved the game in the first place. As is the
case in politics today, Wolin would suggest, both players (i.e., politicians) and spectators
(i.e., citizens) are unable to have an authentic experience of baseball (i.e., democracy).
In keeping with the momentary and melancholic nature of Wolinian democracy,
the sandlot will not last forever. The better players will go on to play organized ball,
some kids will move away, and others will develop other interests. Maybe a local Little
League organization will turn the sandlot into an unblemished and enclosed field,
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complete with bleaehers and a concession stand. Other potential sites for spontaneous
Play will be harder to come by, as parents and property owners place more restrictions on
where children can play. Lest their lives be beset with tragedy or disaster, we plan every
aspect of our children’s lives, even their recreation. With good intentions we try to
manage their activity, making sure things do not get out of hand and no one gets hurt.
Ultimately, the fear of broken windows and legs and the ensuing lawsuits inspires
managed recreation. But Wolin would suggest that such attempts to eliminate risk take
the fun and spontaneity out of life, create merit-based hierarchies, and set limits on
inclusion. Recall that talented kids play more than others in Little League, and that
overly-involved parents often take these organized games far too seriously and put undue
pressure on their 10-year-olds, even in ostensibly supportive environments. It goes
without saying that the intrusive adults in this metaphor represent the paternalistic state.
It becomes apparent as we play out this metaphor that, sadly, democracy is a
fragile enterprise. A myriad of factors can undennine the unity of its participants i.e.,
the demos and send them in different directions. As opportunities for participation
become more scarce in this world, it is almost as if the stars and planets have to be
perfectly aligned for an authentic democratic experience to occur. As baseball has been
increasingly professionalized and institutionalized through media technology—television,
video games, etc. it becomes far easier and more pleasant for us to be spectators. We
would rather experience the game vicariously, not authentically, as it provides many of
the game s thrills without its discomforts, both mental and physical. Wolin recognizes
there is a certain inevitability to all this, but he holds on to the dream that, whenever
possible, people will choose to take part in those spontaneous, natural experiences in life,
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l.ke sandlot baseball or pure democracy, and when reflecting on those days, will
remember with sorrow what has been lost and dimly hope to recapture it once again
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CHAPTER VI
BENJAMIN BARBER AND QUIXOTIC DEMOCRACY
Political theonst Benjamin Barber, the Gershon and Carrol Kekst Professor of
Civil Society at the University of Maryland, is another advocate of participatory
democracy whose sharp critique of liberal democracy-or what he calls “thin
democracy” proves far more convincing and illuminating than his democratic remedies
do. In his landmark work of political theory, Strong Democracy
,
he argues that “thin
democracy” rests on a set of metaphysical assumptions that perpetuate the “belief in the
fundamental inability of the human beast to live at close quarters with members of its
own species/' 1 The idea that communities, working collectively for the greater good, can
reflect the better angels of our nature is inconceivable, even perniciously idealistic, to
liberals. In their view, collectives quickly become unruly hordes posing a threat to the
nghts of individuals. As a result, liberal politics amounts to little more than
zookeeping, devising the right institutional mechanisms and barriers to ensure that
these human beasts can co-exist peacefully within a finite amount of space. Liberal man
is not innately social or political so much as he is a solitary figure whose greatest wish is
to be left alone and guaranteed protection from would-be intruders. His engagement in
politics extends no further than the voting booth, where he periodically chooses elites to
govern in his behalf. So long as these elites successfully limit the amount of conflict in
the zoo, liberal man leels content and will happily re-elect them. Perhaps it goes without
Barber, Strong Democracy, 2 1
.
280
saying that, for Barber, liberalism lacks imagination or vision, and it embraces a far too
pessimistic and simplistic understanding of man.
At the heart of liberal reductionism, says Barber, are three often conflicting
dispositions anarchism, realism, and minimalism. Valuing above all the nega.tve rights
of the individual and the relentless pursuit of property, liberalism is disposed toward
anarchism, endorsing a radical individualism which rests on the belief that the state only
stands to get in the way of the individual and become an unwanted authoritarian
presence. But understanding that individual rights will never be secure in a stateless
society, liberals also embrace realism and allow for the state’s use of power to mitigate
conflict and instill order. Hobbes, probably the first libera] political philosopher, was a
realist par excellence
,
believing that only an absolute sovereign could protect man from
the ferocity of his peers. Later, liberals like Locke and Madison argued that such a
formidable state might successfully restrain the actions of tyrannical men but would
never be able to restrain itself. So, in an attempt to find a happy medium between
anarchism and realism, liberals have tended toward minimalism, the notion that the state
is a necessary evil whose authoritarian tendencies can only be avoided if it maintains
strict neutrality on the common good, endorses pluralism and tolerance, and creates
institutional safeguards to limit its own authority. While we might see minimalism as a
reasonable balance between our desire for liberty and need for political power, it never
resolves the tension so neatly, according to Barber. Our natural condition requires the
creation of the state to protect our liberties, but the state itself poses a threat to those very
liberties it is meant to protect. The point at which the state satisfies the demands of
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realism without compromising the concents of anarch,stn may in the end be impossible to
pin down, thus exposing the incoherence of liberal thought.
Barber finds liberal,sm so frustrating largely because it rests on a number of
faulty assumptions about humanity. Liberals presume, sometimes without realizing it,
that
-humans are material betngs in all they are and in all they do-4® then social and
polmcal time and space are literally matenal or physical tune and space,” and thus
believe humans are “governed by laws that correspond to the laws of physical
mechanics.”2 As physical entities first and foremost, liberal human beings assume the
characteristics of a Newtonian atomic particle. According to liberals, each human is a
distinct and self-contained unit, an atom whose motives and actions are always whole and
indivisible. No two people can occupy the same space at the same time, neither
physically nor politically, socially, or psychologically. Finally, only that which excites
our senses can affect us either physically, emotionally, or intellectually, and each one of
us responds to these external stimuli in exactly the same way. This mechanistic
conception of man leads liberals to believe that man is by nature a solitary, hedonistic,
and politically apathetic being who only seeks to maximize his own sensual pleasure and
remove any impediments toward that goal. Free to the extent that nothing impedes his
motion, liberal man believes other human beings, no matter who they are, represent a
potential threat to his freedom. People interact with them only when it is mutually
beneficial, serving each person’s private and hedonistic interests. Otherwise, they prefers
to be alone, free from any intrusions on their personal space and any obstacles in their
way.
2
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Both the anarchist and realist tendencies ofliberalism view every human being in
exactly the same way, as a "radically individuated particle.”3 At the same time, they hold
disparate views about the role of the state mainly because each tendency rests on a
distinct understanding of political space. The liberal-anarchist sees political space as
infinite and imagines there is enough space in the world for individual atoms to roam
freely without any danger of conflict. Only the state threatens the free movement of each
atom; other atoms never present such a menace. On the other hand, the liberal-realist
sees political space in finite terms: it is a "densely populated” universe wherein freely
roaming atoms are apt to collide with one another. 4 Tension and conflict among atoms is
the norm, requiring the state to intervene, to create boundaries so that individuals are
protected from encroachments by others. The liberal-minimalist, whose search for
middle ground leads him to value tolerance and mutual respect, flirts with the idea that
conflict does not exhaust the potential of human concourse,” 5 that human beings have
the capacity to work together toward greater ends, but ultimately he too, says Barber, can
never relinquish an atomistic conception of humanity. Liberals may disagree about how
much entropy animates the particles in the political world, but they all agree that the
fundamental objective of politics is to keep these atoms away from each other.
Collective attempts at promoting the common good will only increase the level of
entropy, almost certainly putting these atoms on a collision course.
3
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Forever fearful of the authoritarian tendencies of collectives, liberals always
detect something sinrster beneath the surface of their ostenstbly good intentions. Tins
wariness breeds conservatism, an outngh, fear that any democratic action, no matter how
well-reasoned and popular, may trample the “natural” rights of individuals. Better that
we erect institutional bamers to collective energies than nsk their potentially dire
consequences. Better that we do nothing at all, even if circumstances demand action,
than proceed impetuously and regret it later. In the liberal universe, there are only a few
oases of certainty in a vast empty desert, and our lives are in peril any time we wander
too far from these wondrous gifts of nature. Desperately clinging to these natural oases,
liberals refuse to accept that communities can build their own oases, even towns and
cities, in the arid desert. It is never wise to build a city on a foundation of sand, they
warn. Liberals call this political paralysis by a variety of euphemisms—prudence,
circumspection, caution—which, they claim, political uncertainty makes necessary. But,
oddly, liberals are selective with their skepticism. The political convictions of majorities
may arouse their incredulity, but liberals are quite certain of their atomistic assumptions
about humankind. They never bother to question these assumptions from which they
deduce certain political “truths’—namely, that government exists solely to safeguard the
free movement of autonomous atoms—and they assuredly espouse political quiescence
among the citizenry.
As Barber understands it, liberals fear political conviction and change because
they skitter back and forth between radical absolutism and radical skepticism and cannot
find a reasonable middle ground. Either in an absolutist or a skeptical frame of mind,
liberals come to the same conclusion—that collective action of any kind can only cause
2K4
trouble. The problem with this emphasis on “keeping men apart rather than.
. .bringing
them together"'' is that it comes at tire “pnce of undermining activity.”7 Uncertain that
concerted action will yield beneficial results—and afraid that it may even invite
disaster liberals prefer inaction to anything else. But the lack of certainty, says Barber.
should not necessarily preclude concerted action. Minimalist timidity introduces its own
dangers.
Afraid of overstepping the prudent boundaries set by skeptical reason, the
liberal is politically paralyzed. Because he is uncertain of his beliefs, he
hesitates to act. But in a world of necessary actions and ineluctable
consequences, the liberal’s diffidence cannot mean that nothing happens,
only that he causes nothing to happen. He may modestly abstain from
acting on behalt of public goods that he does not think can be legitimated,
but his reticence only means that private and clearly illegitimate forces
will control his destiny unopposed. Refusing to impose himself or a
public will on others, he willy-nilly permits market forces, which are
neither public nor just, to ride roughshod over his fellow citizens. 8
Understanding liberty merely as "freedom from" intrusions on our personal space and
property encourages a dangerous passivity that leaves many people vulnerable to an
increasingly boorish private sector. Vigilantly adhering to constitutional limits, the
liberal state agonizes over the extent to which it can lawfully intervene on the behalf of
the majority will, while economic elites consolidate their power and play an increasingly
dominant role in our lives. We may not be certain about the consequences of any given
civic action, but Barber maintains that political paralysis invites a certain end: the
“random coercion and arbitrary force" of faceless corporations which will “seize hold of
6
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7
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our common destinies.”9 Merely protecting negative freedoms suceors the economically
powerful, and it does nothing to aid the less fortunate or to promote a broader sense of the
social good. After all, elites have far more resources at their disposal, not only to assert
their authority in the private sector but to buy influence in the public sphere.
The minimalist attempt to reconcile liberty with power, anarchism with realism,
discounts the prospect of citizenship, the idea that human beings are more than just
autonomous particles and in fact often define themselves in the context of their political
community. According to Barber, the citizen cares about far more than his own sensual
pleasure and maintains strong political convictions and loyalties. He does not recoil from
imagining a better and more just society than the one he currently inhabits, or from taking
action to make his dreams a reality. “With some pluck and creativity we can too build a
city on a foundation of sand! says the citizen. Perhaps most important to Barber is the
idea that liberty and power are connected, that freedom depends on taking control of our
destiny and not simply acquiescing to the world with which we are confronted. Only
nominally free, most liberal men remain vulnerable to the caprices of market forces and
invisible to the helpful hand of the state, while a politically engaged citizenry can alter
the balance of power in society, curbing the cruel excesses of the market, and making the
state responsive to common needs. Without power to go along with it, freedom exists in
name only, it is merely an abstraction that has no real meaning based on experience.
Like Rousseau, Barber believes that man is bom not free but in chains, and he achieves
freedom not by eluding his fellow man but by cooperating with him.
9
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For Barber, man is an inherently social creature. Embracing an atomistic
conception of man, liberals fail to take into account the fact that human beings are
profoundly conflicted creatures whose selves are often split between competing loyalties
or impulses, that our identities are the products of our relations with others, and that we
often respond willfully (and not mechanistically) to the world around us. As Barber
eminds his readers, no man possesses an undivided and unencumbered self that
completely precedes social relations, and his actions are not merely predetermined
responses to external stimuli. Each of us is ambivalent and complex, socially constructed
and interdependent, idiosyncratic and willful. Identity is not monolithic or clearly
defined. Every one of us resembles a community quilt, whose intricate patterns, the
product of many hands and influences, reveal myriad inconsistencies and contradictions.
Man s freedom, then, is not tantamount to the unimpeded atom, for in large part
he is the product of his community. Each of us is a “complex entity made up of different
and conflicting parts. We can no longer speak of the entity being coerced or being free as
a whole, we must specify which parts and which objects are in question.” 10 My body, for
example, may be free and uninhibited but my mind may not be. It may be under the spell
of a powerfully persuasive influence or of unseen habits of mind formed by years of
education, socialization, and subliminal messages. As such, man is only free to the extent
that he is aware of all the outside influences and internal contradictions that constitute
him and can then consider his options before acting. Reflexive or instinctive actions
—
mechanistic responses to external stimuli—indicate he is in chains. But as long as man is
10 Superman and Common Men
,
48.
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a conscous and deliberate actor, keeping in nnnd the opportunity costs of any decision
and the regret he may feel later, he is free.
If we are to understand human beings in this more sophisticated way-as
inherently soctal and conflicted creatures who are free to the degree that they are aware
of their condition of interdependence-we will no, conclude, as liberals do, tha, humanity
,s a lost cause, only worthy of a political system based on our worst and most pessimistic
expectations of it. We will not assume that people are pnmarily hedonistic and selfish
and then devise a political system that offers no hope other than protecting each
individual particle from intrusion on its personal space. Nor will we understand politics
in crudely pluralist terms, as an arena wherein private interests compete for influence
over the state and fight over its finite amount of goods and services. Instead, suggests
Barber, we will see humankind's capacity to view issues from someone else’s
perspective, cooperate with others in its community, and sacrifice personal gain for the
sake ot another. And we will understand human freedom in social terms, as an awareness
of the world around us and our complex relationship to it. Accordingly, we may imagine
a far different political landscape, one in which people transcend their individual interests
and become politically engaged citizens, directing their energies toward the
commonweal.
Through his relationships with others, man can
—
quite unlike an atomic particle
—
transform himself. Unbound by preconceptions of what it means to be a human being, he
can define himself by the way in which he interacts with others. He can liberate himself
from unconscious influences and the dogma of hedonism through democratic action.
When reminded of Rousseau's admonition that men must be “forced to be free,” liberals
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shudder with fear, recalling the bloody excesses of the French Revolution. But. for
Barber, this phrase is far more innocuous than i, sounds and simply suggests that, to be
free, citizens must be made acutely aware of the civic duties for which they are
responsible in their community. Democracy, with all its institutional mechanisms for
deliberation and careful consideration of alternatives, creates the conditions under which
citizens can exercise this kind of freedom.
Unfortunately, liberal democracy only provides opportunities for democratic
participation to a handftil of elites-those fortunate enough to become our elected
representatives. A champion of participatory democracy, Barber offers a version that he
calls “strong democracy.’' While “strong democracy has a good deal in common with the
classical democratic theory of the ancient Greek polis,” says Barber, it “does not quite
envision politics in the ancient sense of a ‘way of life,’ and is explicitly hostile to the still
more extravagant claim that politics is the way of life.” 11 Like liberals, Barber is
sensitive to the dangers ot totalizing politics and resistant to communitarian notions that
the political should subsume every facet of our lives. Yet, as we have seen, he is also
frustrated with the citizen passivity and market dominance inherent to liberal politics.
Representing an attempt to find a middle ground, strong democracy
envisions politics not as a way of life but as a way of living—as, namely,
the way that human beings with variable but malleable natures and with
competing but overlapping interests can contrive to live together
communally not only to their mutual advantage but also to the advantage
of their mutuality. 12
1
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2
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In a strong dentocracy, cit.zens engage more actively in polities bu, do so voluntanly,
understanding that their panic, pat,on will benefit themselves and the community as a
whole. Strong democrats do no, relinquish their private lives, as citizens of the ancient
pohs do, bu, a, the same time their part, e,pa,ion strengthens their attachment to their
community and thereby transforms them in a profound way.
To make this happen, citizens in a strong democracy participate directly in all
ree phases of politics deliberation, policymaking, and implementation. Unlike
Wohnian democracy, strong democracy does not represent a wholesale rejection of
liberalism and its institutions or uphold a radical vision of the political. Instead, Barber
intends strong democracy to be an achievable goal that will modify rather than undermine
existing liberal institutions. Barber considers the liberal fear of majority tyranny to be
overstated—for, indeed, he often quotes Louis Hartz who quipped that the “American
majority has been an amiable shepherd dog kept forever on a lion’s leash” 13—but he
recognizes the need for liberal institutions to protect minorities from potentially
repressive collective action. By grafting strong democratic institutions onto existing
institutions, Barber wants merely to change the emphasis of American politics—to
remove many, but not all, limits on majority action. If this were to happen, the “amiable
shepherd dog” would have the opportunity to roam on his own once in a while or, at the
very least, enjoy the freedom that comes with a longer leash. Liberals maintain that
citizens could never govern themselves well because they do not have the expertise to
address complex policy issues and will sooner succumb to the persuasive rhetoric of
See for example, A Place For Us, 1 9; Strong Democracy, 1 7; and An Aristocracy of
Everyone, 155.
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demagogues than engage in politics with any degree of seriousness. Barber respectful*
disagrees, asserting that part.cipation itself provides the edueation any citizen needs to
contribute intelligently. We can expect a deliberative cit.zenry to govern itself well, far
better, in fact, than a group of elites ever will. So long as strong democrats institutions
are put in place, citizens will rise to the occasion.
Perhaps the most important phase of strong democracy is the first, in which
citizens engage in public deliberation-^ what Barber calls "political talk.” In his view,
political talk “protects the political process from rigidity, orthodoxy, and the yoke of the
dead past” and also "enlarge[s] perspective and expand[s] consciousness [among the
citizenry] in a fashion that not so much accommodates as transcends private interests and
the antagonisms they breed.” 14 To institutionalize political talk, Barber calls for the
creation of neighborhood assemblies throughout the country, which would provide a
forum in each community for citizens to deliberate with fellow citizens on important
political matters, especially those of local interest. Citizens would not only voice their
opinions but also listen to the perspectives of others in their community. Barber suggests
that the art of listening may be the linchpin to strong democracy, for only through
listening are we able to see beyond our private interests and consider ideas that challenge
the dogma to which we have become blindly attached. With such a broadened
perspective, we become citizens who can arrive at a mutual understanding and reach a
consensus about the appropriate mode of action.
This leads us to the next phase of strong democracy. Once citizens have carefully
considered an issue from various perspectives, they can move on to the decision-making
14
Ibid., 189-90.
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process. Though Barber seems ,o extol the vtrtues of political talk more than anyth,ng
else, he understands that people will only avail themselves of opportunities for
deliberation if they can ultimately exere.se political power. Talk means nothing if it does
not lead to action. So, not surprisingly, Barber proposes institutionalizing a national
initiative and referendum process to empower the citizenry. It is important to note,
however, that he attempts to remedy the problems plaguing direct democracy in many
states right now. He is aware that direct democracy is vulnerable to manipulation by
elites, and that in its current form the referendum does little to encourage deliberation
before citizens issue an up-or-down vote. This is why he endorses a process that
resembles the one once used in the Republic of Raetia, where the referendum did not so
much settle a matter as it sparked further debate. 15
Barber proposes that neighborhood assemblies host meetings in which citizens
may discuss the issues relevant to an impending referendum vote. To encourage further
deliberation he recommends that referenda be voted on twice before they become law.
He also favors a multi-choice referendum ballot that offers a “more varied and searching
set of choices capable of eliciting more nuanced and thoughtful responses” from the
citizenry. Rather than just yes or no, citizens will have five voting options: 1
.)
unequivocal yes; 2.) yes in principle, but with some reservations about the particulars of
this proposal, 3.) unequivocal no; 4.) no with respect to the particulars of this proposal,
but not opposed in principle (suggest “reformulation and resubmission”); 5.) no for the
15
Raetia was the subject of Barber’s dissertation, which he eventually turned into a book
entitled The Death ofCommunal Liberty. I will discuss this book more fully later in the
chapter.
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moment, but not necessarily opposed in principle (postpone farther action at this time).' 6
Barber claims that this multi-choice format would infonn the second round of
deliberation. For example, if a majority votes “yes” on a referendum, but a large portion
of that majority lends its support “with some reservations,” citizens will have the
opportunity to explore these reservations in the neighborhood assemblies. The idea here
is that two-stage voting and a multi-choice format will encourage thoughtful decision-
making and will also ensure that the shepherd dog remains amiable-and, perhaps more
importantly, regretful. In Barber’s view, free political actors should experience regret
about the lost opportunities that come from making any important decision. Infused with
a feeling of “perpetual regret” for what could have been done (or not done), participants
in a strong democracy understand politics as an ongoing and endless process in which we
always correct the mistakes, or build on the incomplete successes, of the past. Citizens
should feel compelled to revisit an issue ad nauseum lest any better options (or even
subtle modifications for improvement) are overlooked. (Of course, one wonders at what
point regret turns into political paralysis—the kind with which liberals are often infected.
Barber poses this question himself but, unfortunately, does not venture to answer it.)
Where regional or national issues are concerned, Barber has exhibited in the past
a fairly naive belief that the use of telecommunications technology could establish links
among numerous assemblies and facilitate nationwide discussion. While critics of
participatory democracy have often focused on the problem of scale—the sheer size and
scope of modem nation states Barber has asserted that it “is susceptible to technological
and institutional melioration. Once we see the potential political benefits ofmodem
16
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technology, he has suggested, "scale becomes a tractable challenge rather than an
insuperable barner.’" 7 But, to be fair, Barber's m,d-80s confidence in technological
melioration has matured qu„e a bit. In more recent writings, he presents a more sober
and nuanced analysis of democratic hopes in a world increasingly dominated by
technology. He sees how technology, harnessed by the state or big corporations, can
erect just as many barriers as it can create avenues to strong democracy. 18
This may explain in part why in his recent writings, especially in A Placefor Us
,
he has concentrated less on institutionalizing strong democracy and more on fostering a
strong democratic brand of civil society. Barber defines strong democratic civil society
as the realm that mediates conflicts between the private and the public. We are
conditioned to think that the tension between the state and the private sector, or between
the community and the individual, is a “zero-sum game ’-that a more active state means
diminished liberty and more dependency; that a more robust private sector (and
diminished state) leads to rampant inequality and destruction of the commonweal. But
Barber maintains that this third sector, democratic civil society, can foster a spirit of
cooperation between these two spheres. Democratic civil society
can place limits on government without ceding public goods to the private
sphere, and at the same it can dissipate the atmosphere of solitariness and
greed that surrounds markets without suffocating in big government’s
exhaust fumes or in the stifling air of would-be communities. Both
government and the private sector can and should be humbled by the
growth of civil society, for it absorbs some of the public aspirations (its
17
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See twentieth anniversary edition of Strong Democracy, also see technology-related
essays in Barber’s A Passionfor Democracy.
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commitment to public work) without being coercive, and it maintainsliberty without yielding to the jungle anarchy of commercial markels '
Lymg a, the threshold between the public and private spheres of life, democratic evil
society can appropriate the best elements of each in its quest for common ends: i, is
participatory and communal (like the public sector, yet voluntary and uncoercive (like the
private sector).
Barber has recently situated strong democratic practices outside (or at the edge of)
traditional state institutions because, like Wolin, he has begun to see that big government
has eclipsed opportunities for meaningful political participation as much as big business
has. Caught in the crossfire, civil society has been a casualty of an ongoing war over the
course of American history between the private and public sectors. While the former
crushed civil society in its mad rush to turn profits, the latter heroically came to the
people’s defense but undermined their chance to participate in the process by not
involving them in any fundamental way
.
20
As the state and private corporations played a
larger role in our lives, all we could do was watch passively and leave public concerns to
these entities in which we had no active role to play. Barber has always understood “the
tendency of all institutions to ossify and become distanced from their constituents (the so-
called iron law of oligarchy),"" 1 and his later works suggest that even strong democratic
institutions, if controlled by state, can have this same tendency. As a result, strong
democracy can better avoid ossification if it remains somewhat independent of the
A Placefor All ofUs, 64-65.
20
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state and of bus,ness. Instead of drawing a bluepnn, of potential strong democratic
institutions, he now calls for fuzzier measures that encourage the growth of more
spontaneous and less formally institutionalized democratic participation. For instance, he
advocates the creation of public spaces in which citizens can meet ad hoc to redress
public problems, but he no longer stresses the importance of institutionalizing a
nationwide network of neighborhood assemblies. He also calls on consumers to organize
boycotts against corporations that engage in unscrupulous business praetiees-sueh as
outsourcing production to off-shore sweatshops or squashing union drives—which
suggests he holds little hope for democratic state action to curb corporate excesses.22
Nevertheless, we should not mistake his growing wariness of the state for any kind of
retrenchment, for he still believes participatory democracy is the solution to our current
political woes.
Having dedicated most of his career to deepening democracy, Barber has
consistently shown a deep respect for Hartz's shepherd dog, believing that it can always
learn new tricks, no matter how old it grows. In “the absence of independent ground” or
foundational truth, citizens in a strong democracy can join together and learn from their
experiences to address problems in their communities. It should hardly come as a
surprise, then, that Barber often draws explicitly on the pragmatist tradition and
understands his theory and his work as a vital part of it.~ 2 The big three classical
pragmatists Peirce, James, and Dewey—feature prominently in his writings and deeply
22
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Barber even admits in the introduction of his landmark work of participatory
democratic theory. Strong Democracy
,
that he has “been much helped by the tradition of
American pragmatism,” xii.
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influence his political Ihough,. As he sees it, strong democracy goes a long way toward
completing the pragmatist project which forsakes phtlosophtca. huhris, the ill-advised
quest for certainty, and any reliance on foundational truth, and which instead sees both
knowledge and man himself as social constructions. “Strong democracy,” Barber says,
‘hs pragmatism translated into politics in the panic,patory mode.”24 Like the pragmatists,
he embraces uncertainty and sees it as an opportunity for people to resolve conflict and
dectde their own destiny collectively rather than defer to metaphysical assumptions that
bear the fraudulent stamp of truth (democratic epistemology). And like the pragmatists,
he believes man’s nature is no, fixed bu, educable, forever shaped by his interaction with
others in his community (democratic psychology). Quite manifestly Barber embraces a
democratic epistemology and psychology, but his democratic theology is somewhat
shaky. Though not as defeatist as Wolin, whose uncompromising epistemology and
psychology completely undermine his theology. Barber has also shown a frustration with
modernity and its tendency to foreclose democratic opportunities. I now examine more
closely the three democratic tenets in Barber's thought.
I.
Barber s democratic epistemology is quite evident in his work. He admonishes us
to accept our epistemological limits as human beings and find truth only in what works
experientially, not in the metaphysical dogma of religion or rationalism. The point at
which this experience-based truth becomes contestable, where people with varying
experiences come to different conclusions, strong democratic politics emerges as the
~4
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arena in wh.ch cifzens can engage in d.scuss.on with others ,n their community and.
after bnnging their expenences to bear on the tssues at hand, reach a tentahve settlement
about the right course of action. These settlements serve as prov.stonal truths, whtch for
the moment are the best answers to the quest,ons before the community, but forever
remain open to re-examinahon and further scrutiny. As Barber puts it, “Politics concerns
tself only with those realms where truth is not-or is not yet-known... Where
consensus stops, politics starts/’25 And because the business of democracy is to work
toward a consensus not yet reached, to generate provisional truths, it actually serves as
“
itS °Wn eP'stenlol°gy-”26 Politics as epistemology suggests that power determines truth,
and indeed Barber would agree wilh this formulation but of course with the vital caveat
that this truth must be an expression of communal will.
Liberals, on the other hand, believe that their metaphysical assumptions about
humanity should be the basis of politics. Each man is a “radically individuated particle”
whose only aim in life is to be free of all encumbrances, and this “truth” informs our
political knowledge. Or, more specifically, when we frame the human experience in
these atomistic terms, we conclude that people do not have the capacity for meaningful
collective action and thus should live in a polity that does more to protect their negative
rights than to offer them opportunities for political participation. Liberal epistemology,
then, is deductive, beginning with a set of general principles from which we logically
derive specific political knowledge, such as the proper role of government and its
institutions. Barber maintains that this reliance on syllogistic thinking stifles our political
25
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magmation. Under the liberal regime (in both senses of the word), we cannot deviate
from this chain of logic whtch determines from the outset what is poldical truth.
Unconstrained by this logic, strong democrats see no limits to what man can learn
and accomplish politically. Instead of ceding politics to a ng,d epistemology, we should
"depict epistemology in political terms,” winch means “conceiving politics [itself] as
epistemology and thereby inverting the classical liberal priority of epistemology over
politics.”
27
Though Barber does not say it in so many words, the strong democratic
epistemology shows itself to be inductive, resting no, on unsubstantiated assumptions bu,
empirical facts which members of a community interpret collectively and deliberatively
and from which they then infer useful political guidelines—guidelines that they
continually reconsider and modify as new data come to the surface. The effectiveness of
these guidelines is only limited by the degree to which the democratic process is
inclusive. Says Barber:
Knowledge understood as socially constructed... has a genuine validity,
but it is a validity that is conditioned and thus conditional. It will be more
or less persuasive to the degree the community from which it arises can be
shown to be more or less democratic, more or less self-reflective, more or
less inclusive. The only truth the modem school can have is produced by
democracy: consensus arising out of an undominated discourse to which
all have equal access. 28
As the level ot participation increases, with more people contributing their experiential
knowledge and political imagination to the discussion, the emerging guidelines will have
more general appeal they will be "persuas ivo (or effectively “true”) for a larger
number of people. Indeed, Barber embraces the Peircean “metaphor of truth as a cable
27
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woven together from many slender strands” which he believes is redolent of a strong
democrats polity.
-'Many c.tizens are bound together intimately through their common
citizenship, and they interact gutded by opinions that in themselves are slender and
provisional but that when woven together into a communal will and a public purpose
inspire powerful conviction Indtvidual citizens may never know anythmg with
absolute certainty, but when they form a deliberative collective, they represent a
formidable force ofcommon eonvtction. Together, they become convinced that a certain
approach or course of act.on is the best political solution, and they exert their power to
make it happen.
We may find much more comfort and satisfaction in certainty, but it is not
available to us, especially in the realm of politics, where truths and principles will forever
be strenuously contested. With certainty out of the equation, the trick, then, is for people
to reach an agreement on what works for them. “Since the objective is to find working
maxims rather than fixed truths and shared consciousness rather than immutable
principles, what is needed is a common language and a mode of seeing that will facilitate
legitimate political judgments.' 30 Politics does not involve the search for truth—we have
philosophers engaging daily in that fruitless activity—but rather entails making
judgments, seeing the problem before us, communicating our various perspectives to
each other, developing a shared vision of our goals, and ultimately finding “working
maxims that achieve these aims. Only a democratic community can make political
judgments, for
29
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interacting with one another in
>ion-making on the way to
produces rather than (as with
tics. Democratic political
In a world devoid of intrinsic meaning or truth, communities bear the responsibility of
making these judgments, figuring out together what works best for them.
Liberals decry this as politics without foundations, and they assert that a healthy
these foundational truths supporting our political institutions, they will necessarily
collapse. But Barber remains undaunted by these cries of alarm, for Barber agrees with
Dewey that political knowledge requires not foundations but the application ofmethod—
and the method turns out to be democracy itself.”32 Democratic regimes certainly
inherit foundations, but Barber claims that they flourish
both in spite of the foundations that have supported their birth and in the
absence of all foundations. Like every political system, democracy too
has a birth mother, and thus rests on foundations. Unlike every other
political system, however, democracy is necessarily self-orphaned, the
child who slays its parents so that it may grown and flourish
autonomously. 33
Democracy as a form of parricide is a chilling image, indeed, but Barber asserts that
hacking up its aged parents is a melancholy necessity. 34 Citizens of a democratic
polity must be prepared to rebel against the traditions it inherits and come to realize that
polity must have first principles to which it can always return in times of crisis. Without
31 A Passion for Democracy, 25.
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our common experience mforms our political knowledge more than recetved wisdoms. If
democracy has any foundations other than those it so enthusiastically renounces, they can
only be found within the democratic process itself. For democratic methods or
procedures provtde the means by which communities can bring conflict into the open and
resolve them.
Barber has no doubt that citizens applying the democratic method are capable of
maktng sensible judgments. While strong democracy ‘‘does no, place endless faith in the
capacity of indtviduals to govern themselves,” it does maintain “that the multitude will on
the whole be as wise or even wiser than pnnces.” And, says Barber, strong democracy
accords with these words spoken by Theodore Roosevelt (incidentally, a former student
of William James): “The majority of the plain people will day in and day out make fewer
mistakes in governing themselves than any smaller body of men will make in trying to
govern them.”35 While most political theorists have doubted the wisdom of “plain
people” and have instead placed their faith in the wisdom of aristocrats or philosophers or
in the mitigating effects of institutions. Barber believes that people applying the
democratic method, deliberating with their fellow citizens to address common concerns,
will govern themselves perfectly well.
The Republic of Raetia is a telling example. In the published version of his
dissertation, The Death ofCommunal Liberty
,
Barber recounts the history of this once
thriving and idyllic participatory republic nestled in the Swiss Alps. At the heart of
freedom in the Republic of Raetia, which achieved independence in 1524 but lost it at the
hands of Napoleon in 1 799, was the commune. Later to become a Swiss canton by the
35
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name of Graubuenden in .he early nineteenth century, Raetia was a loose confederation
of communes, each about the size of a netghborhood, in which citizens participated
directly in every aspect of political life. Men in each commune deltberated for long hours
on tssues of importance to them, reached consensus before making final decisions, and
even worked together to implement their proposed solution.36 The central government in
the republic had surprisingly little authonty, and even though tins radical decentralization
of power created many organizafional inefficiencies (even chaos) and thus slowed the
pace of economic and technological progress, citizens experienced the exhilarating
freedom of deciding their own destinies with others in their community. Despite what
liberal critics would expect, Raetian citizens did not experience majority tyranny.
As a creative participant in the formation of the communal will, the
[Raetian] individual needed no guarantees for the containment of
communal power; as the instrument of policy implementation, he needed
no sacred rights with which to defend himself against the encroachments
of an ambitious bureaucracy. In the most fundamental sense, the citizen
was the communal authority: its will was his will, its needs were his
needs, its instrumentalities were his very limbs, and its power was his
sweat and blood. To speak from a liberal constitutional perspective about
the dependence of freedom on the separation of powers and the
constitutional containment of power is, in the context of the self-
governing, face-to-face polity, to speak an alien tongue. 37
The Raetian citizen did not require protection from communal authority because he saw
the community as an extension of himself, of his own needs and desires expressed in his
36
Barber stresses the importance of “common work in the Raetian commune. Citizens
did not delegate the implementation of their decisions to experts; they did the work
themselves. For example, the decision to build a new road could not be made in a
splendid flurry of democratic spirit and then forgotten, left to some engineer corps to
complete. To will the road into being, as it were, entailed building it. Those who willed
it built it, and their labor was regarded as an expression of commonality for which no
compensation was required.” Death ofCommunal Liberty, 176.
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willfuJ democratic participation. Having devoted countless hours to deliberating with his
fellow citizens and reaching consensus with them, the Raettan identified with those very
communal decisions in which he played a vital part. Though difficult for modem liberals
to conceive, the Raettan did not understand liberty as individual freedom from intrusion
or obstacles but rather in communal terms, “as collaborative self-reliance and community
autonomy.”38
Given his enthusiasm for communal expressions of liberty, Barber does not
understand why liberals fear an unrestrained demos and think that “parchment
barriers” as Madison referred to the Bill of Rights in his initial criticism of it—will
effectively protect individuals from majority tyranny. In the United States, the
Constitution secures a number of rights to which every person is entitled, and because
they are supposedly grounded in reason and perhaps god, they precede political
discussion. They are pristine political truths that real world politics should never sully.
The problem, says Barber, is that these rights, abstract and untouchable, would not
constrain a potentially tyrannical majority whose members had no involvement in their
construction and hence no real attachment to them. They would either ignore these rights
outright or, if need be, find clever ways around them. One hundred years of Jim Crow
speaks to the crafty circumvention of the Civil War amendments (as well as a few of the
original ten) by an oppressive white majority.
More effective, according to Barber, would be
an appeal to the citizenship of its members, reminding them that they are
embarked on a public course of action that cannot meet the objections of
reasonable public discourse. Lynchings are carried out but they are not
38
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,
efended
, ,
They may be m°re successfully interdicted by an anneal
circumstances tifT"
"eS 'hat COnnecl ,he Participants under normalcums han by an invocation of the ‘rights’ of the victim Inreasonableness, commonality, part,c, pat,on, and citizenship I ™he most
sy"an°“ ,°n ™d mob behavior that a political
Engaging people in public discourse, givtng them the chance to art.culate and defend
their .mended actions, is apt to produce second thoughts-and perhaps moderate their
111 cultivating ongoing public talk and participation in public action,” strong
democracy places internal checks on the “extremes of popular passion” and creates
among the people "a spirit of reasonableness.”40 Liberal democracy, on the other hand,
can only introduce external limits, delivered to us from on high, to prevent mob rule. As
the contemporary political landscape teaches us, a mindless invocation of rights will not
spark useful dialogue, and those accused of violating rights will only call forth a similarly
abstract political principle in their defense, thus hardening their resolve to act
inhumanely. As Barber sees it, appeals to abstract rights or first principles sever our ties
with others in the community; they discourage the hard yet rewarding work of political
talk and striving for a reasonable middle ground.
Although political talk is hard work, it affords participants the opportunity to
define rights democratically. In the liberal framework, we must rely on the wisdom of
philosophers and founders who decide which rights are indeed “natural,” and we must
refiain from challenging the truth of their judgments. But Barber says, “Rights are not
like triangles or the Second Law of Thermodynamics: the issue is not truth and error but
39
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at best right opinion, intersubjective agreement, and common ground.”41 Rights do not
precede political discussion but are rather its end product. Only after exhaustive
deliberation can citizens come to an agreement on those rights to which all human beings
are entitled, and even then, they remain contestable, open to further challenge and debate.
What is required is not foundational mandates or individual mental
political skillsJ 3PPlym8 tlXed s^andards to a changing world, but such
wwt n necessary to discovenng or forging common groundWhat right, or even what a right is, cannot in itself determine politicaljudgment. Rights themselves are constantly being redefined and
reinterpreted, dependent for their normative force on the engagement and
commitment of an active citizen body.
According to Barber, no political truths, not even those “inalienable” rights celebrated in
the liberal tradition, exist prior to civic engagement. If we merely adhere to “fixed
standards or absolutes, we nsk the danger of embracing antiquated ideas, so-called
nghts that no longer have any relevance in today’s world. We face this problem in the
United States, where large corporations have received the status of “legal persons” and
thus enjoy the rights of pnvate individuals. The reality is that corporations are public
entities whose impact on society can hardly be overestimated and whose very existence
depends on those “states they now assail.”42 Nevertheless, the unassailable wisdom of
the liberal tradition insists that corporations are entitled to these “natural” rights which
precede political discussion, even when history teaches us that the legal status of
corporations is mere artifice, and even when our experience demonstrates quite clearly
that coiporations exert an unimaginable amount of power and influence in our society
41 A Passion for Democracy, 61.
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today. In a strong democracy, civtcally engaged citizens could revist, this question and
perhaps agree to curb those rights currently enjoyed by corporations.
in Barber's view, political truths of any kind are agreements reached by a group
of civically engaged and deliberating cttizens. We should never blindly accept received
wisdoms about the nature of human beings or about the “natural" nghts to which they (or
their organizations) are entitled. For “truth is no longer to be mined from extra,errestnal
bodies labeled God or nature or reason or metaphysics.” Like the pragmatist thinkers to
whom he continually pays tribute, Barber believes all received wisdoms are contestable
and open to debate, and even those truths arrived at consensually and deliberatively are
provisional, inviting re-examination and refinement. But the truth—even provisionally
useful truth-will never emerge unless we conform “to communicative processes that are
genuinely democratic and that occur only in free communities.” No one should be
excluded from the discussion, for the emergence of truth requires input from everyone
concerned with the issue at hand. Says Barber:
the conditions ot truth (such as 'truth is in this residual post-modernist
form) and the conditions of democracy are one and the same: As there is
freedom, as the community is open and inclusive and the exchange of
ideas thorough and spirited, so there is both more democracy and more
learning, more freedom and more knowledge. Knowledge is always
provisional, ideas conditionally agreed upon. And just as no argument
will be accorded merit because of its source alone, so no individual will be
privileged over others simply because of who he is (white or male or
straight) or where he comes from (old money, the wrong side of the tracks,
the United States of America). 43
In short, uncompromising openness and the vigorous exchange of ideas are the key to
devising provisionally useful truths. And Barber claims his strong democracy, which
43 An Aristocracy ofEveryone, 223.
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remams open to all and involves never-ending deliberation, provides the forum wherein
citizens can create such truths-and in the process (re)crea.e themselves.
II.
In arguing that strong democracy transforms its participants, turning them into
citizens who engage in politics not merely to satisfy private object,ves but to work toward
common ends. Barber makes evident his democratic psychology. Barber is quite explicit
about the pedagogic value of political participation, arguing that the democratic process
serves as a school where participants receive a civic education and begin to think beyond
themselves (and their private interests) and more in public terms.
Community grows out of participation and at the same time makes
participation possible; civic activity educates individuals how to think
publicly as citizens even as citizenship informs civic activity with the
required sense of publicness and justice. Politics become its own
university, citizenship its own training ground, and participation its own
tutor.
While we may leam some valuable information about our rights and the law in the
classroom, people do not receive a real civic education until they are politically engaged.
If given the opportunity to wield “some significant power,” people “will quickly
appreciate the need for knowledge, but foist knowledge on them without giving them
responsibility and they will display only indifference.”45 The knowledge gained from
political engagement turns private individuals into public-minded citizens. Says Barber:
In a strong democratic community... the individual members are transformed, through
44
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their participation in common seeing and common work, into citizens. Citizens are
autonomous persons whom participation endows with a capacity for a common vtston
Talking with and working along side others to solve problems common to us all enables
us ,0 see ourselves and our relationship with others in a radically different way. From
our political participation we leam to sympathize, to imagine what it is like to walk in
another man's shoes, and this experience changes us profoundly. Barber often invokes
Rousseau to make h.s point clear: "What is crucial about democratic community is that,
as Rousseau understood, it 'produces a remarkable change in man'; that is to say, through
participation in it, man's 'faculties are exercised and developed, his ideas broadened, his
feelings ennobled, and his whole soul elevated.
-'”47
This belief in the transformative power of democracy is grounded in the idea that
human nature is malleable. As a social creature, man’s nature is determined by the way
he interacts with others. Man is a reflection of his socio-political relationships; he is as
base or noble as the community in which he is embedded.
Strong democratic theory posits the social nature of human beings in the
world and the dialectical interdependence of man and his
government.
. .Like the social reality it refracts, human nature is
compound; it is potentially both benign and malevolent, both cooperative
and antagonistic... But all these qualities can be transformed by legitimate
and illegitimate social and political forces. For man is a developmental
animal a creature with a compound and evolving telos whose ultimate
destiny depends on how he interacts with those who share the same
destiny.
48
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Human bemgs are no, fatally flawed, their sms indeliUy etched into then vety souls.
Each one of us is a blank slate with the potential either to sink into the abyss of depravity
or to nse to the heights of righteousness. Accordingly, we should devise a political
system that provtdes its citizens with a etvic educatton that elevates us. Setring people in
an environment where ruthless competition and crass materialism are the nonn runs the
risk of turning them into those depraved creatures liberals assume we are by nature.
Liberal theorists have long assumed-or have argued it is safer to assume-that
human bemgs have certain immutable traits, traits sown into their very nature. We must
accept men as they really are—solitary and independent, selfish and acquisitive,
hedonistic and pain-avoiding, base and corrupt, power-seeking and aggressive—and not
rest our hopes on their moral bettennent. Consistent with Judeo-Christian theology,
liberal man has fallen from grace and has little chance of redemption, and thus we should
never expect too much of him. We should instead assume the worst and devise a political
system based on those assumptions. But while most men are untrustworthy, liberals of a
more anarchist disposition remind us that we should exalt and leave unfettered those few
individuals who can transcend the human condition and, exceeding all expectations,
become something better than the rest us—something akin to the Nietzschean superman
The end result is a political system that frustrates concerted civic action, lest men do too
much damage, but yields to those unique individuals—those Rockefellers and Camegies
and Edisons and Picassos—whose creativity, entrepreneurship, ingenuity, greed, or fame
(or some combination thereof) makes them exemplary and admirable beyond all measure.
These men do not rely on help from others; they stand alone and firm, enduring without
complaint the stark reality of life and imposing their creative will onto the world.
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In a world with many base men and a few extraordinary ones, the political
solution is to discourage the collective action of the former and to facilitate the individual
heroism of the latte. Either way, the result serves to keep people away from each other.
And while society and collectivities are inevitable in a world with a finite amount of
space, liberal man chooses to view these social relationships as mere contracts. In his
universe, there can be “no fraternal feeling, no general will, no selfless act, love or belief
or commitment that is not wholly private”49 because human relationships-what appear
to be fraternal bonds or moral commitments—are really just the result of rational
calculation to serve the hedonistic aims of individuals. The problem with “the liberal
theory of human nature,” says Barber, is that it “defines] man in ways that deprive him
of the potential strength of mutuality, cooperation, and common being.”50 The liberal
conception of human nature completely ignores the possibility that politically cooperative
experiences can be formative and contribute to our moral education and development. 51
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It is important to note, however, that there are some thinkers in the liberal tradition,
including J. S. Mill, T. H. Green, and L. T. Hobhouse, who agree that human nature is not
static, that people are capable of moral growth and development. Green and Hobhouse,
especially, saw society in organic terms and believed that removing an individual from
his social context would destroy his humanity. Embracing a democratic psychology, they
maintained that man's relations with others not only helped to define him but could also
contribute to his personal growth. Hobhouse comes quite close to advocating
participatory democracy in his groundbreaking work Liberalism
,
in which he says,
“Democracy is not merely founded on the right or the private interest of the individual.
This is only one side of the shield. It is founded equally on the function of the individual
as a member of the community. It founds the common good upon the common will, in
forming which it bids every grown-up, intelligent person to take a part. No doubt many
good things may be achieved for a people without responsive effort on its own part... But
democratic theory is that, so obtained, they lack a vitalizing element.” Liberalism
,
1 lb-
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Th.s is not to suggest that liberals reject etvic education altogether. They have
often praised the vtrtues of a liberal education which can prepare our schoolchildren for
citizenship and instill those values friendly to liberal democracy, such as tolerance,
diversity, and mutual respect, among others. Although Barber believes democratic
participation is the true school wherein citizens receive their civic education, he does not
ignore the importance of liberal education in our schools. But he claims that merely
instilling values in our future citizens, as if they were empty vessels awaiting the elixir of
knowledge, falls short of a true liberal education. As he sees it, liberal education does not
involve receiving dogma delivered to us from the teacher’s lectem, passively accepting as
true whatever emanates from his mouth. Instead, libera] education must be an adequate
preparation for democratic participation, compelling students to challenge conventional
wisdom, think critically, and deliberate over the options presented to them. Says Barber:
Education is a training in the middle way between the dogmatic belief in
absolutes and the cynical negation of all belief. On the fringes where
dogma or nihilism prevail, force is always master. Well-taught students
learn to suspect every claim to truth and then to redeem truth provisionally
by its capacity to withstand pointed questioning. They learn that
somewhere between Absolute Certainty and Permanent Doubt there is a
point of balance that permits knowledge to be provisionally accepted and
applied (science, modestly understood, for example) and allows conduct to
be provisionally evaluated in a fashion that makes ethics, community, and
democracy possible. 52
In promoting this kind of middle ground, liberal education becomes a training ground for
democracy. Like citizens in a strong democracy, students learn to challenge truth claims
and through a slow, communal, and deliberative process—to forge provisional truths
that can withstand these challenges.
52 An Aristocracy ofEveryone
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But Barber acknowledges the danger of post-modern excess, in which students
and intellectuals find joy in deconstrnoting truths until there are none left. Truth may be
illusory, as post-modernists contend, but they are necessary nonetheless, says Barber.
"Civilizatton, Yeats reminded us, is tied together by a hoop of illusion. It would be
dangerous to pretend that the illusion is real, bu, i, is fatal to dispense with i, altogether,^
as post-modernists would have us do.
Justice and democracy are the illusions that permit us to live in comity.
ruth and knowledge are the illusions that permit us to live
commodiously Art and literature are the illusions that make commodious
living worthwhile. Deconstruction may nd us of all our illusions and thus
seem a clever way to think, but it is no way at all to live
.
53
These “illusions” may not be true in the Platonic sense, as they are not concepts that
correspond to any a priori reality (e.g., the Forms or Divine Law), but if they help us
hve commodiously” and make our lives “worthwhile,” if they actually prove to be
rewarding and ennching in our common experience, they are true in the existential sense.
Once students understand this, they will not wallow in a malaise of existential despair but
will instead see the value of citizenship, pursuing the truth in a democratic fashion,
holding up all truth claims to the test of common experience. Some conservatives like
Alan Bloom have claimed that democratizing education in this way has already proven
disastrous, promoting a dangerous relativism that has all but sent us down the precipice
toward nihilism. Accordingly, they agree with Plato that only a gifted elite should
receive the full breadth ot a liberal education, which involves challenging received
53
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w,sdoms and flirting with relativist while the res, of us should obcd.ently accept the
absolute truth given to us. 54
Because liberals hold that there are a few men more g.fted than the res, of us, i, is
no, surprising that they exalt expertise and leadership in politics. With regard to the
former. Barber argues that deference to specialists and professional polihcians, whose
“only distinctive qualification... turns out to be simply that they engage in politics,” is
completely unnecessary « So-called experts have more political knowledge than the res,
of us simply because they enjoy the privilege of participating in politics. Any of us could
attain this expertise if given the opportunity to engage in politics. “Strong democracy,'’
says Barber, “is the polities of amateurs, where every man is compelled to encounter
every other man without the intermediary of expertise.”56
Barber acknowledges that leadership is a trickier issue. Not all people are bom
leaders, and this poses a serious problem for strong democracy. Those more naturally
gifted leaders could rise before their fellow men and provide them the guidance and
comfort for which so many of them are desperately searching. This leader-follower
dynamic encourages passivity in the vast majority and thus threatens to undermine strong
democracy. As leaders assume more power and authority, followers soon relinquish their
demanding duties as citizens and show deference to those they believe more capable of
54
See especially Alan Bloom's famous political and educational polemic, The Closing of
the American Mind. Bloom claimed to be a proponent of liberal democracy, but as a
follower of Straussianism, he may have represented a particularly elitist form of it.
Nevertheless, Barber would argue that this elitist tendency pervades liberal thought.
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governing. But Barber maintains that natural leaders, though potentially inimical to
strong democracy, could also facilitate the democratic process. To begtn with, leaders
could prove very helpful the transition to strong democracy. An ideal transitional
leadership would
-guide people toward self-government” and, when their job is finished,
withdraw to the role of citizen. These leaders would inspire citizens to assume the
awesome responstbility of self-governance and help them understand that leaders like
them are no longer necessary. Though Barber does not concede this point, the
transit,onal leadership would be
-founders” of the strong democrat,e regime, but their
success would largely depend on our forgetting their crucial role. We could not
memorialize them as we do our founders in the United States today.
After the establishment of strong democracy, natural leaders may also provide an
on-going facilitating function, playing the role of “teacher’ or “judge” to ensure that the
process runs smoothly without directing it toward specific outcomes. Barber also likens
the facilitating leader to a psychologist or group therapist who helps his “patients” find
answers to his questions and problems on their own. 57 In short, leaders in a strong
democracy would always encourage participation and never assume an authority that
would encourage deference and passivity in the citizenry. It seems that natural leadership
poses the greatest challenges for strong democracy at its early stages, when citizens have
yet to assume their civic responsibilities with relish. But as average citizens grow more
confident in their capacity to govern, they would likely resist and squelch the demagogic
tendencies of natural leaders. Nevertheless, Barber does not resolve the tension between
leader and follower, between expert and amateur, to one’s complete satisfaction. Though
57
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Barber maintains
.ha, strong democracy rejects the “intermediary of expertise,” the
natural leader in a strong democracy will always assume roles, such as the facilitator, that
require a certam expertise most of us do no, possess. How these leaders or experts will
learn to res,ram themselves from disruptmg the strong democratic process remains an
unanswered question which we will consider more fully in the last chapter.
Despite the challenges presented by leadership, Barber's democratic psychology
never wavers. That men are educable and that political panic,pation provides the proper
education he takes on faith. He says:
Faith in democracy requires a belief neither in the benevolence of abstracthuman character nor in the historical altruism of democratic man
Altruists do not need government. What is required is nothing more than a
ai h in the democratizing effects that political participation has on men a
taith not in what men are but in what democracy makes them. 58
Some would argue that this is a giant leap of faith. Although Barber asks of his reader
“nothing more” than a belief in the transformative effects of democracy, many critics
maintain a natural incredulity. After all, human beings have had limited experience with
participatory democracy, and those few historical examples do not accord entirely with
theory. There is no clear evidence that participating citizens in the Athenian assembly or
in the New England town meeting during its hey-day ever underwent the kind of radical
transformation described by Barber. And even if they did—or could—experience this
transformation, we are still left with another question: with all the temptations and
distractions plaguing the post-modem world, will people today actually take the time to
engage extensively in democratic politics?
Ibid., 237.
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III.
Despite an overall optimism that pervades most of his work. Barber has on
occasion betrayed an almost Woltnian melancholy, even a, the earliest stage of his career.
The title of his dissertation, The Death ofCoruna, Liberty, speaks volumes about his
democrat,c theology, his faith that people possess the will to govern themselves. The
St0ry
'
le ,e" S is a meful one: a confederation of autonomous communes, each ofwhich
was a model of participatory democracy, the Republic of Raetta stubbornly preserved its
communal liberty, even in the face of persistent colonization and subjugation by foreign
aggressors, but finally succumbed to the forces of modernity. Even Napoleon, who
indeed took away Raetian independence, could not destroy their communal liberty, but
advances in centralized administration, technology, and commerce eroded the people's
sense of citizenship and alienated them from their local communities. Now a Swiss
canton called Graubuenden, the former Raetia is a ghost of what it once was, containing
220 communes that have relinquished a good deal of their power to the central
government and, as a result, have experienced a precipitous decline in direct political
participation. While the central government has managed to turn a confederation of
relatively backward villages into an economically robust nation state, it has come at an
incalculable expense.
Barber suggests that this sad ending, the death of communal liberty in
Graubuenden, was inevitable. In the final sentence of the penultimate chapter, Barber
poses the problem in the form of a question: "Is life in small, self-governing relatively
autonomous rural communes possible in the Western industrial world in the 1970’s?”59
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His answer is plainly no. He considers it “improbable that the communes will survive in
anything like their traditional, face-to-faee democratic form" and clatms that the “failures
of communalism and dtree. democracy reveal the inevitability and potency of pluralistic
centralism in an industrializing society."* And while Barber hopes "that these dying
forms contain the promise of an alternative mode of political life,” he sees no escape
from the politically devastating effects of modernity. Communes in modem day
Graubuenden lace a difficult dilemma, the product of a century-long collision between
tndisputedly vital communal norms and the apparent requtsites of national survtval in an
industrializing world. Progress in this context may mean the surrender of both
meaningful personal autonomy and real self-government.”61
As Barber ruefully relates, modernization has forever transfonned life in the
Swiss communes. One of the more distressing trends is that young people, who alone
can preserve the survival of the communal ideal, are drawn away from their home
villages, often compelled to move elsewhere for educational and economic opportunities,
but just as often lured by an outside world teeming with activity and temptation.
Moreover, modem transportation systems—including the automobile, which Barber
considers the instrument of liberal individualism—have uprooted people from more
traditional communities, allowing them to travel greater distances for work and
recreation. And multinational corporations have moved into these communities,
providing jobs for those people who can no longer subsist on those sheep-herding or
60
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fish,„g practices tha, might have strengthened communa, bonds bu, certatn.y frustrated
economic progress “ Neo-Luddtte attempts to preserve or recapture the pastoral punty
of these traditional communities have failed time and again, says Barber, because i, is
impossible to "impede the inroads of cosmopolitanism; any more than silence can impede
no,se; or placidity, ambition Barber suggests that the many trappings ofmodem
life such as economic efficiency, intractable consumerism, centralized administration,
professional expertise, mass mobilization, and immediate access to informal,on-are
incompatible with the kind of rustic simplicity democratic life seems to demand. And
though he has maintained a spirited optimism throughout his career, an undercurrent of
despair and hopelessness runs beneath the surface, only to emerge in those few moments
of what may be theoretical candor.
But Barber does not simply wax nostalgic for a bygone era of democratic
authenticity as Wolin seems to do. He refuses to relinquish his democratic hopes, and
he has hitched his wagon to strong democracy, which he believes is the “alternative mode
of political life” that can reconcile modernity with communal liberty. At first, this may
not seem feasible largely because of problems of scale. After all, millions of people
cannot fit into an assembly hall and discuss an issue that affects us all, like the national
defense budget. Modernity has deracinated people from their small, tight-knit
communities and thrown them willy-nilly into a global world, horrifically vast and
alienating, yet inconceivably interconnected. Citizens in a small participatory democracy
62
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can ge, ,o know each other and develop a strong tnu.ua, understanding, bu, the modern
world does no, afford such opportumties. Suspieton of the unknown Other is the nonn.
and unseen suffenng (or jus, grumbling) half-a-world away, or even in a nearby town,
hardly elicits sympathy. Bu, in a world where many of our aettons have significant
implications for those very people from whom we are afienated, Barber believes we must
recapture in some way what traditional communities once had-but, of course, on a
larger scale. We may no. be able to meet face-to-face with people in our community as
we once did, but sophisticated communications technology could approximate this
experience. If we allow ourselves to dream big, communications technology has the
potential to turn this enormous planet riddled with war and mutual distrust into a global
village. While the dream of a global village may seem far-fetched at this point,
technology could at the very least connect people to their fellow countrymen and their
government, promoting an ongoing dialogue on issues of national importance, and
empowering people throughout the country to gain crucial political knowledge and to
work collectively to address these issues.
Barber understands, however, that there is nothing inevitable or teleological about
the democratic use of communications technology. He sharply criticizes those
democratic futurists who believe technology will one day lead us to a glorious promised
land ot widespread political participation. Technology can be as democratic or fascistic
as those who harness its power. Nobody would claim that the radio was a democratizing
force in Nazi Germany, where mass media was under the control of a repressive state. In
the summer of 1994, the genocidal regime in Rwanda seized control of the radio stations,
wherefrom it waged a deadly campaign of misinformation and propaganda, inciting
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Hutus to slay their Tutsi neighbors with the maehetes they had been given a few months
earlier. Says Barber: ''Ends condition means, and technology is just a fancy word for
means. The new telecommunications are less likely to alter and improve than to reflect
and augment our current socioeconomic institutions and political attitudes.”64 While
technology does not serve genoeidal ends in this country, it hardly serves the public
interest either. Not surprisingly, in our liberal democracy, technology has been used
primarily for commercial purposes—to serve private interests and to further the ends of
capitalism. This does not have to be the case, of course. “It remains true that technology
can assist political change and may sometimes even point in new political directions... but
unless there is a political will directed at greater participation, the potential remains only
that: a potential.”65 Technology could be used for democratic purposes if we had the
“political will,” but why do we lack this will?
Certainly, liberal attitudes have become deeply entrenched in our society, and so
long as they prevail, technology will continue to be the servant of private interests. But
Barber also sees a problem with technology itself and devotes considerable space to
discussing its “vulnerability to undemocratic forces”66 This is especially troubling
because Barber has often argued that technology represents the only solution to
democracy s woes in the modem world. If technology proves susceptible to
undemocratic forces, there would seem to be very little hope for strong democracy.
Nevertheless, Barber cannot ignore the warning signs. Large corporations have seized
64 A Passion for Democracy
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control of our communications and tnedta technology to ins,,11 and reinforce the values of
passive individualism and consumerism-,o undermine our democratic will. Evoking an
Orwellian nightmare, Barber argues that, a, its worst, technology in the postmodern
world has become an agent ot soft totalitarianism, a means by which “subtle tyrants
possess their subjects' hearts and minds through the control of education, information,
and communication and, thereby, tun, subjects into allies in the enterprise of servitude.”67
While technology need not inevitably corrupt democracy,” its "potential for benign
enslavement cannot be ignored.”68
Like many cntics on the left, Barber believes the problem begins with the
deregulation of the media and communications in the United States which has led to the
concentration of ownership. Deregulation advocates often claim it has loosened
government control over the media and given consumers more choice and access to a
wider range of information. But Barber argues that the proliferation of television
channels has merely created the illusion of greater choice, for only a handful of media
conglomerates owns them all. These companies, which “exercise an effective
monopoly,” produce a narrower range of programming than ever before and, as a result,
provide fewer sources of alternative news or entertainment. The hundreds of channels to
which we have access merely give us more ot the same, perpetuating an overwhelming
cultural homogeneity that is inimical to democracy. Because it “thrives on dissent.
Ibid., 252.
Ibid., 254.
Ibid., 253.
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deviance, political heterogeneity, and individuality,”™ democracy requires a true
divers,,y of medta outlets and tnfonua.ton sources. Bu, even the internet, a purportedly
democratic technology that gives every browser immediate access to literally billions of
web sites, has become increasingly dominated by large media corporations whtch limit
the real choice of content. It is only a matter of time, according to Barber, before big
corporations close this vast and open frontier. 71
While corporate control of media technology has imposed a rigid uniformity of
media content, it has also had an atomistic effect on society, promoting reclusion and a
withdrawal into private life. That corporate-controlled technology shapes us to be the
same but also divides us may sound contradictory, but it is not. Under the sway of this
market-driven technology, we all come to believe in, and readily conform to, capitalist
ideals which encourage people to spurn community and pursue their private interests with
vigor. In short, we conform to the ethos of solipsism when democracy demands the
opposite that each of us choose to work toward common ends and become citizens.
Technological advances like television and the internet, both hailed as purveyors of
democracy, do little to connect us a larger community and instead keep us at home more
than ever. In fact, they do more to support our consumerist habits, telling us what to buy
and providing us the convenient means to do so, than to teach us the values of citizenship.
Without our necessarily realizing it, these technologies turn us into passive recipients and
adherents of capitalist dogma.
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But many Jurists assert that because it is both interactive and melusive, the
internet in part.cular provides opportunities for democratic action and common, ty-
building. Barber is not so sanguine.
How can there be “common ground” when ground itself vanishes andwomen and men inhabit abstractions? There may be some new form ofcommunity developing among the myriad solitaries perched in front of
eir screens and connected only by their fingertips to the new webdefined by the internet. But the politics of that “community” has yet to beinvented, and it is hardly likely automatically to be democratic, certainly
not as a result of market imperatives. It has yet to be shown that
anonymous screen-to-screen interaction can do for us what face-to-face
interaction has done. 72
In Barber s view, technologies like the internet that give us access to information and
connect us electronically to other people have not proven to be adequate substitutes for
tace-to-face interaction. No matter how much internet enthusiasts “prattle on about
community, it is highly unlikely that “an anonymous exchange with strangers whose
identity is a matter of invention and artifice [can] replicate the kind of conversations that
occur spontaneously among fellow PTA members about a school board election.”73
Indeed, Barber’s exploration of the internet has revealed very few traces of community or
democratic activity. If anything, the internet has afforded users new ways to exclude
others and cultivate their prejudices. 74
Finally, Barber maintains that the technological focus on expediting tasks with
speed and efficiency does not agree with the deliberate pace and tedium of democracy.
We live in an impatient world, where people expect instant gratification and demand
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entertainment and stimulation every second of the day. Indeed, we bore quite easily. Bu,
strong democracy demands that we slow down and revel in the “cumbersome” and
“certifiably unentertaming” process of deliberation. Says Barber:
The problem goes deep—to the very core of what democracy means
and
dCPendS °n dellberatl0n
> Prudence, slow-footed interactioni time-consuming (thus “inefficient”) forms of multi-lateral
conversation and social interaction that by postmodern standards may
an7airv
r
Tr
e
K
t
,
lme'COnSUmm8
’
demandin& sometimes interminable,lways certifiably unentertainmg. Computer terminals, on the other
and, make process terminable, for electronic and digital technology’s
imperative is speed. Computers are fast as light, literally. Democracy is
s ow as prudent judgment, which is very slow indeed, demanding silences
as well as communicative exchange and requiring upon occasion that days
or months pass by before further thought or action can be demanded. 75
We live in a technology-laden culture that prizes decisive action, getting things done
quickly and without hesitation. The logic of computers is binary, making a choice
“between on and off, A and B
,
yes and no” and then moving to the next decision without
ever looking back. But politics eschews simple dichotomies and requires “complex and
nuanced” reasoning from its participants. 76 It obliges them to entertain the possibility
that both A and B are correct or that neither is correct, to challenge the very premise of
the question, to feel “perpetual regret” about decisions of the past, and to engage those
past decisions in an endless dialectic of revision.
Technology is often hailed as a great convenience, allowing us to complete life’s
tasks in a short amount of time and thus giving us many hours for leisure. Barber also
hopes that one day we will reach a point where technology affords us with plenty of time
° Ibid., 259.
76
Ibid.
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to engage in politics," but he understands that technology, gu.ded and controlled by
capitalist forces, has eondit.oned us to make speed an unperative in our lives. Changing
our expectations of what one can reasonably accomplish in a day, technology has made
us busier and more frantic than ever. Unfortunately, this frenehc pace is anathema to
democracy. Our technologteal “tools are in a certain sense out of synch with democracy,
out of control, says Barber, and it becomes increasingly clear why Thoreau “worried
about how easily we can become the tools of our tools”78 We may want to use
technology for democratic purposes, but this proves impossible if technology has taken
hold of us. For example, he warns his readers that cyber-democracy, which lets citizens
vote for or against policy proposals with a simple click of a computer mouse, is
susceptible to majority tyranny. In allowing people to make decisions instantaneously,
without taking the time to deliberate with their fellow citizens or to consider carefully all
the relevant positions and facts, this unmediated form of participatory democracy “would
do more to undermine democracy than to reinforce it.”79
The vulnerabilities ot technology to undemocratic forces speaks to the larger issue
of democracy’s fragility. “About the future role of democracy in society we cannot be
certain, says Barber. Because it is a fragile form of social organization, its prospects
are clouded. Despite its uncertain future, Barber maintains his faith in democracy. But
he also continues to fear that these hopes will be dashed for good if technology fails us
now: “This may be our last opportunity to turn the technology of the new age into a
77
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servant of an old political ,dea: democracy. Democracy has a difficult time surviving
under the best of c,reams,ances” (my emphasis).» Although Barber is always qu.ck to
remind the reader that the poht.cal consequences of technology are not preordained
any way, that technology can be either the savior or deaih-knell of democracy, he seems
to suggest here that our window of opportunity will not remain open forever. Once
market forces co-opt our technolog,es for their own purposes and then those technologies
plant their stamp of corruption upon us, all is lost.
Before technology conditions us to use technology from the confines of our
homes solely for the purposes of solipsistic activity, we must summon the political will to
develop state-of-the-art technologies that can really enhance civic communication, that
can draw people out of their homes and into neighborhood assembly halls wherein they
can engage in senous political deliberation with not only others in their local community
but with participants in other assemblies across the country—or the world—via a vast
and sophisticated telecommunications network. In recent years, Barber has rested his
democratic hopes on civil society and not on the state alone, lest the state eclipse
opportunities for democratic participation. But it is quite obvious that strong democracy,
depending on these technological enhancements, will require massive state support. A
largely unorganized civil society could never get such a complex and large-scale
operation off the ground; only the state could muster the requisite resources for this kind
of radical change. Barber must be aware of this necessity, but he never concedes this
point. After all, the likelihood that the national government would invest in such a costly
program which would take power away from political elites and currently enjoys little
80
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popular support anyway-is quite slim. And, even if this were to happen, a state-run
participatory democracy may become hopelessly bureaucrat,c and fad to replicate the
condmons of community experienced in anden, Athens or Raetia. Meanwhile, time is
nmmng out. It may no, be so long before we become the “tools of our tools,” a sentiment
that evokes a dystopian future often deptcted in science-fiction fdms.
IV.
Barber may not exhibit the melancholy and defeatism of Wolin, but his
democratic theory does betray what I would call a thin optimism. He goes to great
lengths to criticize liberal democracy for being too thin, but his faith that people will
summon the will to engage in politics is a bit thin as well. Participatory democratic
theories, as I have argued, rest on three tenets. Imagine a three-legged stool, each leg
representing a tenet, and you will see that Barbers strong democracy has two sturdy legs,
its robust democratic epistemology and psychology. But its third leg, his democratic
theology, is in danger of coming loose. Wolin's radical democracy is missing a third leg
and, as a result, immediately collapses on itself. In the end. Barber’s strong democracy
may do the same. I characterized Wolin’s theory as “melancholic democracy,” a sad
remembrance of what democracy once was and will never be again, except for brief
moments. I would suggest that Barber's theory strikes the tone of a “quixotic
democracy, a stubborn faith in what he acknowledges, in his more intellectually honest
moments, is a remote possibility at best.
To shed some light on Barber's political theory, it may be useful to revisit briefly
the baseball metaphor explored in the previous chapter. We can liken strong democracy
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to an organized baseball league that remains inclusive and amateur. Anyone can
parttcipate in the league, either as a player or in another capaeity, and these participants
decide collectively on the rules of the game. Voluntary umpires will preside over games
to ensure fair play. While participants certainly enjoy the sheer thrill of the game, their
objecttves extend far beyond the destre for an authentic experience. They believe the
game will have realizable community benefits—such as health and fitness or good
sportsmanship-for which they always strive. With this in mind, panic,pants do all they
can to make sure the league is not a short-lived enterprise. They want it to endure and
take root in the community-or, rather, they want the game itself to nurture the
community that is planted in its soil. They will build fields, order uniforms, make
schedules, and organize practices. Though structured, the game will not abide
exclusionary practices or hierarchies of any sort, for the ultimate goal is not to field the
best players and win games but to partake in the game and its communal benefits. More
talented players will not feel impeded because they will find a useful role in teaching the
fundamentals and raising the overall quality of the game.
On a final note, I would suggest that the image evoked here is—in some ways—
far less convincing than the sandlot. Many of us have experienced something that
approximates sandlot baseball, a brief moment in one's life when the stars seemed to
align in such a way that everything was perfect, with players coming together
spontaneously to play the game they love in the way the see fit. But the baseball league
analogous to strong democracy resembles nothing this author has ever seen. Participants
expend time and energy building an organized league that will last for future generations
to enjoy, that will become a vital part of community life, yet somehow over the long term
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they will manage ,o suppress Iheir competitive impulses and preserve both mclusion and
equahty in the league. This seems unlikely. 1 already described in the prev.ous chapter
the competitive nature of even Little League baseball and the resulting hierarch.es and
exclusionary practices. While this is no, to say that strong democracy is unfeasible,
should give us pause.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION
Once situated within the pragmatist tradition, participatory democracy reveals
itself to be impracticable, merely a theoretical concept with no hope for real-world
application. The impracticability of participatory democracy first becomes evident when
its contemporary enthusiasts, such as Wolin and Barber, raise considerable doubts about
man's free will in the modem world. Holding a more pessimistic view of power in the
modem world, participatory democrats do not share with classical pragmatists an
optimism about man’s freedom to make choices. In their understanding, we are all
constrained by social and political forces that are always remote and often unseen and
sinister. Both Wolin and Barber suggest that modem systems of organization and control
have made it increasingly difficult for citizens to exercise free will and become truly
engaged in civic affairs. In other words, participatory democracy proves far too
demanding for the average person, whose free will (and hence political will) has become
systematically enervated by the forces of modernity. In my view, this suggests that the
first two tenets—the democratic epistemology and psychology—require democratic
conditions that are unattainable in modernity. After all, democracy can only improve our
political knowledge and educate us to be upright citizens if we have opportunities for
authentic and widespread civic engagement and live in an environment conducive to the
kind of sustained and deliberative democratic activity championed by Dewey. Ifwe no
longer have the will to attend all those meetings and devote a significant portion of our
time to civic life, we will never enjoy the reputed epistemological and psychological
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benefits of partlcipa„on. Participatory democrats know this intuitively, which is why to
varying degrees they assume a measure of pessimism in their work and rarely venture
outside the realm of theory-and seem foolish or awkward when they do,
Panicipationists like Wolin and Barber may concede that modernity constrains
man's free will and makes their theory impracticable, but they both suggest that the first
two tenets the democratic epistemology and psychology-are alive and well. This
means that participatory democracy may remain useful as a coherent political theory, an
ideal for which humanity should still strive in hopes of somehow approximating it in
practice, even if only in brief moments. This seems clearly to be Wolin’s view. But
viewing participatory democracy through the lens of pragmatism also enables the critic to
evaluate the merits of the first two tenets and subject them to careful scrutiny. Quite
conceivably, human beings may not attain truth in the inductive and deliberative manner
pragmatists claim, and they may not enjoy malleable natures which only await a proper
education to improve. If either of these tenets fails to withstand such scrutiny and proves
untenable, participatory democracy fails to stand up even as a theory—and, of course,
proves even more impracticable than initially suggested.
Recent developments in the philosophy of science present serious challenges to
the epistemological assumptions underlying participatory democracy. In his ground-
breaking work, The Structure ofScientific Revolutions { 1962), Thomas S. Kuhn changed
forever our understanding ot scientific inquiry. He showed that, far from being open and
deliberative, the pursuit ot scientific knowledge is just as bound to its historical context
as other institutions and thus not necessarily an agent of progress. The belief that science
marches us steadily toward the ultimate truth is naive, based on an idealistic view of how
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scientists operate. Drawing on historical examples, Kuhn debunked the notion that
scenttsts belong to an open community of competent inquirers who use their expert.se to
mvent creative ways of enhancing our knowledge and discovering truths. In reality, he
satd, most sc,enlists are nothing more than highly educated technicians working within
the narrow confines of a dominant paradigm winch begins with a canonical piece of
research that lays down a se, of plans and procedures for fitture research. Not taught to
be intellectually flexible and innovative, scientists work solely within their paradigm,
which provides them the tools and methods for solving puzzles in their narrow field. But
when an existing paradigm fails to solve a number of puzzles, it faces a crisis which
compels scientists to think more broadly about their discipline and to entertam alternative
approaches. A revolution occurs when scientists shift their allegiance to a new paradigm
that can resolve this crisis, whereupon they lock themselves into a new set of plans and
procedures. The history of science, then, can be characterized as long stretches of tedium
and conformity, punctuated by brief revolutionary moments.
Kuhn's work dropped a bomb on the world of science and philosophy, for he
showed that science was not immune to ossification and corruption. Like any other
institution, science could become trapped in its own web of practices and specious
assumptions, and only a crisis could bring about significant change. Kuhn argued that the
scientific community was not an open society wherein members freely exchange
information and ideas and make piecemeal reforms to standard practices as needed. On
the contrary, his study of the history of science revealed its authoritarian tendencies.
Scientists deter to those tew intellectual authorities whose exemplary research has
become regarded as canonical and unassailable. The most devout followers of this canon
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enforce obedience to (he new paradigm and quickly ostracize heretics. Kuhn even went
so far as to suggest that ‘'the member of a mature scientific community is, like the typicai
character of Orwell’s 1984, the victim of a lustory rewnt.en by the powers tha, be.”'
Hyperbolic compansons to an Orwellian un,verse notwithstanding, Kuhn withheld any
judgment of scientific practices and, in fact, considered their authoritarian tendenc.es a
usefol source of stability. But many critics of science used Kuhn for their own purposes.
Postmodernists were especially eager to invoke Kuhn’s work which, in their view,
corroborated their claim that discourse can never escape relationships of power. Cntics
of America’s Cold War policy believed that Kuhn offered a plausible explanation for
why the scientific community had proved so vulnerable to co-optation by an ominous
military-industrial complex. Although Kuhn did not endorse such critical applications of
his work, he did believe that power arrangements affected how scientists seek knowledge
and severely limited their range of activity. As a result, Kuhn also called into question
the notion of scientific progress. The many historical examples he cited in his landmark
work indicate that scientific progress is not quite what we had taken it to be. ..We may,
to be more precise, have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of
paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth.”2
A new paradigm may resolve the last crisis, but there is no guarantee that overall it
represents a step forward epistemologically. It may be just another framework in which
scientists are forced to operate.
1
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If we take Kuhn seriously, we have to reconsider whether participatory
democracy understood, in Deweyan terms, as the sctentifie method writ large-is
always the best way to attain political knowledge. Even under the most .deal eondttions,
when participating citizens successfully employ the methods of sctence, democratic
communities may not always produce the best policies, for they too will work within a
closed system, a particular paradigm that limits their thinking and modes of operation. In
a worst case scenano, they may yield to an Orwellian authority whose demagoguery and
'doublespeak" may prove irresistible. At best, they will operate within the narrow
parameters of a dominant political ethos and become susceptible to what social scientists
call groupthink .”3 In their attempt to acquire knowledge and devise policies that solve
social problems, democratic communities may not draw openly on all relevant
experiences. Instead, they may gather information too selectively and thus fail to
entertain alternative ideas—ideas that might have proven extremely beneficial to the
community.
Kuhn's notion of paradigm shifts may give credence to Wolin’s concept of
fugitive democracy. Kuhn suggested that the ideal notion of science—described by the
pragmatists as a model open society in which every scientist tested and verified truth
claims—occurs during those occasional revolutionary moments in history. Similarly,
Wolin indicates that true and authentic democracy will erupt for brief moments and
perhaps emit forceful shocks to the political system until the state tames and co-opts. The
state may make some accommodations to the demands of the short-lived demos, thereby
For more on this concept, see Irving, Victims of Groupthink', Irving, Groupthink:
Psychological Studies ofPolicy Decisions and Fiascos', and Allison, The Essence of
Decision.
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altering its paradigm, bu, the democrat,c moment wtll quickly vanish, ossified into a se,
of bureaucratic procedures and protocols. In both the worlds of science and democracy,
groupthink and bureaucratic regimen represent the normal state of affairs. Deliberation
among participants in a free and open forum will only emerge in times of crisis, when the
need for alterative points of view becomes that much more pressing.
Recent research has also posed serious challenges to the democratic psychology.
In his recent book. The Blank Slate: The Modem Denial ofHuman Nature, Harvard
psychologist Steven Pinker draws on recent research to show that nature places limits on
what human beings can reasonably accomplish, and he maintains that denying this fact
can lead to disastrous consequences politically. To assume that man is a soft piece of
clay that can be molded into any conceivable shape or form, a blank slate on which any
teaching can be written, invites the kind of political hubris or over-reaching of which we
should remain forever wary, especially in the wake of twentieth century totalitarianism.
Prudent politics requires a sober acceptance of our psychological limits, recognizing that
not even the best education will turn men into angels. To some degree, we will always
harbor a lust for power and material gain, and in our darker moments we will demonstrate
our capacity for unspeakable evil and an uncanny ability to witness the misery of our
fellow men with little or no sympathy. If we accept that human nature has limits, we
must re-evaluate the democratic psychology which presupposes the infinite malleability
(the near perfectibility) ot humankind. And we must not dismiss so casually as elitist
those political institutions that are mindful ot human frailties and designed to fragment
power and channel human energies toward moderation.
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Pmker contends that a number of recent discoveries “make it unlikely” that
“human nature might radtcally change in some tmagined society of the remote future.”*
Synthesizing a large body of research, he finds plenty of evtdence to support his claim
.ha, human nature has limits. He points to studies showing that the practices of nepofism
and inheritance stem from the pnme status of famtly ties in all human societies; that,
generally, human beings have shown an innate preference for reciprocatmg favors and
exchanging goods to sharing with others in them community; that there are genetic and
neurolog,cal explanattons for the preponderance of vtolence in all human societies; that
human beings from all societies exhibit ethnocentrism and other forms of group-against-
group hostility; that intelligence, assiduity, and sociability are, to some degree, genetic
characteristics, which suggests that social inequality will emerge in even the most fair
economic systems; that people are prone to deceive themselves about their own
independence, wisdom, and integrity as a way of coping with life; and that the moral
sensibilities ot human beings reveal innate biases, such as associating “the good” with
our family and friends, and with conformity, social stature, cleanliness, and beauty. 5
According to Pinker, this research implies that the intellectual and moral capacities of
human beings are not boundless, and some people operate within narrower bounds than
others. Though this is not the proper forum in which to assess the validity of these
studies, the suifeit ot evidence in support of Pinker' s thesis should at the very least make
us think twice before we endorse a political system that relies so heavily on the education
ot its citizens. John Dewey complained to Sidney Hook that critics of democracy
4
Pinker, The Blank Slate, 294.
5
See Pinker, 44-58, 241-82, 294, 306-36, 372-99.
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assumed every man was a “sonofabi.ch We might acknowledge, too, tha, most people
do not have it in them to engage in tireless activism on behalf of the common good. I,
may be unfair to characterize every man as a would-be Kenneth Lay, the former CEO of
Enron, but it is equally unfair to expect every man to exhibit the lifelong public
commitments of a Tom Hayden.
Hayden and his fellow members of SDS displayed a profound democratic faith in
June of 1 962. Though most of the participants at Port Huron did not subscribe to any
orthodox religious teachings, many of them felt as if their experience there portended a
wondrous future for humanity. It was hard for participants not to feel this sense of
destiny when, after many hours of discussion in plenary assemblies and hammering out
the finer points of their manifesto, they walked into the evening and beheld the aurora
borealis. The almost mystical atmosphere described by some Port Huron participants
reflected their near-religious zeal, an undying faith in humankind, in what it could
achieve collectively and democratically. Without a shadow of doubt, they believed that
man could arrive at provisional truths in a deliberative fashion, that men were educable
and not chained to an immutable nature, and that men were free from any obstacles to
civic engagement. We can find the origins of this faith in pragmatism.
As suggested in chapter four, an interesting irony is apparent here: the early
pragmatists prided themselves on their anti-foundationalism, insisting that human beings
can only promote tolerance and social justice if they reject first principles and fixed truths
and focus their attention on the means to achieving a better life, but the democratic faith
of John Dewey, and then the New Left, actually rested on three first principles—what I
have called the democratic tenets. The problem is that all three tenets are untenable,
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Which leaves us wondenng to what extent we should take panic,patory democracy
seriously. The Students for a Democratic Society voiced legitimate complaints in the
early 1960s-rac,al segregatton in the south, the growth of social and ceonomtc
inequality in America, the alarmmg policy of nuclear bnnkmanship in our relattons with
the Soviet Union, and the government's apparent disregard for the demands and needs of
the American people. Undoubtedly, SDS saw the last problem as the root cause of all the
others. But why did they become fixated on part.cipatory democracy as the solution to
what really was a problem of representation? They first turned to participatory
democracy because they believed it was the only legitimate means by which citizens
could be given a fair hearing and a voice in directing government policy. In an
epistemological sense, representation could not substitute for self-detennination.
But throughout the 1960s, student radicals became enamored with the idea that
democracy was a transformative experience for the participant. Arnold Kaufman, who
coined the phrase “participatory democracy" and stressed its transfonnative benefits in
his earlier writings, grew to regret that this idea would give rise to the cult of authenticity.
In his only book, The Radical Liberal
,
which was first released in 1968, Kaufman
complained that the issues at hand—racial segregation, poverty, the cold war, Vietnam
began to play second fiddle to the self-realization of the participant.
[M]any members of the “the Movement" have grown impatient with the
calculations and compromises that effective participation in that process
imposes. They are, as I have said, too often concerned with the state of
their souls than with the preferences and welfare of those they aim to help.
They are too often unwilling to act in ways they regard as inauthentic for
the sake of a greater prospect of definite results. 6
6
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Kaufman found this fixat.on with authentic,ty especially “self-indulgent” because the
"children of middle-class parents have somewhere else to go if they fail - often “beating
then perilous way back to lucrative professional careers,” while the people for whom
they ostensibly work so hard do no. enjoy such a luxury. True radicals, satd Kaufman,
had to consider the “welfare of those they aim to help,” not their own punty. As a result,
defining authenticity as a principled refusal to engage in political calculation and
compromise was “perverse,”
“insincere,” and “ineffectual.”7 At best, we can see this as
the youthful cry for authentic experience in a world laden with superficialities and
phomness; at worst, the petulant demand for an indefinite extension of adolescence.
Neither provided adequate justification for participatory democracy.
In the wake of the student radicalism of the 1960s and early 1970s, participatory
democracy made a swift retreat behind the ivory-covered walls of academia. Many of its
adherents could not relinquish the uncompromising view of democracy to which they
clung since their first protest or teach-in forty years ago. Wolin represents this radical
camp. Others seemed to follow Kaufman’s lead in suggesting that our political system
must create opportunities for civic participation while it also continues to function as a
liberal state that secures rights, both negative and positive, for its citizens. These are
participatory democrats of the deliberative camp to which Barber belongs. The former
group remains petulant and cranky; the latter seems to have grown up. But not so fast. In
the end, both Wolin and Barber concede that a sustainable form of participatory
democracy, which demands a surplus of political will, is not an achievable goal—at least
not in this world. While Wolin is well aware of this sad reality. Barber can only admit as
Ibid., 51-52.
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much in moments of intellectual honesty, for he is not quite ready to relinquish his hope
of institutionalizing participatory democracy. Wolin’s theory, though bom out of ill-
tempered adolescence, assumes the tenor of a
-melancholic democrac/’-a mournful and
thoughtful remembrance of what has been lost and can only be recaptured in brief
moments, if at all. Barber's ostensibly more mature theory takes on the tone of a
‘quixotic democracy”—an upbeat message about what could be, even though it remains
at best a remote possibility. The participatory democrat, then, must be either sullen or
foolish, a Hamlet or a Quixote. Neither choice is terribly appealing in a world that
demands real political solutions. It is ironic that pragmatism, a philosophy stressing the
practical and prosaic, should lay the foundation for such a romantic and poetic political
theory.
341
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adams Henry. Democracy. Esther. Mont Saint Michel and Chartres, and TheEducation ofHenry Adams. New York: Library of America, 1983.
Adams, Larry L. Walter Lippmann. Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1977.
Allen, Gay Wilson. William James: A Biography. New York: Viking Press, 1967
Allison Graham T The Essence ofDecision: Explaining the Cuban Missile CrisisBoston: Little, Brown, 1971.
Anderson Charles W. Pragmatic Liberalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
—
. A Deeper Freedom: Liberal Democracy as An Everyday Morality. Madison WL
University of Wisconsin Press, 2002.
Arendt, Hannah. The Origins oj Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1951.
Amowitz, Stanley. “A Mills Revival?” Logos. 2.3 (Summer 2003). Online.
Balfour, Arthur James. The Foundations ofBelief. New York: Longmans, Green, 1 895.
Barber, Benjamin. Superman and Common Men: Freedom, Anarchy, and the Revolution
New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971.
—
. The Death ofCommunal Liberty: A History ofFreedom in a Swiss Mountain Canton.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
—
. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politicsfor a New Age. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1984.
• The Conquest of Politics: Liberal Philosophy in Democratic Times. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1988.
. An Aristocracy ofEveryone: The Politics ofEducation and the Future ofAmerica.
New York: Ballantine Books, 1992.
—
. Jihad vs. McWorld. New York: Times Books, 1995.
A Placefor Us: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong. New York: Hill
and Wang, 1998.
—
• A Passionfor Democracy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
342
Barzun, Jacques. A Stroll with William James. New York: Harper and Row. 1 983
.
Berlin, Isaiah. Four Essays on Liberty. London: Oxford University Press, 1 969.
Bems, Walter. In Defense ofLiberal Democracy. Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1984.
Bernstein, Richard J. John Dewey. New York: Washington Square Press, 1966.
“0
Soor^/vWO/T Ba,Cs Ward: R 'Chard R° rty °n Uberal D~‘V1 nil sophy. Political Theory 15, no. 4 (1987): 538-563.
Bird, Alexander. Thomas Kuhn. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Bloom, Alan. The Closing ofthe American Mind. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987.
Boiler, Jr Paul F. American Thought in Transition: The Impact ofEvolutionary
Naturalism
,
1865-1900. Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969.
Botwinick, Aryeh and William E. Connolly, eds. Democracy and Vision • Sheldon
Wo lin and the vicissitudes ofthe political. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2001. 3
Bourne, Randolph Silliman. The Radical Will: Selected Writings, 1911-1918. New
York: Urizen Books, 1977.
Brent, Joseph. Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University
Press, 1998.
Caspary, William R. Dewey on Democracy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000.
Ceasar, James. Liberal Democracy and Political Science. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1990.
Cohen, Mitchell and Dennis Hale, eds. The New Student Left: An Anthology. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1966.
Colacurcio, Michael. “The Dynamo and the Angelic Doctor: The Bias of Henry Adams’
Medievalism.” American Quarterly 17, no. 4 (1965): 696-712.
—
. Democracy and ‘Esther : Henry Adams' Flirtation with Pragmatism.” American
Quarterly 19, No. 1 (1967): 53-70.
Cominager, Henry Steele. The American Mind: An Interpretation ofAmerican Thought
and Character Since the 1880s. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1950.
Connolly, William. The Bias ofPluralism. New York: Atherton, 1969.
343
tTo:
PMiC Phil0S°Pher Bal,im°re
’
MD: Hopkins
De Tocqueville, Alexis. Democracy in America. New York: HarperPerennial, 1988.
Dewey John. The Early Works. 1882-1898. Vol. 1-5. Carbondale, IL: Southern IllinoisUniversity Press, 1967-1972. mmois
“st.h!™ nr '899\\924- ^o'5 Ed “ed by J° An" B°ydsto '’- Carbondale.il. Sout ern Illinois University Press, 1976-1983.
^Soll
0
^
,92
u‘
953 N 17 Ed 'ted by J° An" Carbondale, IL:s uthern Illinois University Press, 1981-1991.
Dickstein, Morris, ed. The Revival ofPragmatism: New Essays on Social
and Culture. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998.
Thought, Law,
Diggins John Patrick. The Promise ofPragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of
Knowledge and Authority. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Dostoevsky, Fyodor. The Brothers Karamzov. Translated by Richard Pevear and Larissa
Volokhonsky. San Francisco: North Point Press, 1990.
Eastman, Max. Great Companions: Critical Memoirs ofSome Famous Friends. New
York. 1959. Quoted in Diggins, John Patrick. The Promise ofPragmatism.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. “Farewell Address to the Nation.” (1961) Available online:
http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/ike.htm. Retrieved September 2005.
Elliott, W. Y. P. The Pragmatic Revolt in Politics. New York: Macmillan, 1928.
Festenstein, Matthew. Pragmatism and Political Theory: From Dewey to Rorty. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1997.
Fish, Stanley. The Trouble With Principle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999.
—
. “Postmodern Warfare: The Ignorance of Our Warrior Intellectuals.” Harper’s July
2002. (Fix)
Fuller, Steve. Kuhn vs. Popper. Cambridge: Icon Books Ltd., 2003.
Gale, Richard M. The Plulosophy of William James: An Introduction. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005.
344
Goudge, Thomas A. The Thought ofC
1950.
S. Peirce. Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
Gutting
.Gary. Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique ofModernity
Cambridge University Press, 1999.
Cambridge:
Hami'ton^ A^ander,^James Madis°n
,
and John Jay. The Federalist Papers. New York:
Hayden, Tom. Reunion: A Memoir. New York: Random House, 1988.
"" 3nd Dlck Flacks
‘
“The Port Huron Statement at 40.” The Nation. (August 2002).
Hayek, F. A. The Constitution ofLiberty. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960.
. The Road to Serfdom. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976.
Held, David. Models ofDemocracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987.
Hobhouse, L. T. Liberalism. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
Hofstadter, Richard. 7he Age ofReform. New York: Vintage Books, 1955.
Holmes, Stephen. “Both Sides Now.” New Republic. (March 4, 2002).
Hook, Sidney. John Dewey: An Intellectual Portrait. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
. Out of Step: An Unquiet Life in the 20th Century. New York: Harper & Row, 1987.
Hoopes, James. Community Denied: The Wrong Turn ofPragmatic Liberalism. Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Houser, Nathan and Christian Kloesel, eds. The Essential Peirce, Vol I
.
Bloomington, IN:
Indiana UP, 1992.
Hutchins, “Education for Freedom,” Christian Century (November 15, 1944). Quoted in
Ryan, John Dewey and the High Tide ofLiberalism.
Irving, Janis. Groupthink: Psychological Studies ofPolicy Decisions and Fiascos. 2 nd ed.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982.
—
. Victims ofGroupthink. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1972.
345
•htm. Retrieved
Letters of William James. Edited by Henry James. Boston: AtlanticMonthly Press, 1920.
1C
Essays in Pragmatism. New York: Hafner Press, 1948.
Essays. New York: Library of America, 1987.
-. Writings 1878-1899: Psychology: Briefer Course, The Will to Believe, Talks to
Teachers and to Students, Essays. New York: Library of America, 1992.
Kam
’
‘
M^eminan^ir
TranS 'ated by Norman KemP Smith. London:
—
. “Human Nature and Participatory Democracy” ( 1 960). Reprinted in Connolly, ed.
The Bias ofPluralism. New York: Atherton, 1969.
—
. The Affluent Underdog." The Nation. (November 5, 1960): 349-350.
—
. “Teach-Ins: New Lorce for the Times.” In Menashe and Radosh, eds. Teach
-Ins, U.S.A.: Reports, Opinions, Documents. New York: Praeger, 1967.
—
. The Radical Liberal. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970.
Kautz, Steven. Liberalism and Community. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.
Kloppenberg, James. Uncertain i ictory: Social Democracy and Progressivism in
European and American Thought. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
—
. The Virtues ofLiberalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Knight, Jack and James Johnson. “The Political Consequences of Pragmatism.” Political
Theory 24, No. 1. (1996): 68-96.
Knight, Thomas S. Charles Peirce. New York: Washington Square Press, 1965.
Kuhn, Thomas. The Structure ofScientific Revolutions
,
2nd ed. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1970.
Kaufman Arnold S. “Two Cheers for American Education.” Socialist Commentary
( Nm/prnhor 1 Ol O "> ^(November 1959): 21-23.
346
Lasch, Christopher. The True and Only Heaven. New York: Norton. 1991.
Lasswell, Harold. Propaganda Technique in the World War. New York: P. Smith, 1938.
u“
;^,o)°5S"
Mind: w,i,iam james ” s «
—
. The Phantom Public: A Sequel to Public Opinion. New York: Macmillan, 1927.
—
. The Good Society. Boston: Little, Brown, & Co., 1937.
—
. The Public Philosophy. New York: Mentor Books, 1955.
. Public Opinion. New York: Macmillan, 1965.
Locke, John. Two Treatises ofGovernment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue. Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press,
Martin, Jay. The Education ofJohn Dewey. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002.
Mattson, Kevin. Intellectuals in Action. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 2002.
McWilliams, Wilson Carey. The Idea ofFraternity in America. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1973.
Menand, Louis, ed. Pragmatism: A Reader. New York: Vintage Books, 1997.
Menand, Louis. The Metaphysical Club: A Story ofIdeas in America. New York: Farrar,
Straus, and Giroux, 2001.
Menashe, Lewis and Ronald Radosh. Teach-Ins, U.S.A.: Reports, Opinions, Documents.
New York: Praeger, 1967.
Miller, Joshua L. Democratic Temperament: The Legacy of William James. Lawrence,
KS: University Press of Kansas, 1997.
Mills, C. Wright. The New Men of Power: America s Labor Leaders. New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1948.
—
. The Power Elite. London: Oxford University Press, 1956.
347
‘ S°Ci
-^Zt
P/Z^i9lhl Higher New York: Paine
Misak> Companion 10 Peirce New York: Cambridse
Mitchell, Joshua. The Fragility of.Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995.
Moore, Edward C American Pragmatism: Peirce. James, and Dewey. New York-Columbia University Press, 1961.
—
. Great American Thinkers Series. New York: Washington Square
Mumford, Lewis. A Golden Day: A Study in American Experience and
York: Bom and Liveright, 1926.
Culture. New
Myers, Gerald E. William James: His Life and Thought. New Haven, CT - Yale
University Press, 1986.
Niebuhr, Reinhold. Moral Man and Immoral Society. New York: C. Scribner's Sons
^he Children ofLight and the Children ofDarkness. London - Nisbet
1945.
—
. Reinhold Niebuhr on Politics: His Political Philosophy and Its Application to Our
Age as Expressed in His Writings. Edited by Harry R. Davis and Robert C. Good.
New York: Charles Scribner’s and Sons, 1960.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. The Gay Science. Translated by Walter Kaufman. New York:
Vintage, 1974.
• CJn the Genealogy ofMorals and Ecce Homo. Edited by Walter Kaufmann. New
York: Vintage Books, 1989.
—
. Twilight ofthe Idols / The Anti-Christ. Translated by R. J. Hollingdale. London:
Penguin Books, 1990.
Owen, J. Judd. Religion and the Demise ofLiberal Rationalism: The Foundational
Crisis ofthe Separation ofChurch and State. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2001.
Pateman, Carole. Participation and Democratic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1970.
348
°fUbera‘n^ ****
Pa,,ersN^^E£5%£ Pub,icw~ *-**““*
PeirCe
’ Pr“
e
i93T
derS ' Col,ected PaPers- VoL 7 « Cambridge: Harvard University
—
. Collected Papers. Vol. 1-6. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.
Perry, Ralph Barton. The Thought and Character of William James. Vol. 1 and 2
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1935.
Pinker, Steven. The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial ofHuman Nature. New York-
Viking Press, 2002.
“Port Huron Statement.” (1962) Available online:
http.//coursesa.matrix.msu.edu/~hst306/documents/huron.html.
Retrieved September 2005.
Posner, Richard A. Law, Pragmatism, and Democracy. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 2003.
Putnam, Hilary. Renewing Philosophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
—
. Words and Life. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994.
. Pragmatism: An Open Question. Cambridge: Blackwell Publishers, 1995.
Putnam, Robert. Bowling Alone. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000.
Putnam, Ruth Anna, ed. The Cambridge Companion to William James. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1 997.
Ratner, Joseph, ed. Intelligence in the Modern World: John Dewey s Philosophy. New
York: Modem Library, 1939.
Rawls, John. A Theory ofJustice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973.
—
. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
“Rebels with a Cause.” Film. Directed by Helen Garvy. Shire Films, 2000.
Riccio, Barry D. Walter Lippmann—Odyssey ofa Liberal. New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1994.
349
New
Rorty, Retard .Philosophy and,he Mirror ofNature. Princeton: Princeton University
-. Consequences ofPragmatism: Essays, 1972-1980. Minneapolis: University ofMinnesota Press, 1982
.
y
—
. Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambndge University Press, 1989.
—
. Essays on Heidegger and Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991
.
—
. Objectivism, Relativism, and Truth. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
—
. Achieving Our Country. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
—
. Philosophy and Social Hope. London: Penguin Books, 1999.
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Basic Political Writings. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,
Russell, Bertrand. Philosophical Essays. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1966.
Ryan, Alan. John Dewey: And the Hide Tide ofAmerican Liberalism. New York: W. W.
Norton & Co., 1995.
Sabine, George H. “The Pragmatic Approach to Politics.” American Political Science
Review 24, no. 4 (1930): 865-885.
—
. “The Two Democratic Traditions.” Philosophical Review 61, No. 4 (1952): 451-474.
Sandel, Michael J. Liberalism and its Critics. New York: New York University Press
1984.
. Democracy s Discontent: America in Search ofa Public Philosophy. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1996.
Schattschneider, E. E. The Semisovereign People. Hinsdale, IL: Dryden, 1975.
Scheffler, Israel. Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead, and
Dewey. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986.
Schilpp, Paul Arthur, ed. The Philosophy ofJohn Dewey. Chicago: Northwestern
University Press, 1939.
350
Schirmer, Daniel. “William James and the New
-Winter 1969): 434-445.
Age.” Science and Society 33 (Fall
Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Hatper & Row
Sharrock, Wes and Rupert Read. Kuhn: Philosoph
MA: Blackwell Publishers, 2002.
er ofScientific Revolution. Malden,
Shusterman, Richard. “Pragmatism and Liberalism Between Dewey and Rorty.” PoliticalTheory 22, no. 3 (1994): 391-413. J
Simon, Linda. Genuine Reality: A Life of William James. New York: Harcourt Brace,
Stettner, Edward A. Shaping Modem Liberalism: Herbert Croly and Progressive
Thought. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993.
Truman, David B. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951.
West, Cornell. The American Evasion ofPhilosophy: A Genealogy ofPragmatism.
Madison, Wl: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989.
Westbrook, Robert B. John Dewey and American Democracy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1991.
—
. “Pragmatism and Democracy: Reconstructing the Logic of John Dewey’s
Faith. In Morris Dickstein, ed. 1998. The Revival ofPragmatism. Durham NC‘
Duke UP, 130.
White, Morton. Social Thought in America: The Revolt Against Formalism. London:
Oxford University Press, 1976.
Wiener, Philip P. Evolution and the Founders ofDarwinism. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1949.
Wilson, Edmund. Patriotic Gore: Studies in the Literature ofthe American Civil War.
New York: Oxford University Press, 1962.
Wolin, Sheldon. ‘‘Political theory as a vocation.” American Political Science Review 63
(1969): 1062-1082.
—
. “The People’s Two Bodies.” Democracy 1 (1981): 9-24.
351
“What Revolutionary Action Means Today.” Democracy 2 (1982): 17-28.
- “°n *e^7 and Practice of Power.” In After Foucault
,
edtted by J. Arac NewBrunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1988.
-. The Presence ofthe Past: Essays on the State and the Constitution. Baltimore MD-Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.
Norm and torm: The constitutionalizing of democracy.” In Euben, et al eds
Nv““
P°!‘!‘cal ,ho"gl‘l and ,he reconstruction ofAmerican democracy. IthacaY. Cornell University Press, 1994.
"Fugitive democracy In Democracy and difference: Contesting the boundaries of
t
\99^
lltlCa1, edltCd by Seyla Benhablb
' Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
. Transgression, Equality, and Voice." In Demokratia: A Conversation on
Democracies, Ancient and Modern
,
edited by Josiah Ober and Charles Hedrick
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996.
—
. 7ocqueville Between Two Worlds. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
—
. Politics and Vision. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.
Xenos, Nicholas. “Momentary Democracy.” In Botwinick and Connolly, eds.
Democracy and Vision. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Young, James P. Henry Adams: The Historian as Political Theorist. Lawrence, KS:
University Press of Kansas, 2001.
Zuckert, Michael. The Natural Rights Republic. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1996.
352

